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Introduction 
Water is an essential, indeed crucially vital strategic natural resource for 
all economies. Every country’s drinking water supply, food production, 
energy supply, and, consequently, industrial development hinge on water 
availability. The resource is also the sine qua non for healthy human living 
conditions and sound ecosystems. Even today some countries, including 
many African countries, must be termed “water-stress economies” because 
to cover their water needs they are forced to fall back on water reserves 
generated outside their own national territory. Since developing countries 
use the lion’s share of their water resources for irrigated agriculture, with 
an increasingly important share going into power generation, and in view 
of the fact that these two sectors are essential for economic development, 
dependence on water supplies from other countries is widely seen as an 
important indicator for the crisis proneness of entire economies. 
In the past the joint use of transboundary rivers was often seen as entailing 
major security-related conflict potentials. In the late 1980s and particularly 
during the 1990s blaring headlines like “Water Wars,” “Water More Pre-
cious than Gold,” or “Water Seen as Fuel for Military Conflicts” drew the 
public’s attention to potential or existing use conflicts along transboundary 
water bodies. Rising consumption and the asymmetrical hydropolitical 
relations between countries fuelled the assumption that water shortages 
would just about inevitably lead to violent conflict. A much-cited example 
was conflict among the riparian countries along the Nile and Euphrates-
Tigris; the relations between the riparian countries of Southern Africa 
were likewise seen as a potential source of conflict. 
However, actual developments have not borne out these somber forecasts. 
Indeed, experience shows that transboundary water resources are far more 
likely to serve as the motor of transboundary cooperation than of violent 
conflict between nations. Since the end of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, it is precisely Southern Africa – a region with an exceptional num-
ber of transboundary rivers – that has a number of positive developments 
to show in this regard. But in other regions as well, Africa’s heads of state 
and government have set their sights on a cooperative management that 
has been affirmed in many declarations and bi- and multilateral agree-
ments. 
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While cooperation in transboundary river and lake basins is a necessity, it 
is not at all a matter of course. If it is not possible to satisfy the accumu-
lated demand of all riparian countries sharing a river or lake system, the 
result may be water-use conflicts of many different kinds.1 These conflicts 
are concerned quite generally with water-quantity and water-quality is-
sues. Unlike domestic conflicts over water quantity and quality, which are 
generally accessible to resolution by a higher-level state authority or by 
informal means, i.e. by the users themselves, one particular feature of 
transboundary water-use conflicts is that they can be resolved only through 
negotiations between sovereign states. However, there is some evidence 
that domestic conflicts among water users lead to violence if authorities 
are not able to balance interests and enforce the law. 
Developments in southern Africa show clearly that access to transbound-
ary water resources depends on political and economic power relations 
between the riparian countries. The unequal economic power of riparian 
countries and their unequally developed administrative capacities further-
more have an important influence on the ability of riparians to engage in 
cooperation. 
Africa is a continent exceptionally well endowed with river basins and 
large inland lakes2 that extend over the territories of several countries. 
Both crisis-prone hotspots and a good number of promising approaches to 
transboundary water management can be observed here. Today there are 
international agreements in effect for 20 of Africa's 63 river basins, and in 
16 river basins there are institutionalized forums that have the task of co-
ordinating national initiatives. 
Despite this limited number of formal coordination forums, transboundary 
water management has made considerable progress, especially in Southern 
Africa: New organizations have been founded, existing organizations have 
been restructured and leaned down, and some of such organizations have 
enlarged their fields of responsibility and redefined their functions. The 
                                                          
1  The term "conflict" refers to disputes and differences of interests between riparians that 
may occur when accumulated demand cannot be satisfied. The task of conflict 
resolution may be approach by cooperative or by confrontational means; under certain - 
restrictive - conditions, though, the riparians concerned may opt to settle a conflict over 
water use by violent means. 
2  The term "lake" is used here for all inland lakes. 
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reasons for this must be sought in the overall political constellation given 
at present, with the Republic of South Africa, the dominant regional 
power, pursuing a cooperative and pro-integration course. Furthermore, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) provides an over-
arching political framework conducive to such efforts aimed at trans-
boundary cooperation. Another important success factor must be seen in 
the incremental, pragmatic approach that has been pursued in the devel-
opment of transboundary water organizations. Two features typical of the 
approach are confidence-building measures and the procedures and forums 
governing transboundary cooperation that have now been established. 
Many promising developments may also be noted for older river-basin 
organizations like the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve  
Sénégal (OMVS), the Niger Basin Authority (NBA), and the Lake Chad 
Basin Commission (LCBC), and new initiatives for cooperation are pres-
ently being undertaken on Lake Victoria. In addition, the founding of the 
African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) has established a conti-
nent-wide cooperation context that has placed transboundary water coop-
eration on its agenda, and is receiving external support for the purpose. 
By comparison, cooperation along the region's roughly 38 transboundary 
groundwater systems is weakly developed, and examples of cooperation 
may be found only in North Africa, on the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Sys-
tem and the North West Sahara Aquifer System. Even though some African 
countries have increasingly been tapping groundwater resources for agri-
culture and to supply household needs, very few forms of institutionalized 
cooperation have been established thus far. 
The international donor community has played an important role in the 
foundation of nearly all river and lake basin organizations. It has contrib-
uted important financial and technical support for the building and devel-
opment of such organizations, in taking stock of the current situation, in 
exchanging data, in developing options for and programs of action, in 
supporting international and local NGOs and stakeholder groups, and it is 
involved in the funding of infrastructure projects. Apart from international 
donor organizations, regional actors like the SADC Water Division, the 
Water Division of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), AMCOW, and the African Union (AU), via the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) also play a role here, and they 
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themselves have been receiving financial and technical support for this 
purpose. 
Germany is engaged at several levels of transboundary water management 
in Africa: at the international level through the G8 and the European 
Union Water Initiative; at the continental level (AMCOW, NEPAD); at 
the regional level (SADC Water Unit), in river and lake basin 
organizations (ORASECOM on the Orange-Senqu, the LIMCOM on the 
Limpopo, the Nile Basin Initiative, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission) 
and, indirectly, at the bilateral level, making use of the instruments of 
financial and technical cooperation in the water sector (water supply and 
wastewater disposal, water sector reforms, harmonization of water 
policies); in the agricultural and in the energy sector. 
In order to further promote international cooperation on the African conti-
nent, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ) has funded the project Transboundary Water Resources 
Management in Africa. It asked the German Development Institute (DIE) 
to commission a number of studies (see below), the themes of which were 
defined by DIE in communication with development and water experts. 
On the basis of these studies, a results workshop was held at the DIE in 
Bonn on April 14, 2005, where participants from universities and devel-
opment organizations reached agreement on some core recommendations 
for development cooperation. The recommendations given in the studies 
and during the discussion process were condensed in a policy paper (see 
below). It provides further grounding of and some new ideas for trans-
boundary water management, a relatively new field of development coop-
eration. 
Wirkus and Boege take an in-depth look at the present state of trans-
boundary water management and the experiences made with it on selected 
African transboundary rivers and in lake regions, including the Orange-
Senqu, the Limpopo, the Zambezi, Lake Victoria, and Lake Chad. For 
each of these cases the study presents hydrological, economic, and general 
political background data and analyzes risks, conflict factors, and the po-
tential and need for development cooperation. One focus of the presenta-
tion is water-related agreements and international institutions with their 
mandates and procedural rules. Wirkus and Boege show that apart from 
promoting individual river basin organizations, one other strategy that  
has proven successful is support for continental and regional actors like 
Introduction 
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AMCOW and SADC’s water sector unit, respectively. At present trans-
boundary lake basin management is still in a rudimentary state of devel-
opment and could be expanded; a promising window of opportunity ap-
pears to be opening up for Lake Victoria. The authors also stress that more 
attention should be paid to the development potential of transboundary 
groundwater reserves as new field of activity for development cooperation 
on the African continent. 
Klaphake, in collaboration with Voils, investigates the concept of benefit-
sharing, which plays a prominent role in the international discourse on 
transboundary water cooperation. Making use of the concept could provide 
crucial impulses for water cooperation, despite divergences in interests and 
the upstream-downstream problems typically involved here. The study 
looks into 18 concrete cases, a number of them on the African continent, 
in which riparian countries have concluded agreements with a benefit-
sharing character. Most projects with benefit-sharing features are con-
cerned with dam construction designed to jointly generate and use water 
power, a development that is due in large measure to the simple and rarely 
contentious predictability of the benefits stemming from energy genera-
tion. On the other hand, there are as good as no benefit-sharing agreements 
for projects designed to improve water quality or to achieve other ecologi-
cal objectives. 
Klaphake identifies a number of factors that may have conducive or ob-
structive impacts on benefit-sharing agreements. Such agreements, with 
their reciprocal benefits, become increasingly important in situations 
marked by growing water scarcity, since this case entails rising economic 
costs for non-cooperation. There are, for instance, substantial problems 
involved in implementing win-win projects if the countries concerned 
pursue conflicting interests, uncertainties over project impacts have not 
been clarified, and administrative and economic capacities are underde-
veloped. Since benefit-sharing can best be realized in connection with 
river development and acquisition of new water resources (e.g. interbasin 
water transfer), development cooperation should work to implement stan-
dards of project monitoring and design of the kind set out in the guidelines 
of the World Commission on Dams. 
Development cooperation should also undertake efforts to render transpar-
ent the potential economic benefits of other forms of water cooperation. In 
view of the fact that successful international win-win projects hinge cru-
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cially on competent and effective project organization, funding, and con-
trol, development cooperation can provide support for national admini-
strations in the form of assistance for capacity-building. Promotion of 
regional water agreements and river basin organizations also increases the 
likelihood that benefit-sharing agreements will in fact be concluded, since 
such efforts serve to create an environment that is at the same time stable 
and conducive to confidence-building. 
In view of the fact that a substantial share of the expenditures of many 
transboundary water management projects goes into data gathering and 
processing, Grossmann starts out by discussing the general need for a 
shared database. In the author’s opinion the concern here is not simply to 
generate as many data as possible; a more promising approach would be to 
work on data which serve to illustrate the specific advantages and draw-
backs of different strategies for the parties concerned. One aspect of cen-
tral importance here is that the database find acceptance among the parties 
to negotiations; such acceptance could be supported through jointly or-
ganized river basin studies and water resource assessments. 
Grossmann investigates, in a number of African river basins, the role that 
individual river basin organizations have played in this process. The find-
ings clearly indicate that the capacities required to collect and process the 
relevant data needed to address transboundary water management issues 
hinge in particular on the spectrum of tasks assigned to a river basin or-
ganization (operational management of transboundary infrastructure sys-
tems and/or strategic water resource planning) and the way in which such 
river basin bodies are organized. Development cooperation should provide 
support for those approaches designed to strengthen information manage-
ment that are at the same time conducive to achieving the core functions of 
a given river basin organization. 
Promotion of transboundary water management organizations is regarded 
as an important priority by the Southern African Development Commu-
nity, and other regional and continental associations have also placed 
transboundary water management on their agenda. These efforts are sup-
ported by the international community, e.g. by the G8 Africa Action Plan 
and the EU Water Initiative, but also by the World Bank and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Afri-
can Development Bank (AfDB), and other influential organizations. How-
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ever, according to Mostert, the influence of donors should not be overes-
timated, although donors could play an important role in the different 
phases involved in establishing systems of transboundary water manage-
ment. With a view to these phases – e.g. initial meetings, negotiations, 
conclusion, implementation, and monitoring of agreements – the article 
discusses the instruments that are presently in use. These include the or-
ganization of opportunities to exchange information and experiences, 
capacity-building, funding of infrastructure projects, and financial support 
for national delegations and the development and design of international 
forums. 
Hardly any studies have been published that assess the issue of donor 
engagement in the development of transboundary water management and 
point to approaches that appear especially promising. This is one reason 
why the only way to identify the promising fields and instruments used by 
individual donors is to take a specific approach, i.e. one not devised 
against the background of years of experience and not geared to coming up 
with universally applicable solutions. This in turn depends, among other 
things, on regional interests and the strengths of individual donors. En-
gagement, though, need not necessarily take shape at the international 
level, since solutions to use conflicts are often best found at the national or 
local level. Donors could play a supportive role in harmonizing national 
water legislation and policies. Only a limited number of river basin or-
ganizations provide for any form of public participation, although exam-
ples can be found among North American and European organizations. 
Development of approaches for, among others, the African context might 
prove to be a promising field of activity in its own right. It would also be 
important to develop innovative approaches for a sustainable funding 
policy for river basin organizations. 
Mostert generally advocates the principle of building on existing devel-
opments and potentials and responding to concrete needs of the riparian 
countries concerned. As a final point, he emphasizes the need to evaluate 
the effectiveness and sustainability of donor engagement, in the interest of 
both the donor community and regional and national actors. 
In all African countries investigated, water resources will be further ex-
ploited by means of constructing dams and interbasin water transfer proj-
ects in order to satisfy increasing economic demand and social needs. In 
order to avoid negative impacts on riparian states and to balance benefits 
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and costs, the promotion of coordinating forums is significant. However, 
promoting their establishment and their management capacities is one 
instrument of development cooperation. Scheumann and Neubert assume 
in their recommendations that development cooperation will also continue 
to be bilateral in nature. Of all the instruments referred to here, it is the 
funding of infrastructure projects that poses a particular challenge. While 
some projects can be agreed upon directly with river or lake commissions 
(the KfW e.g. is conducting energy-sector projects together with the 
OMVS as the contract partner in charge of the projects), this is more the 
exception than the rule. As a rule credits for infrastructure investments 
(dam construction, irrigation and drainage systems, municipal water sup-
ply and wastewater disposal, etc.) are provided on a bilateral basis. Since 
some projects may tend to aggravate existing conflicts, it would be im-
portant to conduct, in advance, risk analyses concerning their inter-country 
conflict potential. These may e.g. be projects designed to expand irrigated 
agriculture in a given country or on the upper course of a river. Further-
more, this may also apply for projects that are designed to promote certain 
industries and may have impacts on downstream water quality. Our rec-
ommendation is therefore generally to review DC projects to determine 
whether there is reason to assume that they may entail transboundary im-
pacts and what types of impacts these may be. 
In providing bilateral support for water measures that are likely to have 
impacts on other riparian countries, DC should insist that the countries 
planning such measures adhere to the principle of prior notification, and it 
should become engaged only in the case that countries that may be faced 
with adverse impacts raise no objections. The principle of prior notifica-
tion and the no-objection rule should also be applied precisely for projects 
for which Germany provides Hermes credit guarantees. This recommen-
dation is more political than technical in nature. 
Finally, Scheumann and Neubert sum up the findings of the studies in a 
number of strategic recommendations covering several fields of action, 
viz.: 
(i) Improving transboundary coordination by identifying economic and 
noneconomic incentives 
(ii) Supporting the establishment of coordination and cooperation fo-
rums 
Introduction 
German Development Institute 9 
(iii) Giving due consideration to water-quality and environmental issues 
(iv) Supporting efforts to develop disaster-prevention plans 
(v) Strengthening information exchange and management 
(vi) Capacity-building for monitoring and for public participation  
(vii) Promoting the sustainable funding of river- and lake-basin organi-
zations 
(viii) Extending cooperation to cover groundwater management 
(ix) Strengthening donor coordination. 
We would like to thank the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (BMZ) for funding the project as well as for the 
confidence it has placed in the authors. We also wish to extend our cordial 
thanks to those who participated in the discussion rounds as well as to the 
experts from universities and development organizations for the valuable 
contributions they provided during work on the study was in progress. 
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Transboundary water management on Africa’s international 
rivers and lakes: current state and experiences 
Lars Wirkus / Volker Böge 
1 Introduction  
The 2003 UN World Water Development Report makes note of a wors-
ening global water crisis. This crisis, it notes, is not least a crisis of water 
governance. The political parameters, institutions, and mechanisms 
required to ensure that water resources are used sustainably are in need of 
optimization, particularly in the countries of the South. Good water 
governance, in particular along transnational lake and river basins, is a 
necessary – but not sufficient – condition for achieving the water-related 
Millennium Development Goals. 
This goes in particular for transnational lake and river basins. While they 
hold considerable potential for conflict and escalation, they also offer a 
variety of different possibilities for transnational cooperation. German 
development policy and development cooperation thus may be said to 
have good reason to define support of transboundary cooperation along 
international waterbodies and promotion of relevant institutions as one of 
its priority areas in Africa. What is called for here is special political ef-
forts to support crisis prevention and to make optimal use of cooperation 
potentials. A donor country like German can use support for institution- 
and capacity-building to gain substantial influence on transnational river-
basin management. Support for transboundary water management should 
directly serve the ends of conserving and making sustainable use of natural 
resources and supporting civil conflict resolution. Furthermore, in regions 
faced with a situation of weak statehood good water governance can serve 
indirectly – above and beyond the field of water utilization – to strengthen 
forces operating in the direction of stabilizing social and state structures, 
thus generally contributing to crisis prevention, development, and securing 
the foundations of peace. 
Support for transboundary water management in Africa must be seen in 
the context of two interlinked task areas. The one concern is water man-
agement as a means of promoting sustainable (ecological) development; 
i. e. as a means of coming closer to the objective of achieving the water-
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related international development goals. The other is water management as 
a means of crisis prevention. This is noted, not least, in the German gov-
ernment's action plan on "Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and 
Peacebuilding" of May 2004. "Transboundary cooperation in the water 
sector," the documents states, plays a particularly important role for the 
field of crisis prevention. Transboundary cooperation serves to stabilize 
peace, and this is a central precondition for achieving the international 
development goals. Viewed in these terms, the two fields of action may be 
seen as interdependent. 
The manifold significance of transboundary water resources management 
in Africa is addressed in various international documents with guideline 
character; these include e. g. the G8 Africa Action Plan, the New Partner-
ship for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Action Plan, and the Abuja 
Declaration of the African Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW). 
Furthermore, the G8 Water Action Plan, with its commitment to support 
improved management and development of shared river basins and to pro-
mote "river basin co-operation throughout the world, with particular 
attention to African river basins" (G8 Water Action Plan, 1), offers an 
important point of reference for relevant German DC efforts. These efforts 
also have reference to the work of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory 
Board on Water and Sanitation and the International Water for Life 
Decade proclaimed by the UN General Assembly (2005–2015). 
The study's aim and methodological approach 
The aim of the research and advisory project "Transboundary Water Man-
agement in Africa" is to provide advisory support for relevant German DC 
activities in this field by formulating recommendations on promotion of 
transnational cooperation on international rivers and lakes. In the frame-
work of the overall project, which consists of five individual reports, the 
task of this report is to present a review and analysis of the experiences 
made thus far.  
As a desk study, the report evaluated available literature and documents, 
and made use of written and oral queries addressed to national and 
international experts. For this purpose the authors developed and used a 
number of different questionnaires that factor in regional and national 
givens.  
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The design of the questionnaires and the literature evaluation were geared 
to the analytical grid for investigating river-basin organizations stipulated 
in the terms of reference for the project: 
— agreements on which cooperation is based; 
— membership; 
— mandate; 
— tasks and functions; 
— organizational structure; 
— linkages to national decision-making structures; 
— mode of operation; 
— means by which a river-basin organization is funded; 
— engagement of third parties / donors; 
— conflict management / resolution; 
— stakeholder participation; 
— relationship to regional agreements and institutions; 
— implementation and efficiency. 
However, the report shows all limits set to a desk study. In view of the low 
response rates to the questionnaires, the authors were quite often unable to 
verify whether the information obtained from the literature is in fact cor-
rect. This goes both for the implementation and efficiency aspect and for 
the aspect of geopolitical classification and assessment, the reason being 
that up-to-date knowledge and information from experts and local actors 
are essential in this connection. Unfortunately, the authors were not always 
able to deal with this point in the depth required because the review of the 
literature as well as oral and written expert interviews are not sufficient to 
meet some of the criteria in the level of detail that would have been 
desirable. This would have required a longer stay in the region to conduct 
in situ interviews. 
Selection of transboundary rivers and lakes 
In coordination with the project sponsor, the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the following five trans-
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boundary waterbodies were selected for more exact analysis: Orange-
Senqu, Limpopo, Zambezi, Lake Victoria, and Lake Chad (see Fig. 1). 
The budget available for the study was not sufficient to cover any further 
lake and/or river basins. This restriction of the scope of the study to five 
basins ruled out any comprehensive discussion and analysis – at least in 
the strict scientific sense of the term – of the kind stipulated in the terms of 
reference. This limitation is known to the project sponsor. The 
recommendations are therefore based in essence only on the river and lake 
basins referred to below. The individual basins were selected as follows: 
Orange and Limpopo are the southern African river basins in which (a) 
economic development is furthest advanced and (b) there is an especially 
great need for transnational regulation on account of the heavy use of 
water resources made there. In these river basins, German DC has sup-
ported basin-related institutions for some time now, and done so with a 
good measure of success. Orange and Limpopo are generally regarded as 
relative successes of institutionalized international cooperation. 
The Zambezi is the largest river in southern Africa, and the one with the 
most riparians. Its basin holds substantial development potential. Efforts 
aimed at transnational management have been slow in making headway; 
however, recent events (i. e. establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse 
Commission (ZAMCOM) in July 2004) seem to indicate that development 
in this area could take a more dynamic course. 
Lake Victoria is Africa's largest lake, one that has substantial economic 
significance for its riparians. The establishment here of a lake-basin com-
mission in November 2003 set in train a new and promising course of 
development. In addition, the basin is directly linked to the Nile, no doubt 
Africa's politically most sensitive river basin, as well as to the efforts un-
derway there to further develop transboundary water management. Lake 
Victoria and Lake Chad are transnational waterbodies that involve prob-
lems quite unlike upstream-downstream problems normally encountered 
along transboundary rivers. 
Lake Chad, which has a very large basin, has in recent years been exposed 
to extremely high levels of ecological degradation. In addition, the basin 
has a long history of institutional cooperation (or at least attempts at such 
cooperation) – it should be noted in this connection that the Fort Lamy /  
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N'djamena Convention on Lake Chad was signed as far back as 1964 – a 
fact which holds promise of a number of informative insights. German DC 
plans to step up its engagement on Lake Chad in the future. 
Figure 1: Overview of the river and lake basins selected, their 
riparians, and the cooperative structures in place there 
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2 Outline of the problem: International waterbodies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is a region with an extraordinary number of trans-
boundary river basins. Sixty-three of the world's 261 international river 
basins are located on the African continent. Here we find both crisis-prone 
hot spots and many promising incipient approaches to water governance 
and transboundary water resources management. Sub-Saharan Africa is for 
this reason especially well suited to serve as a paradigm to identify both 
lessons learned and deficits in the implementation of transboundary water 
management – and to derive recommendations from successes and deficits 
alike.  
One feature typical of the hydrogeographic conditions found in Africa is 
the often markedly uneven distribution of water resources in the conti-
nent's basins. Apart from water-rich regions, i. e. those with abundant pre-
cipitation that contributes significantly to the volume of available water 
resources, there are also regions with low precipitation that contribute 
relatively little to the overall volume of water resources available and 
obtain a substantial share of the water they use from high-precipitation 
regions. The classic case for this constellation is the Nile, whose upstream 
riparians are located in high-precipitation regions, while Egypt, the 
downstream riparian, is located in an arid region. 
The situation on the Zambezi and in other river basins in southern Africa 
is a similar one. Here the riparians to the north (Angola, Zambia, DR 
Congo, Mozambique) have abundant water resources, while the riparians 
to the south (in particular South Africa (RSA), Botswana, and Namibia) 
lack sufficient water resources. These latter countries are highly reliant on 
water resources generated outside their borders. While, for instance, the 
RSA consumes 80 % of all the water resources used in the SADC region, 
it contributes only 8 % to the region's water resources. A constellation of 
this kind necessarily holds potential for conflict. 
It is not without good reason that the example of the Nile is again and 
again cited in the popular discourse on "water wars." Egypt is wholly 
dependent on the waters of the Nile for its economic development, and for 
this reason Egypt has declared a secure supply of water from the areas 
beyond its border to be a vital national security interest. In the past there 
have been repeated conflicts between Egypt and the upstream Nile 
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riparians over the allocation of the waters of the Nile, and these conflicts 
have even led to threats of war in times of particular stress (i. e. in periods 
of drought). Egypt, a strong military power, once threatened Ethiopia, the 
far weaker upstream riparian, that there would be "no alternative to war" 
(Anwar Sadat 1979, African Recorder, cited in Anderson 1991) if Ethiopia 
failed to respect "Egypt's full rights to the waters of the Nile." And it was 
the then deputy Egyptian Foreign Minister and later UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Ghali who, in 1990, made a statement that was often to be cited 
later, namely that the next war in the region would not be over oil but over 
water (Scheumann / Schiffler 1998, 1). Thus far this war has not hap-
pened. Indeed, for some years now the Nile riparians have been talking, in 
the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), about a joint utilization of the waters of the 
Nile that would entail benefits for all parties. 
This positive development is a good indication that the constellation out-
lined above also offers incentives for international cooperation. Decision-
makers throughout the world, and precisely in Africa, have come to recog-
nize in principle that transboundary waters call for cooperative trans-
boundary management (see also Mostert 2005). This has found expression 
in numerous bi- and multilateral declarations and agreements on individual 
waterbodies as well as in framework agreements that lay down general 
principles governing the management of transboundary river basins. One 
agreement that deserves to be underlined in this connection is the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigable Uses of International Water-
courses (April 1997). Thus far the convention has been signed by only 20 
countries and ratified only by 12, among them no more than two African 
countries – the RSA and Namibia – and it is therefore not yet in force. The 
convention, based on earlier documents (in particular the ILA's 1966 Hel-
sinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers), lays down a 
number of central principles, including the principle of "equitable and 
reasonable use," the obligation not to cause "significant harm to other 
watercourse states," and the principle of "optimal utilization and adequate 
protection of an international watercourse" (UN Convention 1997, 
Articles 5, 7, 8). Despite the fact that the convention is not yet in force, it 
sets standards that provide orientation for international water management 
in the river basins analyzed here. 
Also on the African continent, a number of multilateral declarations of 
intent and documents have been adopted that take a positive stance on the 
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need for transboundary cooperation. These would include the NEPAD 
Action Plan or the AMCOW Abuja Declaration. While there are still no 
such agreements or understandings for the majority of African river ba-
sins, agreements have already been signed for 20 African river basins, 
including all of the continent's important transboundary waterbodies. Fur-
thermore, river-basin organizations (RBOs) – in fact, in some cases even 
more than one per basin – have been established in 16 African river ba-
sins.1 Some African countries are members of several such RBOs. With 
membership status in 18 RBOs, the RSA leads the field, followed by Swa-
ziland (8), Tanzania (5), and Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (each 4). 
Even though these figures tell us nothing about the quality of the 
agreements and organizations concerned (e. g. about the scope and levels 
of concretization of the cooperation agreed on, or about organizational 
structures, mandates, modes of operation, effectiveness, implementation), 
they do indicate an awareness of the problem and a will (at least at the 
declaration level) to engage in joint searches for solutions. 
Furthermore, international water management plays, at least in some cases, 
a prominent role in the framework of higher-level efforts aimed at regional 
integration. This is most clearly in evidence in the case of SADC. The 14 
SADC member states have committed themselves to an integrated and 
cooperative management of the transboundary waterbodies in the SADC 
region. This declaration of intent accords well with SADC's overarching 
goal of using economic cooperation and integration as a means of pro-
moting development and prosperity in the member countries. It may be 
seen as characteristic of this situation that the first cooperation protocol 
signed in the SADC framework was the SADC Protocol on Shared Water-
course Systems (1995). This is a good illustration of the great importance 
that the SADC member countries attach to the issue. This is further under-
lined by the fact that in creating the SADC Water Sector and the SADC 
Water Division, the community has also given itself the institutional un-
                                                          
1 The general tasks of RBOs may be seen as including: "Reconciling and harmonizing the 
interests of riparian countries; Technical cooperation; Standardisation of data 
collection; Exchange of hydrologic and other information; Monitoring water quantity 
and quality; Submission for examination and approval of proposed activities, schemes 
or plans which could modify the quantity and quality of the waters; Development of 
concerted action programmes; Enforcing agreements; Dispute resolution." (Savenije / 
van der Zaag 2000, 27). 
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derpinning it needs to implement the SADC water protocol. There has also 
been a relatively intensive and continuing discussion underway in the 
SADC context. It has led, among other things, to a revision of the water 
protocol to bring it into line with the 1997 UN convention. The so-called 
Revised Protocol was adopted in 2000. 
Transboundary water management also plays a role in connection with 
other African regional organizations – e. g. ECOWAS, EAC, and IGAD – 
as it does for some important pan-African institutions (AfDB, AU, 
AMCOW). 
3 Transboundary water management in Africa with 
reference to selected rivers and lakes 
What follows will present some key hydrological, economic, and political 
framework data on the waterbodies selected for analysis in the present 
study: the Orange-Senqu, the Limpopo, the Zambezi, Lake Victoria, and 
Lake Chad. These are used as the basis to assess risks and conflict factors 
as well as cooperation potentials and needs. The presentation focuses on 
water-related agreements and institutions (see Fig. 1) and the actors in-
volved in lake- and river-basin management. 
3.1 Orange-Senqu 
3.1.1 Characterization of the basin 
The Orange River is roughly 2,300 km in length. Its immediate riparians 
are Lesotho (source), the RSA, and Namibia (estuary). Botswana also 
shares the Orange River Basin, which has an area of close to 1 million 
km2. The RSA holds the largest share of the basin (60 %), followed by 
Namibia (25 %), Botswana (12 %), and Lesotho (5 %). The river's 
headwaters, located in Lesotho's northeastern highlands, receive abundant 
precipitation (an annual mean of 2,000 mm); otherwise the basin's climate 
is for the most part arid (annual average precipitation of 44 mm). The Or-
ange's mean annual runoff (MAR) is 11,000 million m3; to this the RSA 
contributes 55 %, Lesotho 41 %, Namibia 4 %, and Botswana a negligible 
amount (Heyns 2003; Heyns 2004). The river's most important tributaries 
are the Senqu in Lesotho, the Vaal in the RSA, and the Fish in Namibia.  
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The Vaal is the main source of water in the Gauteng region of the RSA. 
This is the most highly developed region in South Africa, indeed in all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The region is home (mostly in urban areas) to 40 % 
of the RSA's population, and it accounts for 85 % of the country's energy 
demand. 
The Orange River Basin is one of the most highly developed basins in all 
of southern Africa. There are a total of 37 large-scale dams (height: over 
25 m; storage capacity: over 12 million m3) in the basin, most of them (24) 
located in the RSA. The largest dam in South Africa is the Gariep Dam 
(storage capacity: 5,600 million m3), while the largest dam in the basin is 
the Katse Dam in Lesotho. Industry, mining, (urban) households, and 
irrigated agriculture generate substantial demand for water that the Vaal 
Figure 2: Overview of the Orange-Senqu basin institutions   
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itself is unable to meet. For this reason the Vaal has been linked via a 
complex system of interbasin transfers (IBTs) with eight other river ba-
sins, tapping them to meet Gauteng's water needs. This has meant that the 
Orange-Vaal system has a negative water balance. At the same time, eco-
nomic activities in Gauteng are 100 % dependent on IBTs. And this in 
turns means that the Orange has huge strategic significance for the RSA, a 
fact which casts some light on the importance of the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP) (Turton et al. 2004, 99). 
Most of this water is used for irrigated agriculture. In the RSA 800,000 ha 
of land are presently under irrigation, and 300,000 ha of this total is 
located in the Orange River Basin (Heyns 2003, 21; Heyns 2004, 8). But 
some urban centers and mining projects are also among the region's major 
water consumers. The problem of water quantity is increasingly 
aggravated by a water-quality problem caused by pollution from towns, 
industry, mining projects, and saline return flows from irrigation projects. 
Future development will hinge in crucial ways on an adequate, secure 
supply of water. Namibia, for instance, has plans to sharply expand 
irrigated agriculture on the Lower Orange (currently some 2,200 ha) with a 
view to producing grapes for the European and North American markets, 
in this way creating 10,000 new (seasonal) jobs. "It is clear that the future 
development of the labour intensive export grape industry is economically 
viable, but is heavily dependent on the availability of water." (Heyns 2004, 
7) Namibia is therefore very interested in building a new dam on the 
Lower Orange (ibid.). 
In the future it would also be conceivable to supply Botswana's capital 
Gaborone with water from Lesotho, and this would give Botswana a stra-
tegic interest in the Orange River Basin, even though no water flows into 
the Orange from Botswana and at present the country makes no use of the 
Orange. 
The Orange River forms the border between the RSA and Namibia. There 
are some problems concerning the actual course of the border between the 
two countries. In 1890 the boundary was defined on the basis of the high-
water level along the northern banks of the river, and this meant that Na-
mibia was without direct access to the river's waters. Prior to independ-
ence, Namibia was promised that the boundary would be shifted to the 
middle of the river; but the promise was not respected, and since then there 
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have been disputes over the border. Although this state of affairs has 
served to tarnish South Africa's image as far as water policy is concerned, 
it does not appear to constitute a danger to the relations between the two 
countries (Turton et al. 2004, 99–100). 
3.1.2 Description and analysis of river-basin institutions 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Commission 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was conceived as a means 
of resolving the problem posed by South Africa's need for a secure water 
supply by tapping the water-rich Senqu in Lesotho to meet water needs in 
the Gauteng region. The project is designed to divert the waters of the 
Senqu (in Lesotho) to Gauteng via a complex system of dams and tunnels 
and at the same time to generate hydroelectricity. The idea is that water 
transfer and power generation will benefit the development of both of the 
countries involved. Lesotho, a country that uses only a small part of its 
abundant water resources, provides low-cost water to its water-poor 
neighbor South Africa for purposes of power generation. Lesotho is paid 
royalties in return (Klaphake 2005). 
Most of the costs for the project were borne by the RSA, which was given 
loans from national and international banks. The LHWP is one of the 
world's largest transboundary water projects.2 The project has served to 
solve Gauteng's water-scarcity problems while at the same time benefiting 
Lesotho in economic terms.3  
                                                          
2  The centerpieces of the first phase of the LHWP are an electricity plant in Muela and 
two large-scale dams (Katse, 185 m in height, and Mohale, 145 m in height) with tunnel 
systems (the longest of which extends for 45 km) to convey the water to Gauteng. The 
first phase was concluded in 2004; since then water has been transferred at a rate of 29 
m3/s – the equivalent of roughly one quarter of the Senqu's total flow. The projected 
following phases of the LHWP (originally there were to be four phases by the year 
2020) have been suspended, since it became clear that project planning had 
overestimated by far South Africa's future water needs, and because the RSA's water 
policy has since undergone a marked shift toward water demand management. 
3  It is, however, important not to ignore the ecological, social, and political costs 
involved. These include the flooding of grazing land, resettlement of larger population 
groups (who were forced to wait to receive their inadequate compensation), and 
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The legal basis for the project is a bilateral government treaty signed in 
October 1986. This is one of the most comprehensive and detailed water-
related agreements concluded in Sub-Saharan Africa (Turton 2004, 274). 
It lays down clear-cut and binding rules governing the behavior and the 
duties of the parties (LHWP Treaty 1986). Since then six protocols have 
been added to the treaty; they may be seen as reflections of the 
experiences made in connection with implementation as well as of newly 
emerging problems, not least several concerning the project's institutional 
underpinning. 
Originally, each of the two parties established an independent implement-
ing organization of its own; in Lesotho the Lesotho Highlands Develop-
ment Authority (LHDA, responsible for dam construction and operation), 
in the RSA the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA, responsible for 
the construction and operation of the tunnel system as well as for financial 
and credit management) (LHWP Treaty 1986, Articles 7 and 8). 
A Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) was created as a coor-
dinating and oversight body; each of the parties delegated three represen-
tatives to it (ibid., Article 9). Since this structure proved unwieldy, a com-
prehensive reform was undertaken in 1999: The JPTC was reorganized to 
form the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC), a body with 
markedly strengthened competences and capacities (permanent secretariat, 
biweekly LHWC meetings). LHDA and TCTA were restricted to a num-
ber of highly specific powers and made more subordinate to the LHWC, a 
move that served to streamline the organizational structure (Protocol VI 
1999). "The LHWC has monitoring and advisory powers over the admin-
istrative, technical, and financial activities of the project" (Turton et al. 
2004, 241). 
One special feature of the LHWP's institutional structure is its dispute-set-
tlement mechanism (see Annex and LHWP Treaty 1986, Article 16). If a 
dispute emerges between the parties that cannot be settled through nego-
tiations, a dispute-settlement body, the Arbitral Tribunal, is called in. The 
members of the tribunal are appointed on an ad hoc basis; the tribunal is 
made up of three members, none of whom may be from one of the parties 
to the treaty. Each side appoints one member; the members in turn appoint 
                                                                                                                         
widespread corruption in connection with the project and the management of project 
funds. 
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a third person as their chairman. If they are unable to reach agreement, the 
president of the International Commission on Large Dams appoints a tri-
bunal chairman, who may not be a citizen of either the Kingdom of Leso-
tho or the RSA. The body issues binding decisions on a majority basis.4  
Engagement of third parties / international donors has contributed appre-
ciably to the LHWP's success. The World Bank (WB) deserves special 
mention here. While the role it plays as a provider of credit is quite limited 
– the bank has financed no more than three percent of overall project costs 
– the WB's engagement has encouraged other donors – the chief of which 
is the European Investment Bank (EIB) – to become involved in project-
financing. Furthermore, the WB has also had an influence, in the broadest 
sense of the term, on the projects political context. It worked for incorpo-
ration into the project of minimum social and environmental standards, 
obtained permission for the project from the South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO, which was at that time the internationally recog-
nized representative of Namibia, then still under South African control), 
and made its engagement conditional on a Namibian no-objection state-
ment (Conley / van Niekerk 2000, 144 f.). Finally, the WB's engagement 
also served to strengthen the hand of Lesotho, the far weaker partner, in its 
dealings with its powerful neighbor (Turton 2003, 147). 
Originally, no institutionalized stakeholder participation was provided for 
in the framework of the LHWP. But over the course of time a number of 
national and international environmental and human rights NGOs took up 
the cause of the project, voicing criticism of its environmental, social, and 
political impacts, objecting to its lack of social and environmental com-
patibility, and working for the interests of the affected population. To cite 
only two examples, the Highlands Church and Solidarity Action Group 
(HCSAG) from Lesotho and the International Rivers Network deserve to 
be mentioned in this connection. Following several meetings of represen-
tatives of these two NGOs, WB representatives, and representatives of the 
governments involved, in 1999 agreement was reached, under the pressure 
of civil society, on a memorandum of understanding between the LHDA 
and interest groups in Lesotho. It provides for cooperation in the following 
                                                          
4  "The award of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be definitive and binding on the Parties, and 
they shall duly and expeditiously give effect thereto." [see LHWP Treaty 1986, Articles 
16, (15) (b)]. 
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areas: "monitoring and evaluation activities; advocacy activities; commu-
nity empowerment activities; service provision; and delivery activities 
(…)" (Meissner 2000, 26). 
The Orange-Senqu River Basin Commission 
The LHWP and its institutional framework have now been amalgamated 
with the Orange-Senqu River Basin Commission (ORASECOM), an RBO 
that was created in 2000 and includes all four basin riparians (RSA, Na-
mibia, Lesotho, Botswana). ORASECOM neither replaces earlier bilateral 
agreements nor precludes additional future bilateral projects. However, it 
does oblige its members to share information (Turton 2004, 275 f.). 
ORASECOM is in line with the principle that the integrated and sustain-
able management of international river basins should involve all riparian 
countries (while LHWP and PWC are bilateral projects in a multilateral 
river basin). 
ORASECOM, established on November 3, 2003, is the result of protracted 
discussions and negotiations that were made possible by the process of 
political change in the RSA. According to its founding document, 
ORASECOM is an international organization with a legal status of its own 
(for information on the following, see ORASECOM Agreement 2000). 
The organization's founding document makes reference to, and explicitly 
recognizes, the Helsinki Rules, the 1997 UN Convention, and the SADC 
Water Protocol. The parties are obliged to exchange date on a regular basis 
(Articles 7, 4) and to provide prior notification of "any project, pro-
gramme, or activity with regard to the River system which may have a 
significant adverse effect upon any one or more of the other Parties." (Ar-
ticles 7, 5). They furthermore commit themselves to undertake joint efforts 
to protect the basin. Existing bilateral agreements and institutions are not 
affected by the new organization (obligation to inform only); future bilat-
eral agreements must be in line with ORASECOM.  
ORASECOM functions as an advisory body to the parties on issues con-
cerned with the development, utilization, and conservation of the water 
resources of the Orange River Basin (Article 4). ORASECOM is author-
ized to conduct appropriate feasibility studies. In cases involving differ-
ences of opinion, matters are referred back to the political level for deci-
sion. The organization's founding document makes reference to the SADC 
Tribunal as a dispute-settlement mechanism. The commission is thus only 
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authorized to make recommendations based on joint water-yield assess-
ments, the findings of feasibility studies, and joint assessments of water 
allocation and appropriate infrastructure development. 
ORASECOM still lacks a differentiated organizational structure. At pre-
sent it has only a council consisting of the delegations of the parties. Each 
delegation has three permanent members; additional advisers may be con-
sulted from case to case (Article 2). The delegations meet twice a year, as 
a rule for three days. Decisions are reached by consensus (Article 3). The 
meetings are supported by a task team (advisers, donor representatives, 
and others) which usually meets for a separate, one-day session prior to 
commission meetings. Thus far the commission has presented several 
reports. The council is authorized to set up working groups and to appoint 
technical experts and advisers if this seems called for (Article 6). There is 
a desire to establish a secretariat; a study has been prepared on the matter, 
and there are now plans to set up a secretariat in Pretoria (in May 2005). 
Thus far there are no plans to have ORASECOM manage infrastructure 
projects. One aspect central to ORASECOM's work is its task of elabo-
rating an integrated water resources management (IMRM) plan, which is 
set to be presented in two or three years time. 
Disputes that cannot be resolved through commission negotiations are 
(according to Article 8) to be brought before the SADC Tribunal, whose 
decisions are to be recognized as "final and binding" (Article 8). 
ORASECOM is funded by the water ministries of the countries concerned. 
It also receives financial support from Germany (through the GTZ), 
France, and the EU (in the framework of the EU Water Initiative). The 
Orange River Basin / ORASECOM is one of the five regions selected for 
EUWI support. ORASECOM has presented the EU a project portfolio 
"relating to the harmonization of the legislation in the different countries, 
the study of transboundary aquifers, water demand management, a basin 
information system, capacity building and stakeholder participation" 
(Heyns 2004, 9).  
Germany is providing support for the preparation of an integrated water 
resources management plan, a study on the establishment of an 
ORASECOM secretariat, appropriate organizational consulting services, 
and additional capacity-building projects. In 2001 the German funding 
contributions amounted to € 0.167 million, while the figures for 2004 and 
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2005 were € 0.335 million and € 0.385 million, respectively; the figures 
projected for 2005 and 2006 are € 0.217 million and € 0.05 million, re-
spectively. France has contributed to a feasibility study on the sustainable 
development of the Molopo-Nossab River system, a project designed to 
promote environmental and water protection, as well as other water proj-
ects of transboundary interest (groundwater in the Molopo sponges in 
Lesotho etc.) (Heyns 2004, 9). 
The Permanent Water Commission 
Mention must, finally, be made of the Permanent Water Commission 
(PWC), a bilateral institution created by the RSA and Namibia in Septem-
ber 1992. The commission's task is to provide the governments of the two 
parties with advice on the development of the Lower Orange (the section 
along which the Orange forms the border between the two countries). The 
PWC replaced a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) set up in 1987. 
The PWC acts in the capacity of a "technical adviser to the Parties on 
matters relating to the development and utilisation of water resources of 
common interest to the Parties" (see PWC Agreement 1992, Article 1; for 
aims, see Article 3). This advisory function consists mainly in the prepa-
ration of reports. The commission is made up of three delegates from each 
party; it can appoint additional advisers. The PWC has a weak organiza-
tional structure; this consists in meetings convened from case to case as 
well as "sub-committees dealing with joint irrigation and planning tasks" 
(see Conley / van Niekerk 2000, 141). Decisions are taken by consensus. 
Each of the parties is responsible for bearing the costs of its own delega-
tion, with each host country assuming the costs for the meetings held 
there. Otherwise the parties share all other costs that may accrue. 
ORASECOM is regularly informed on all PWC activities. Disputes and 
differences are settled in consultations between the parties. 
One other aspect associated with the 1992 PWC Agreement is the estab-
lishment of a Joint Irrigation Authority for a large-scale irrigation system 
on both sides of the Lower Orange (Noordoewer in Namibia; Vioolsdrift 
in the RSA: the Vioolsdrift and Noordoewer Joint Irrigation Scheme – 
VNJIS, 800 ha). A special dispute-settlement mechanism was set up for 
this purpose, a so-called Arbitral Tribunal and a separate institution for the 
Orange River Mouth, an area listed in the Montreux Record of Wetlands 
Under Threat. Government representative of both parties as well as repre-
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sentatives of the private sector (mining) have seats on this Orange River 
Mouth Interim Management Committee. 
These institutions have remained in existence even after ORASECOM was 
created. Between the RSA and Namibia there is now a bilateral agreement 
in force that guarantees water deliveries of 50 million m3 per year for 
Namibia; this amount is set to rise to 60 million m3 by the year 2007. For 
this point of time, though, the RSA has announced some new demands of 
its own, and this will call for new negotiations or efforts to find a new 
solution. In this connection the PWC started out in 2001 with a series of 
studies on the future development of water resources on the Lower Or-
ange, including one to examine the possibility of building a new dam on 
the Lower Orange (Heyns 2004, 8). 
3.1.3 Destabilization risks, cooperation potentials, options 
for German Development Cooperation 
The task of securing a sufficient supply of water for the economic devel-
opment of the Orange River Basin will remain a challenge in the future as 
well. The problem of water quantity will soon be exacerbated by an in-
creasingly pressing quality problem due to water pollution. Conflicts may 
develop between the RSA and Namibia over the development of the 
Lower Orange. But in view of the good record of cooperation between the 
two countries, these should not pose any serious risk of destabilization. On 
the other hand, any forced, exaggerated attempts to push through further 
phases of the LHWP could well entail risks. What we mean here is less the 
relations between the countries concerned than the growing resistance of 
civil society forces in Lesotho and the RSA (and at the international level) 
that would have to be anticipated. Here too, though, we find no destabili-
zation risk. Yet the issue of "the future of the LHWP" does point to the 
need for more intensive participation of civil society actors in 
transboundary river-basin management. Support for relevant efforts could 
prove to be a new field of activity for German DC (capacity-building, 
organizational development, training). Furthermore, German DC should 
continue with its support of ORASECOM (assistance in setting up a 
secretariat and in working out an IWRM plan) and undertake efforts to 
ensure that the positive experiences made in connection with 
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ORASECOM are disseminated and made use of in other river basins 
(ORASECOM as the core of a center of competence). 
3.2 Zambezi 
3.2.1 Characterization of the basin 
The Zambezi is some 3,000 km in length. Its basin encompasses an area of 
roughly 1.4 million km2. This means that it is Africa's fourth-largest river 
system. The Zambezi has eight riparians – Angola, Botswana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – the highest 
number in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Zambia holds the largest share of the 
river basin (41 %), followed by Angola (18 %), Zimbabwe (16 %), 
Mozambique (12 %), Malawi (12 %), Tanzania (2 %), Botswana (1.5 %), 
and Namibia (1.5 %). The Zambezi's mean annual runoff is 94,000 million 
m3. Its most important tributaries are the Luene and Lungoe-Bungo in 
Angola, the Chobe in Botswana, the Shire in Malawi, the Luinana in 
Namibia, the Kabompo, Kafue, and Luangwa in Zambia, and the 
Manyame, Sanyata, and Gwayi in Zimbabwe. Precipitation levels in the 
basin range between 600 and 1,200 mm per year; while Angola and 
Zambia are riparians with high precipitation levels, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe are relatively arid by comparison. Malawi and Tanzania are not 
immediate Zambezi riparians; they are linked to the river through Lake 
Malawi and the Shire River. The Zambezi River Basin is home to over 40 
million people, most of whom live in Malawi (31 %), Zimbabwe (29 %), 
and Zambia (22 %). The Zambezi's water resources are used by 
households as well as for irrigated agriculture, mining, power generation, 
and – to a lesser extent – industry; the river is also used for fishery and 
shipping. 
Several large dams built to generate power are the most conspicuous water 
projects in the basin; the largest of these are the Kariba Dam (Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) and the Cahora Bassa Dam (Mozambique), followed by dams 
on the Victoria Falls, the Kafue River (Kafue Gorge), and on the Lunsefwa 
River (the Mita Dam). There are a total of 12 larger dams (over 15 m in 
height) in the basin. At present these waters are used to irrigate some 
200,000 / 250,000 ha of agricultural land (Shela 2000, 69 f.; Heyns 2003, 
28). 
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In view of the region's relatively high population growth (on average almost 
3 % p. a.) and the ambitious development projects underway there, pressure 
on water resources is bound to increase in the future. Angola, the upstream 
riparian, could – now that the protracted civil war has been ended which for 
years blocked any major measures in the water sector – prove to be 
interested in making more use of the waters of the Zambezi in the future. 
Botswana and Namibia, also upstream riparians, are water-poor. Namibia 
plans to hugely expand a sugar-cane irrigation project in the Caprivi Strip; 
Botswana intends to utilize the waters of the Zambezi by building a pipeline 
to supply Gaborone, its capital (Heyns 2003, 28). Zimbabwe, also a water-
poor country, has plans to supply the water needs of the city of Bulawayo 
with water from the Zambezi (Bulawayo Water Division Project / 
Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project).5 Thanks to its population density, 
Malawi, a country whose territory is almost completely within the basin, 
will see itself faced with increasing water scarcity in the future. Malawi 
currently has plans for a 40,000 ha irrigation project on the Shire (Heyns 
2003, 28). Finally, the RSA, itself not a Zambezi riparian, has also become 
involved by announcing its interest in supplying the Gauteng region with 
water from the Zambezi via an IBT system (using a 1,200 km-long pipeline 
from the Caprivi Strip through Botswana to Pretoria). 
As things stand now, the water yield in the Zambezi Basin still far exceeds 
consumption levels (except for recurrent drought periods that periodically 
assume the character of natural disasters). And for this reason there are at 
present no serious conflicts over the waters of the Zambezi.6 It should, 
                                                          
5  At the end of July 2004 reports on a planned Malaysia-Zimbabwe joint venture caused 
some unease among politicians and the general public in Mozambique. These plans are 
for a 450 km-long water pipeline from the Zambezi to Bulawayo. The project would 
have immediate impacts on the lower-course riparian Mozambique and in particular on 
the operations of the Cahora Bassa Dam. But there have been delays, evidently on 
account of financing problems. At present only one Chinese company is engaged in 
preparatory work set to lead up to the construction of Gwayi-Shangani Dam, which is 
likewise a component of the MZWP. 
6  Ciuta (2000, 143 ff.) sees the matter differently: "In recent years, a number of serious 
conflicts haven been observed in the Zambezi basin" (ibid., 143). He mentions: the 
conflict between Zambia and Zimbabwe over Zimbabwean plans to build a dam in the 
Batoka Gorge; conflicts in the East Caprivi region between "tourism facility operators 
and fishing communities" (ibid.), conflicts between Namibians and Botswanans living 
along the Chobe River over different use types (tourism versus agriculture); similar use 
conflicts between Zimbabwe (tourism) and Zambia (fishery); water-use conflicts 
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though, be noted that Angola and Zambia are the only riparians that will 
have sufficient water resources in the future. All the other riparians today 
or soon will be forced to contend with water scarcity. In view of this state 
of affairs it is impossible to rule out future conflicts between the riparians 
over water use and water allocation. As far as both crisis prevention and 
sustainable development are concerned, transboundary water management 
would therefore be the approach best suited to serving the needs and 
increasing the welfare of all riparians. 
3.2.2 Description and analysis of river-basin institutions  
The Zambezi River Authority 
The beginnings of transboundary cooperation in the Zambezi River Basin 
go back to colonial times, and the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA), for 
which Zambia and Zimbabwe are jointly responsible, was founded during 
the colonial period. 
Zambia and Zimbabwe are the most important Zambezi riparians. Zambia, 
a water-rich county, is heavily dependent on the river, and a good part of 
its territory and the majority of its population are located in the basin. 
Roughly the same goes for the downstream riparian Zimbabwe. The 
Zambezi forms the border between the two countries for a stretch of some 
750 km. The two riparians for the most part share the Zambezi's water 
resources; the most important vehicle of their cooperation is the Kariba 
Dam, a large structure (128 m in height) which plays a key role in their 
electricity supply. Thirty-four percent of the electricity consumed by both 
countries is generated by the Kariba Dam. The dam has a capacity of 
1,266 MW (600 MW on the northern, Zambian side and 666 MW on the 
southern, Zimbabwean side). Work got underway on the Kariba Dam in 
                                                                                                                         
between Malawians and Mozambicans along the Lower Shire; a conflict between 
Namibia and Botswana over the course of the border in Lake Liambezi. However, there 
is little reason to suppose that these conflicts hold all that much conflict potential at 
present. Heed should though be paid to Chiuta's observation: that "... localised conflicts 
are found in all the riparian states and these are mostly caused by pollution, dam and 
tourism developments that have dispossessed the local communities of their access 
rights to the water resources" (ibid., 146). 
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1955 and was concluded in 1976.7 Starting in 1963, the Central African 
Power Corporation (CAPCO), founded by South and North Rhodesia, was 
in charge of building and operating the dam. In 1987 CAPCO was dis-
solved through decisions taken by the parliaments of Zambia and Zim-
babwe, now independent states, and replaced by the ZRA. 
Equal shares of the ZRA are held by each of these two countries. The 
authority has an independent legal status, and is based in Lusaka. The 
objective of the ZRA is 
"to obtain for the economic, industrial and social development of the 
two countries, the greatest possible benefit from the natural advantages 
offered by the waters of the Zambezi River and to improve and intensify 
the utilization of the waters for the production of energy and for any 
other purposes beneficial to the two countries" (ZRA Agreement 1987, 
Preamble). 
Despite this more generally formulated aim, the ZRA is clearly focused on 
the joint operation of the Kariba Dam. The ZRA is responsible for water 
allocations to both parties, and their electricity companies are in charge of 
power generation. The relevant arrangements are set down at length in the 
ZRA Agreement (see ibid., Annexes I and II on Articles 22 and 23). Other 
ZRA tasks include data collection, examination of the need for new dams 
and their acceptance, elaboration of recommendations on the effective use 
of water and other resources (ibid., Article 9). 
The ZRA's organizational structure includes a Council of Ministers con-
sisting of two ministers from the governments of each of the parties (ibid., 
Article 4), a Board of Directors, three of whom are appointed by each 
government (ibid, Article 8), and a chief executive, who is appointed by 
the board and confirmed by the council. The chief executive may not be a 
citizen of the signatory country in which the authority is headquarted 
(ibid., Article 11). A secretariat and three ZAR departments and their 
heads report to the chief executive (Tumbare 2002, 107). In organizational 
terms, the ZRA has a hierarchic structure. Its various departments are 
located in Lusaka, Harare, and Kariba. The ZRA employs some 200 per-
sons, most of whom come from Zimbabwe (Tumbare 2002, 107). 
                                                          
7  Several thousand people were forcibly resettled in connection with the project, and most 
of them received inadequate compensation, or indeed no compensation at all.  
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The ZRA has a secure financial base. Since 1999 the authority has levied 
fees on the two national electricity companies for the water supplied to 
them for power generation. This enables the authority to earn the revenues 
it needs for its own work; at present it has water-sales revenues amounting 
to roughly US$ 10 million per year (Tumbare 2002, 107). The ZRA's 
financial and administrative autonomy makes it largely independent of the 
national water authorities (and their weaknesses). Still, some important 
areas have remained under the responsibility of the national authorities of 
the parties and are thus out of bounds for the ZRA (e. g. environmental 
policy). 
The ZRA Agreement does not provide for any dispute-settlement mecha-
nism. Article 32 simply states that differences between the parties are to be 
referred to an arbitrator or an arbitration body / commission set up by the 
parties. Arbitration awards are binding on the parties. 
Even though the ZRA generally functions smoothly, there are some differ-
ences between the parties that go back to the beginnings of the Kariba 
Project. Back then North Rhodesia was in favor of a project on a Zambezi 
tributary on its own territory (the Kafue Project), while South Rhodesia 
was in favor of the Kariba Project on the Zambezi itself. The latter pro-
posal finally won the day. The so-called Batoka Hydroelectric Project has 
been in planning since the early 1990s. While Zimbabwe, facing energy 
and water problems, is pushing to have the project realized as soon as 
possible, Zambia has little interest in it (Chiuta 2000, 143). Despite the 
positive findings of a feasibility study, the project has made no headway 
since 1993. Other joint projects that have been envisaged – Devils Gorge 
and Muputa Gorge – have yet to reach a concrete planning stage. The 
ZRA-related differences between Zambia and Zimbabwe must be seen in 
the larger context of the relations between the two countries, which are not 
always free of tensions. 
The main donor active here is SIDA. Since 1998 SIDA has provided fi-
nancial support for the ZRA's Environmental Monitoring Programme 
(EMP).8 A number of measures have been conducted in the EMP frame-
work; to cite a few examples: an Environmental Policy and Strategy has 
been elaborated for the ZRA (adopted by the board in 2000), a Water 
                                                          
8  The program also receives technical support from the Stockholm Environment Institute 
(SEI). 
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Quality Monitoring System has been created, a Water Hyacinth Control 
Plan has been developed, and information management has been improved 
by the introduction of GIS (ZRA Overview 2003). In addition, a special 
focus has been placed on capacity-building. "Capacity building has been 
an important component of the programme (...). The programme has pro-
vided an opportunity for both ZRA staff and stakeholders to develop their 
technical capacity through various hands-on and class-room style training 
programmes" (ibid.). The FGEF (French Global Environmental Facility) 
has also been supporting a ZRA environmental project: Support to Pollu-
tion Monitoring and Management on the Zambezi River (feasibility study 
in 2000, project begin 2003, € 1.5 million for 36 months) (ZRA-FGEF 
Project). But the donors are engaged only in marginal areas of the ZRA's 
spectrum of tasks. In large measure the ZRA operates independently of 
donor engagement. 
As far as environmental issues are concerned, more and more nonstate 
stakeholders have recently become involved in the ZRA's activities, even 
though the ZRA Agreement does not provide for any participation of this 
kind. SIDA has set up participation-related workshops and supported the 
establishment of a Stakeholder Working Group (with a secretariat of its 
own) (ZRA Overview 2003).9  
The ZRA may been seen in large measure as a success story of trans-
boundary water management. This is due to the many shared interests that 
have brought the parties together (border rivers, no upstream-downstream 
problems) as well as to the authority's organizational strength and 
administrative / financial autonomy, but also to its clear-cut and limited 
mandate: operation of the Kariba Dam. As soon as it steps beyond this 
mandate (as it did e. g. in the case of the Batoka Gorge project) problems 
emerge that have more to do with general Zambian-Zimbabwean relations 
than with specific water issues. 
                                                          
9  The working group's members include e. g. the African Wildlife Foundation, the Lake 
Kariba Fisheries Research Institute, the Environmental Council of Zambia, the National 
Heritage Conservation Commission Zambia, and the University Lake Kariba Research 
Station, Zimbabwe. 
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The Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) and the Action Plan 
for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi 
River System (ZACPLAN) 
The ZRA may be seen as an expression of bilateral water management in a 
multilateral river basin. Establishing the authority was a relatively easy 
task. By comparison, attempts to develop an integrated, comprehensive 
transboundary river-basin management that includes all riparian countries 
was faced with far greater difficulties, and has accordingly taken much 
longer to realize. Even today these efforts have not progressed beyond 
some rudimentary groundwork.  
In May 1987 the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe adopted the Action Plan for the Environmentally 
Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System (ZACPLAN). 
The three remaining riparians, Angola, Malawi, and Namibia, have joined 
ZACPLAN plan since the early 1990s. Despite the implications of the 
term "Action Plan", the document is little more than a relatively loose-knit 
framework program. While the plan does contain quite a number of ideas 
and project proposals, it lacks any binding commitments when it comes to 
implementation or means of securing the plan's institutional and financial 
viability. ZACPLAN includes 19 subprojects, the so-called Zambezi Ac-
tion Plan Projects (ZACPROs), which are devoted to goals of both a more 
or less short-term and a long-term nature. These extend from a compilation 
of all existing and planned water projects and creation of a monitoring 
system for water quantity and quality to the formulation of an integrated 
management plan for the overall basin and proposals on programs to com-
bat the tsetse fly (ZACLAN 1987, Appendix II). 
There is no point in looking through ZACPLAN for binding agreements, 
clear-cut definitions of implementation responsibilities, and precise time-
tables. Nor did ZACPLAN have an organizational structure. The original 
plan to create an independent organization (River Basin Coordinating Unit 
and Zambezi Intergovernmental Monitoring and Co-ordinating Commit-
tee) did not get off the ground (see Nakayama 1999, 403 f., for reasons 
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and background information).10 In other words, ZACPLAN remained 
largely in the realm of the declaration of intent and symbolic politics. 
Some riparians were unwilling to have their hands tied by ZACPLAN, in 
particular when it came to ITB systems designed to supply the RSA, 
which were regarded as extremely lucrative (Nakayama 1999, 406). Also, 
the countries concerned were largely unwilling to accept any meaningful 
financial commitments. ZACPLAN meetings were 100 % donor-funded. 
The lack of an organizational structure and sufficient funding has proved 
to be a crucial impediment to ZACPLAN. One point that came in for 
special criticism by Lamoree / Nilsson (2001, 35) was that in general 
capacity-building efforts were either insufficient or lacking altogether; the 
advisers, they reported, had done only what was absolutely necessary, 
leaving behind little more than a handful of reports. The problem was 
evidently that the higher decision-making levels showed too little 
engagement. In fact, not one single ZACPRO has yet been realized. Only 
ZACPRO6, which is concerned with the elaboration of an integrated river-
basin management plan and funded by the Scandinavian donors SIDA, 
NORAD, and DANIDA, has led to some promising interim results. For 
instance, the first phase of ZACPRO6 saw the creation of a database 
(Zambezi River Basin Information System and Database) (1998), and 
seven sector studies were conducted on water uses in the basin. Work is 
currently underway on an integrated basin development plan (ZACPRO6, 
Phase 2, since October 2001). This task has been taken over by the 
Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM), which was set up in July 
2004. 
The establishment of ZAMCOM, planned since the end of the 1980s, was 
preceded by a number of negotiation rounds that were plagued by set-
backs. It was only in 1996, when the ZRA, supported by the SADC Sec-
retariat, was placed in charge of ZACPRO6, that the efforts to institution-
alize basinwide cooperation finally got off the ground. The crucial phase 
began in 2002. Since then four rounds of talks on ZAMCOM have been 
conducted under the leadership of the SADC Secretariat. The main points 
of contention included the commission's structure, the makeup of its staff, 
its headquarters, its funding, and the relationship between ZAMCOM and 
                                                          
10  Annex VI of the ZACPLAN Agreement – "Institutional and Financial Arrangements" –
contained only "some suggestions on institutional and financial arrangements (...) for 
information." However, these "suggestions" were not implemented. 
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existing (national and international) institutions (Tumbare 2002, 104). In 
the end, though, the Agreement Establishing the Zambezi Watercourse 
Commission was finally signed by the riparian parties (on July 13, 2004).11  
The aim of ZAMCOM is "to promote the equitable and reasonable 
utilization of the water resources of the Zambezi Watercourse as well as 
the efficient management and sustainable development thereof" 
(ZAMCOM 2004, Article 5). The commission's functions are indicated as 
follows: 
"(…) 
(a) collect, evaluate and disseminate all data and information on the 
Zambezi Watercourse (...); 
(b) promote, support, coordinate and harmonise the management and 
development of the water resources of the Zambezi Watercourse;  
(c) advise Member States on the planning, management, utilization, 
development, protection and conservation of the Zambezi Watercourse 
as well as on the role and position of the Public with regard to such ac-
tivities and the possible impact thereof on social and cultural heritage 
matters (...); 
(e) foster greater awareness among the inhabitants (...); 
(f) co-operate with the institutions of SADC as well as other international 
and national organisations where necessary;  
(g) promote and assist in the harmonization of national water policies and 
legislative measures (...)" (Ibid.).  
The parties have committed themselves to a number of principles, namely 
"sustainable development, sustainable utilization, prevention of harm, 
precaution, inter-generational equity, assessment of trans-frontier im-
pacts, co-operation and equitable and reasonable utilisation" (ibid., Arti-
cle 12). They also place special emphasis on the principles of "equitable 
                                                          
11  Zambia was the only party not to sign the document at the founding conference in 
Botswana on July 13, 2004. The official reason given was that domestic debates with 
various stakeholders had not yet led to a consensus on ZAMCOM and that more time 
was needed. 
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and reasonable utilization" and "prevention of harm," which are taken 
over from the UN Convention (extra Articles 13 and 14). 
ZAMCOM is an international organization with an independent legal 
status (ibid., Article 4). In organizational terms, it is to be structured in 
three levels (ZAMCOM 2004, Articles 6–11):  
1. A Council of Ministers in which the national ministers 
responsible for water resources management are represented. 
The council is responsible for policy development; as a rule it 
meets once a year. 
2. A Technical Committee consisting of – at most – three-person 
delegations from the member countries. The committee is 
chiefly responsible for implementing decisions of the Council of 
Ministers and elaborating the Zambezi water-management 
strategy. The Technical Committee meets once a year. 
3. A Secretariat supervised by the Technical Committee and tasked 
with providing technical and administrative support for the 
Council of Ministers. It is headed by an executive secretary. 
The greatest challenge facing ZAMCOM in the near future will be the 
development of the integrated water management strategy for the basin 
and the task of harmonizing the water policies of the member countries. 
ZAMCOM is explicitly assigned the task of water-related dispute settle-
ment and prevention. Article 5 states that ZAMCOM will advise the par-
ties "on measures necessary for the avoidance of disputes and assist in the 
resolution of conflicts among Member States with regard to the planning, 
management, utilization, development, protection and conservation of the 
Zambezi Watercourse." Article 21 lays down a procedure for "settlement 
of disputes." The parties to a dispute are first obliged to enter into "con-
sultations and negotiations in the spirit of good faith." The Council of 
Ministers may offer recommendations on such cases. If no agreement is 
reached in this way, a dispute may be brought before the SADC Tribunal. 
Disputes between ZAMCOM and a member country are also expected to 
be brought before this tribunal. Each member country is obliged to report 
to the commission secretariat on "any programme, project or activity with 
regard to the Zambezi Watercourse." If a dispute emerges between mem-
ber countries over any such activity (e. g. because one or more countries 
fears harmful impacts from a project), "such Member States shall, on the 
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request of any one of them and utilising the good offices of the Commis-
sion, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations with a view to 
arriving at a settlement of such dispute" (Article 16). During the course of 
talks on points under dispute, work on the project in question is to be sus-
pended (for a period of time set by the parties to the dispute or by the 
commission). In the interest of coming up with a settlement, the commis-
sion can initiate a "fact finding study" (ibid.). 
The ZAMCOM Agreement makes explicit reference to the 1997 UN Con-
vention and the Revised SADC Water Protocol of 2000 as the "basis" of 
ZAMCOM agreements (ZAMCOM 2004, Preamble). The ZAMCOM 
Agreement remains without prejudice to other existing agreements (e. g. 
the ZRA), although it does oblige the parties to harmonize such agree-
ments with the ZAMCOM Agreement (Article 18). 
The agreement is somewhat vague when it comes to the question of fund-
ing ZAMCOM (Article 19). All parties are expected to contribute to 
ZAMCOM's budget. The Council is responsible for the actual concrete 
arrangements. 
Under ZACPLAN linkages to national structures were weak. The parties' 
administrative, financial, and technical capacities in the field of water 
policy and management are weak in any case, and ZACPLAN did not 
have any particular priority at the national level. In addition, the only 
ministries involved in the elaboration of ZACPLAN were those responsi-
ble for environmental protection and nature conservation, which at that 
time served as UNEP liaison units, while other important ministries were 
simply not involved. This meant that the latter were not engaged, and it 
also led to interministerial conflicts, all of which served to undercut sup-
port for ZACPLAN at the national level (Nakayama 1998, 406 f.). 
UNEP played an important part in the process that led to ZACPLAN. In 
1986 UNEP had launched its Environmentally Sound Management of 
Inland Waters program, and ZACPLAN took on the role of a pioneering 
and model project (see Nakayama 1998, 199 ff., on the role that UNEP 
played in the preparations for ZACPLAN). Other international (donor) 
organizations like the WB and UNDP as well as international NGOs (e. g. 
IUCN) were also involved in the elaboration of ZACPLAN, although they 
were unwilling to contribute much to the funding of the plan (Nakayama 
1998, 407). UNEP was not only a driving force behind ZACPLAN, it also 
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announced its intention to play a leading role in its implementation once 
the plan had become established. However, subsequent resistance on the 
part of the riparians concerned, and the problems to which this led soon 
forced UNEP to withdraw (Nakayama 1998, 405 f.). 
Later ZACPRO6 was provided conceptual and financial support mainly by 
SIDA, NORAD, and DANIDA. These agencies also contributed to the 
formation of ZAMCOM by funding rounds of negotiations that finally led 
to its establishment. Canada was also engaged in the process. It may thus 
be said that ZACPLAN / ZAMCOM is in large measure donor-driven. 
There have evidently been coordination problems among these donors 
(Granit 2000, 8), and even individual donors have had problems in coordi-
nating between the sectors responsible for national water issues and the 
sectors dedicated to transnational, regional water issues – one of which is 
ZACPLAN / ZAMCOM. 
While stakeholder and civil society participation was welcomed in princi-
ple, in fact these groups played as good as no role whatever. ZACPLAN 
was a project of government water bureaucracies (Lamoree / Nilsson 
2001, 35); water users and the general public had very little voice in the 
countries involved. It remains to be seen whether this will change when 
ZAMCOM is established. In any case, Article 16 of the ZAMCOM 
Agreement states: 
"Member States shall ensure that the Public in an area likely to be af-
fected by a proposed programme, project or activity are informed 
thereof and are provided with the opportunity for making comments 
thereon or objections thereto as well as on the transmittal of such com-
ments or objections to the Commission."  
There are plans to use a project steering committee and a national steering 
committee to ensure that stakeholders are able to participate. SIDA pro-
vides support for "awareness raising activities carried out by a regional 
NGO in partnership with SADC-WSCU and ZRA which has broadened 
and opened up the process" (Granit 2000, 8). 
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3.2.3 Destabilizations risks, cooperation potentials, and 
options for German Development Cooperation 
At present water yield in the Zambezi Basin still far exceeds consumption. 
This is why there are currently no serious conflicts over the waters of the 
Zambezi. But in view of growing population pressure and a number of 
ambitious new development projects, pressure on the Zambezi's water 
resources is bound to increase in the future. Risks may also emerge when 
Angola, the upstream riparian, having ended its civil war, starts to make 
heavier use of the waters of the Zambezi. Another serious risk would also 
emerge if the RSA sought to realize its plans to use the waters of the 
Zambezi to supply the Gauteng region via an interbasin transfer. In other 
words, conflicts between riparians over water use and allocation cannot be 
ruled out for the future. 
To be sure, the constitution of ZAMCOM has meant a real breakthrough 
for basinwide water resources management. This development appreciably 
boosts the chances that cooperative arrangements will be found, especially 
in view of the fact that the ZAMCOM Agreement makes explicit reference 
to the 1997 UN Convention and the Revised SADC Water Protocol of 
2000 as the "basis" of the ZAMCOM agreements. The greatest challenge 
facing ZAMCOM in the foreseeable future will be efforts to develop an 
integrated water management strategy for the basin and to harmonize the 
national water policies of the member countries. This could be an 
interesting field of activity for German DC. But it is important to bear in 
mind here that the Scandinavian countries have been active on the 
Zambezi for some time now, and further studies would be needed to 
determine whether there are needs and niches for German DC activities on 
the Zambezi. 
3.3 Limpopo 
3.3.1 Characterization of the basin 
The Limpopo is roughly 1,800 km in length. Its riparians are Botswana, 
Mozambique, the RSA, and Zimbabwe. The RSA holds the largest share 
of the ca. 415,000 km2-large basin (44 % as compared with 31 % for Mo-
zambique, 20 % for Botswana, and 15 % for Zimbabwe). The upper 
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course of the Limpopo (Crocodile River) forms the border first between 
the RSA and Botswana and then between the RSA and Zimbabwe. The 
Limpopo's MAR is 7,330 million m3. The riparians contribute as follows 
to this volume: RSA 66 %, Zimbabwe 16 %, Mozambique 12 %, and 
Botswana 6 %. Average annual precipitation in the basin is no more than 
500 mm. 
The Limpopo's water resources are intensively exploited to supply urban 
centers, industry, and irrigated agriculture. Beside the Orange, the Lim-
popo is the southern African's most important river in economic terms. Its 
basin is home to some 14 million people (43 % in urban centers), the ma-
jority in the RSA. The Limpopo Basin is thus one of Africa's most densely 
settled and urbanized river basins.  
There are numerous dams in the basin, 44 of them with a storage capacity 
of more than 12 million m3 (Heyns 2003, 14). Most of these dams (28) are 
located in the RSA, on Limpopo tributaries. The largest of these is the 
Loskop Dam on the Olifants River (348 million m3). The RSA's north-
western province of Mpumalanga as well as power-generation facilities for 
Gauteng are supplied with water from this reservoir. The Limpopo is the 
receiving basin for four ITBs and itself has two ITBs (Turton et al. 2004, 
263). The RSA and Zimbabwe together come close to fully exploiting the 
water resources of the Limpopo. 
The RSA's economy, and in particular the country's industrial heartland, 
the Gauteng region, is heavily dependent on water resources from the 
Limpopo. Some 200,000 ha of agricultural land in the RSA are under 
irrigation (together with another 50,000 ha in other riparian countries). The 
Limpopo receives additional water through ITBs from other river basins 
(Orange, Inkomati, and Maputo). Botswana recently inaugurated operation 
of the Letsibogo Dam on the Motloutse, a tributary of the Limpopo, the 
aim being to use a north-south carrier to improve the water supply for its 
capital Gaborone. Eastern Botswana, a densely populated region, depends 
on the Limpopo for its water supply. Mozambique, the downstream ri-
parian, fears further reductions of its water supply, in particular for a large-
scale irrigation project in the country's south and with a view to the Mass-
ingir Dam on the Olifants, a Limpopo tributary (Heyns 202, 15). In addi-
tion, industrial and mining uses on the river's upper course have adverse 
impacts on the quality of the river's waters. In other words, what is at stake 
here is not only water quantities but water quality as well. 
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Since all of the upstream riparians have plans to make more use of these 
water resources, Mozambique's concerns are not unjustified (Pereira / Vaz 
2000). What is called for to avoid any future conflicts is therefore an 
integrated approach to managing the overall river basin. 
3.3.2 Description and analysis of river-basin institutions  
The Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Committee (LBPTC) and the 
Limpopo Watercourse Commission (LIMCOM) 
In 1986 the riparian parties signed, in Harare, an agreement on founding 
the Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Committee (LBPTC), which was 
to advise the parties in their efforts to develop the Limpopo's water re-
sources (LBPTC Agreement). However, the LBPTC remained inactive for 
close to a decade, thanks above all to the extremely tense political situa-
tion in southern Africa in this period. The LBPTC had no organizational 
structure and no formalized procedural and decision-making rules. Only in 
1995, following the political transformation of the RSA, was a second 
meeting of the LBPTC convened. At it, agreement was reached on the 
joint preparation of a hydrological study on the Limpopo. The aim of the 
study was to lay the groundwork for an integrated river-basin management 
plan. The study, the first tangible result the LBPTC produced in its 13 
years of existence, was completed in 1999. In view of Mozambique's per-
sistent complaints that it was being provided absolutely no data or infor-
mation by the upstream riparians, this may be seen as an important 
confidence-building measure. In addition, at the 1995 meeting the parties 
committed themselves to basinwide cooperation and decided to create an 
RBO to lay the groundwork for it. However, several rounds of negotia-
tions (1998 in Gaborone, 1999 in Maputo, 2000 in Harare) on the creation 
of a Limpopo River Commission ended without any tangible results. The 
proposed organization's status remained a matter of dispute. The project 
was dogged by difficulties and delays of the kind experienced during the 
efforts undertaken to establish ORASECOM. Zimbabwe missed several 
meetings (on account of the domestic crisis in the country); as the 
downstream riparian, Mozambique felt discriminated against and placed at 
a disadvantage by the routinized cooperation between the RSA and Bot-
swana. There were disagreements over the responsibility to be transferred 
to an RBO as well as over the relationship the new RBO was to have to 
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existing bilateral institutions and the question of how binding water 
allocation decisions were to be achieved. 
The stage was finally set for an agreement when the parties consented to 
involve the SADC Water Sector and to use the SADC Water Protocol as a 
frame of reference. An additional impulse was provided by the 2002 Jo-
hannesburg Earth Summit. It was there, too, that the SACD Water Sector 
and the LBPTC reached agreement on a project to elaborate a joint action 
plan to combat water-borne diseases in the Limpopo Basin. 
Finally, in November 2002, the agreement to establish the Limpopo Wa-
tercourse Commission was adopted (LIMCOM 2003 Agreement). LIM-
COM is the successor organization to the NBPTC (Article 12). While all 
other existing agreements and institutions remain intact, the parties have 
agreed to harmonize them with the new LIMCOM Agreement. Also, the 
parties continue to have the right to conclude separate Limpopo-related 
agreements, to the extent that such agreements are consistent with the 
LIMCOM Agreement. The agreement makes explicit reference to the 1997 
UN Convention and the SADC Water Protocol, and the commission has 
committed itself to abide by the latter's principles of cooperation.12  
LIMCOM has an independent legal status. It is a technical advisory body 
whose aim is to guarantee that the water resources of the Limpopo River 
Basin are developed, utilized, and conserved for the common good of all 
four riparians (Articles 3 and 7). Recommendations, presented in the form 
of reports, are to be developed with a view above all to the following aims 
and measures:  
"… to determine the long term safe yield of the water (...) the equitable 
and reasonable utilisation of the Limpopo to support sustainable devel-
opment in the territory of each Contracting Party (...) all aspects re-
lated to the efficient and effective collection, processing and dissemina-
tion of data and information (...) contingency plans (...) investigations 
and studies" (Article 7). 
LIMCOM's central organ is the Council (Article 4). It is made up of dele-
gations of the four parties. Each delegation has three permanent members; 
                                                          
12  "…equitable and reasonable utilisation, sustainable development, intergeneration equity 
principle, prevention principle und transboundary impact assessment principle" (Article 
3).  
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additional advisers may be appointed from case to case. The council meets 
at least twice a year; decisions are taken by consensus. The council can set 
up ad hoc working groups, engage advisers and technical experts, and 
appoint administrative service providers. The council is authorized to set 
up a secretariat (Article 4).  
Article 9 of the agreement covers dispute settlement: When disputes arise, 
the parties are first expected to conduct negotiations. If these fail to come 
up with a result within six months, the dispute can be brought before the 
SADC Tribunal "unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise". Deci-
sions of the tribunal are to be recognized as "final and binding". 
The parties to the agreement are responsible for covering the costs of their 
own delegations. When the council meets, the host delegation is responsi-
ble for meeting the costs involved in preparing and conducting the meet-
ing. All other "costs or liabilities incurred by the Commission" are shared 
equally by all of the parties (Article 11). 
In its further (in particular organizational) development, LIMCOM intends 
to seek orientation in ORASECOM.  
As an external actor, Germany, i. e. the GTZ, played an important role in 
the formation of LIMCOM. As in the case of ORASECOM, the GTZ pro-
vided support for the negotiation processes and provided legal support in 
drafting the commission's founding document. The German financial con-
tributions amounted to: € 0.17 million in 2001, € 0.34 million each for 
2002 and 2003, and € 0.39 million in 2004. In the framework of the EU 
Water Initiative, the EU is providing support for a survey of resources and 
activities as well as for modeling work and data-sharing. 
The Joint Permanent Technical Commission and the Joint Water 
Commission 
Beside the basinwide institutions there are also bilateral institutions that go 
back some years.13 Botswana and the RSA had cooperated along the upper 
                                                          
13  The Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee (TPTC) (agreement: 1983, member 
countries: RSA, Mozambique, and Swaziland) cannot be dealt with at any length here. 
While it was supposed to concern itself with water resources shared by all three parties 
(including the Limpopo), the tense political situation at the time prevented it from 
gaining any significance in practice. 
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course of the Limpopo before Botswana won its independence; once it 
became independent, it continued on with this cooperation, despite the 
apartheid regime in the RSA. In 1983 the two parties established a Joint 
Permanent Technical Committee (JPTC) which was tasked, among other 
things, with preparing a Joint Upper Limpopo Basin Study (JULBS). The 
joint work on the JULBS, which required the parties to exchange data and 
information, served to strengthen confidence between the RSA and Bot-
swana. The JPTC meets once a year, and its work may be said to be 
wholly effective. The committee was upgraded to a commission in 1989 
(Joint Permanent Technical Commission).14 Gaborone is supplied with 
water from the Molatedi Dam on the Marico River in the RSA. Botswana 
contributes to the dam's operations. The concessions South Africa has 
made to Botswana are due not least to the fact that the former is reliant on 
Botswana's good will for possible future water projects – e. g. water trans-
fer from the Zambezi and / or the Okavango – since such projects would 
require that pipelines be laid through Botswana's territory. 
In 1997 the two countries also set up a Joint Permanent Commission for 
Cooperation (JPCC), the task of which is to strengthen cooperation in 
various areas (including water resources). 
In 1996 the RSA and Mozambique signed an agreement on a Joint Water 
Commission (JWC) which was to serve as an advisory body on issues 
concerning shared watercourses, including the Limpopo. In view of a 
history of extremely tense and strained relations between the two coun-
tries, the bilateral cooperation between the RSA and Mozambique has 
proven more difficult than the cooperation between the RSA and Bot-
swana, particularly since Mozambique, as the downstream riparian, is in 
an incomparably weaker position and has – unlike Botswana – little to 
offer the RSA by way of water resources. 
The bilateral institutions exist side by side with the multilateral LBPTC / 
LIMCOM. The reason why these institutions have worked out thus far is, 
                                                          
14  In June l989 the JPTC was replaced by a Joint Permanent Technical Commission on the 
Limpopo Basin and this, in turn, was replaced by another Water Commission in 
November 1995. 
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evidently, that two partners are better able to reach quick agreement than 
more than two partners.15 
3.3.3 Destabilization risks, cooperation potentials, and 
options for German Development Cooperation 
The RSA and Zimbabwe are exploiting the water resources of the Lim-
popo nearly to full capacity. The RSA's economy – and in particular its 
industrial heartland Gauteng – is heavily dependent on Limpopo water 
resources. IBTs are used to supply the Limpopo with additional water 
from other river basins. The quality of the waters of the Limpopo suffers 
from the industrial and mining activities. In other words, the concern on 
the Limpopo is with both water quantity and water quality. In view of the 
fact that all of the upstream riparians have plans to increase their 
utilization of water resources, Mozambique has good reason to be 
concerned about its own water resources. This constellation has what it 
takes to make a classic upstream-downstream conflict. 
The creation of LIMCOM has appreciably improved the prospects for 
cooperative basinwide solutions, especially since LIMCOM is explicitly 
integrated into the context of the SADC Water Sector, and the riparians 
have also committed themselves to cooperation in the framework of other 
river-basin organizations. LIMCOM plans to orient its further (above all 
organizational) development to ORASECOM. German DC could focus on 
supporting this linkage. As an external actor, Germany, i. e. the GTZ, has 
already played an important role in the formation of LIMCOM. It should 
continue to play this role over the medium term, perhaps focusing on ef-
forts to further strengthen LIMCOM in organizational terms and to set the 
stage for more civil society participation. Furthermore, German DC could 
provide special support for the country that must in many ways be seen as 
the weakest link here, viz. Mozambique (efforts to strengthen national 
                                                          
15  "Although bilateralism in multilateral basin is not a sustainable approach to cooperate 
in the long-term, it operates however more practically. In multinational river basins, 
bilateral framework for cooperation has technical advantages and short-term benefits 
while multilateral framework, if possible, has political advantages and long-term 
benefits for all. A bilateral cooperation as part of multilateral framework could be an 
alternative approach for basin-wide cooperation" (Mohamed s. a., 3). 
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water management capacities, capacity-building aimed at setting the stage 
for participation on an equal footing in the international water framework). 
3.4 Lake Victoria 
3.4.1 Characterization of the lake basin 
Lake Victoria has an area of roughly 69,000 km2 and a basin about 
193,000 km2 in size. This makes it the world's second-largest and Africa's 
largest lake. It has a volume of 2,760 km3; its shoreline is 3,450 km long 
(1,750 km in Tanzania, 1,150 km in Uganda, and 550 km in Kenya). It has 
an average depth of 40 m, and a depth of 80 m at its deepest point. The 
lake is 412 km long from north to south and 355 wide from east to west. 
The lake's altitude is 1,135 m. The region receives relatively abundant 
precipitation (1,015 mm / annum). 85 % of its water is from precipitation, 
15 % from tributaries (including the Kagera, Nzoia, Sio, and Yala rivers). 
The evaporation rate is equivalent to 85 % of the water that flows out of 
the lake. The largest tributary is the Kagera, which comes from Burundi. 
The waters of Lake Victoria overflow into the Nile, in Uganda, through 
the Ripon Falls / Owen Falls.  
Three riparian countries share the lake, namely Kenya (6 % of its surface), 
Tanzania (49 %), and Uganda (45 %). Burundi and Rwanda also share its 
basin (7 and 11 %, respectively, compared with 44 % for Tanzania, 22 % 
for Kenya, 16 % for Uganda). The basin is home to some 35 million 
people, roughly one third of the overall population of the three riparians. 
The lake and its resources are used to supply water to households, indus-
try, and agriculture as well as for fisheries, transportation, to acquire 
building materials, to generate power, and to dispose of household, agri-
cultural, and industrial wastes. The lake basin is fertile and densely popu-
lated, and it is farmed intensively (to produce coffee, tea, cotton, sugar 
cane, etc.). Some 3 million people in its riparian countries earn their liveli-
hood from fishing and fish-processing. The average annual catch ranges 
between 400–500,000 tons, with Tanzania accounting for a share of 40 %, 
Kenya 35 %, and Uganda 25 %. The region is marked by high population 
growth and high levels of rural-urban migration. Kenya, the riparian with 
the smallest share of the lake, is especially dependent on its resources: 
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Over 50 % of the country's water resources come from Lake Victoria. 
Kenya's part of the basin is very densely populated. 
The basin is troubled by a variety of environmental problems: introduction 
of exogenous fish species (Nile perch and Nile tilapia) that have tended to 
displace native species; overfishing; eutrophication; algae growth due to 
nutrient inflows (phosphorus and nitrogen); massive propagation of the 
water hyacinth (the consequences: decline of fish stocks; impeded trans-
portation and fishing activities); degradation of wetlands along the lake's 
banks; pollution and toxicity due to discharges of wastes and untreated 
wastewater from urban areas, industry (including tanneries, breweries, 
fish-processing plants, paper producers) as well as from agriculture (herbi-
cides and pesticides). Water-borne diseases like bilharziosis, schistosomi-
asis and malaria are widespread. 
The conflicts encountered here are mainly between export-oriented and 
traditional fisheries. There is also a full-blown conflict between Kenyan 
fishermen and Ugandan authorities, who quite often stop Kenyan fishing 
boats and arrest fishermen for allegedly fishing in Ugandan territorial 
waters. This has already led to one international conflict (EALA Study 
2005). Widespread piracy furthermore poses a threat to the security of 
fishing and transportation activities on the lake. 
Tanzania is currently building a 179 km-long pipeline to supply the coun-
try's arid northwest with water from Lake Victoria, and Kenya has devel-
oped similar plans in connection with its Kenyan National Water Master 
Plan. Such projects have impacts that are felt as far downstream as Egypt, 
the lower-course Nile riparian, which is reliant on Lake Victoria as the 
source of the Nile. 
3.4.2 Description and analysis of lake-basin institutions  
The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization  
On June 30, 1994, the three riparians founded the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organization (LVFO) (LVFO Convention 1994, LVFO Convention 
Amendment 1998). The organization came about in the context of the 
Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) (see below). 
The LVFO is an international organization with an independent legal 
status. Its aim is "to promote the proper management and optimum utiliza-
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tion of the fisheries and other resources of the Lake" (Article 2). This in 
turn entails efforts to harmonize the national policies of the parties and to 
develop joint concepts for the protection and utilization of the lake. 
The body's organizational structure provides for:  
— a Council of Ministers; a Policy Steering Committee (made up of 
undersecretaries from the ministries of the parties responsible for 
fisheries; these bodies meet once a year);  
— an Executive Committee (six members, heads of the departments 
responsible for fisheries and heads of fisheries research institutions of 
the parties; these meet once a year);  
— a Fisheries Management Committee (heads of department of fisheries 
management);  
— a Scientific Committee (heads of departments of fisheries research); 
and  
— a Permanent Secretariat (Articles 4–12).  
The Council of Ministers, the LVFO's highest organ, which is made up of 
the parties' fisheries ministers, has thus far met only on relatively rare 
occasions for regular meetings (every two years, the fifth session took 
place on May 27, 2004). But thanks to the Permanent Secretariat, which is 
headquartered in Jinja, Uganda, the LVFO has been able to work on a 
continuous basis. The secretariat is headed by an executive secretary ap-
pointed for a five-year term by the Council of Ministers. The post rotates 
regularly among the parties. The secretariat employs a good dozen persons 
as its full-time staff. The establishment in all three parties of National 
Committees made up of national advisers – which may be seen as the 
LVFO's base – has also contributed to the organization's operational effec-
tiveness. 
Since the fish stocks are this transboundary waterbody's most important 
economic resource, it is understandable that efforts aimed at institutional-
izing transboundary management started out by focusing on fish resources. 
Pressure and support were also forthcoming from abroad: The EU at one 
point temporarily banned the import of Nile perch from Lake Victoria for 
reasons of inadequate hygiene, while at the same time offering assistance. 
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When the EAC was (re)established, the LVFO became an EAC institution. 
A stakeholder workshop held in July 1998 elaborated a vision statement 
for the LVFO that is to serve for purposes of strategic orientation from the 
period from 1999 to 2015 (the so-called LVFO Strategic Vision). 
The most recent session of the Council of Ministers (in May 2004) 
adopted a "Regional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Ille-
gal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing" (RPOA-IUU) on Lake Victoria. 
Figure 3: LVFO – Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization – dispute-
settlement mechanism 
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Its aim is "to ensure compliance to fisheries laws and regulations, 
facilitate monitoring, control and surveillance; enhance collection of 
fisheries statistics to control fishing effort to ensure optimum utilisation of 
the resource and guarantee sustainability of the Lake Victoria fisheries" 
(Joint Communiqué LVFO 2004), i. e. to take action on the problem of 
overfishing and to prevent conflicts over fisheries. 
External actors / donors were involved in the establishment of the LVFO. 
WB / GEF became indirectly involved by financing the LVEMP, the EU 
by funding the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (LVFRP), and the 
FAO was directly involved in drafting the agreement. The LVFO works 
together with the FAO on a close and regular basis. The EU Commission 
is presently (2003–2008) contributing Tsh 35.7 billion (2003: € 35.3 mil-
lion) to the funding of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Management Project. 
The LVFO has a budget of its own, which is prepared by the executive 
secretary and adopted by the Council of Ministers. The parties make con-
tributions to the budget that are set by the Council of Ministers. 
The LVFO has a well-devised dispute-settlement mechanisms (see Fig, 3). 
If a dispute between the parties cannot be settled through negotiations, 
each party to it is entitled to call for arbitration. In this case an arbitral 
tribunal is appointed. It is made up of three persons: Each party to the 
dispute appoints one arbitrator, these then appoint a third arbitrator who 
serves as the tribunal's president. If no arbitrators are appointed within a 
given period, the chairperson of the Council of Ministers appoints the 
remaining arbitrator(s).  
The Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project  
On August 5, 1994, the three riparians concluded an agreement on the 
Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP). The practi-
cal work began in 1997; it was first projected to last for five years. The 
project has since been restructured: After completion of a first phase (in 
2005) preparatory work is set to start on Phase II, which is projected to 
take some 15 years (the program for Phase II is scheduled to be ready for 
decision at that time). The aim of Phase I was "management and control of 
water hyacinth, improvement in the fisheries management and fisheries 
research, water quality monitoring, management of industrial and munici-
pal wastes, conservation of biodiversity, catchment forests and wetlands, 
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sustainable land use practices and capacity building" (see LVEMP web-
site: http://www.lvemp.org/).  
In the framework of the first project phase, 144 microprojects were 
launched in the fields of health, water supply and wastewater disposal, 
education, road-building, fisheries, forestation. Phase II is to focus on 
three components: research and development; management; socioeco-
nomic development. 
An organizational structure with the following elements was created for 
implementation purposes:  
− a Regional Policy and Steering Committee made up of three 
representatives from each of the parties. Its task is to clarify 
open questions and to contribute to settling disputes among the 
parties. The committee has a regional secretariat headed by an 
executive secretary (country in charge: Tanzania);  
− a Regional Task Force 1, which is responsible for fisheries 
management and water hyacinth control (country in charge: 
Uganda);  
− a Regional Task Force 2, which is responsible for management 
of water quality and land use (country in charge: Kenya) 
(LVEMP Agreement 1994, Articles 2, 3).  
In addition, two National Working Groups and a National Secretariat were 
set up in each of the countries party to the agreement; their function was to 
support the LVEMP institutions. Alongside government representatives, 
these national bodies also contained "academic institutions, private sector 
parties and local non-governmental organisations, with a special effort (…) 
made to incorporate local riparian community interests" (ibid., Article 2). 
Regional Task Force 1 was given the task of creating the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organization (see below). 
The LVEMP evidently was successful in its capacity-building efforts, in 
particular in the government institutions involved, above all because the 
national secretariats had a key role to play in project implementation. 
Initially the LVEMP was funded largely by the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), each of 
which contributed US $ 35 million (1997–2001). Each of the three parties 
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contributed a total of US $ 7.8 million (in equal amounts). "Cooperation 
between the LVEMP and EAC/donors (was) poor" (Swedish Strategy 
2004, 31). For Phase II, Norway and Sweden made funds available 
through the World Bank that are to be used to elaborate a Shared Vision 
and Development Strategy as a basis for Phase II. In addition, since April 
2004 (date of approval) the GEF has funded a project entitled Trans-
boundary Diagnostic Analysis and Strategic Action Program Development 
for the Lake Victoria Basin. The LVEMP's regional secretariat is the "im-
plementing entity" for the project.  
Several stakeholder workshops were held in the LVEMP framework. Spe-
cial emphasis was placed on participation of local fishing communities. 
This led to good results, while the participation of so-called catchment 
communities – aimed at avoiding discharges of sediments and nutrients – 
proved less successful. The National Task Forces (NTFs), which organ-
ized the process of developing visions and strategies for the second phase 
of LVEMP, contained both government representatives and representa-
tives of NGOs, the private sector, and the academic community. The NTFs 
organized a number of stakeholder meetings involving a total of some 
15,000 stakeholders (Swedish Strategy 2004, 13). And the Regional Task 
Force (RTF), which developed a transnational Vision and Strategy Pro-
posal, contained both government representatives and "civil society, the 
business community, and academic community" (ibid., 13). NTFs and RTF 
were funded by SIDA. The largest of the some 40 NGOs engaged in the 
LVEMP context is the East African Communities Organisation for the 
Management of Lake Victoria (ECOVIC), an association of several 
smaller NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs). While NGOs 
and CBOs have evidently been involved in developing visions and strate-
gies, their involvement appears to have been accepted only on a case-by-
case basis (mainly participation in workshops); and there still are some 
open questions as to their involvement in the implementation of visions 
and strategies. It remains to be seen whether this state of affairs will be 
different in the framework of the LVBC. Moreover, several international 
NGOs in the basin have been engaged, with SIAD support, in active 
cooperation with the EAC (e. g. IUCN, WWF, ICRAF). 
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The Lake Victoria Basin Commission  
In 1999 the East African Community (EAC) was (re)established by 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC agreement provides, among other 
things, for joint management of transboundary catchment areas. The 
agreement explicitly refers to Lake Victoria as the parties' most important 
shared natural resource. It describes the lake as an element linking the 
members of the EAC, declaring the community's goal to be the lake's sus-
tainable development for the economic and social benefit of all three ri-
parians. The Lake Victoria Basin was declared to be a so-called economic 
growth zone. The EAC secretariat served as a vehicle to set up the Lake 
Victoria Development Programme (LVDP) and a Committee for Lake 
Victoria Development (CLVD). Two other riparians, Rwanda and Bu-
rundi, have since applied for membership in the EAC, and in 2004 
Rwanda and the EAC signed a memorandum of understanding on regional 
cooperation. 
The establishment of the EAC and its engagement on Lake Victoria have 
given new impulses to efforts to set up a lake-basin organization for Lake 
Victoria. The conclusion of a Partnership Agreement between the EAC 
and various donors (Sweden, France, Norway, the World Bank, the East 
African Development Bank (EADB, April 24, 2001)) on a longer-term 
partnership to promote sustainable development in the Lake Victoria Basin 
has also contributed to this end. A Partnership Consultative Committee 
(which meets twice a year) and a Partnership Fund were set up to imple-
ment these goals. For its part, the EAC set up a unit (made up of two offi-
cials) with the EAC secretariat and a Policy Advisory Board to implement 
the program. At the 2000 Johannesburg Earth Summit the heads of gov-
ernment, the state of Sweden and the EAC countries committed them-
selves to the sustainable development of the lake basin (Swedish Strategy 
2004, 17). Sweden has pledged SEK 1.5 billion (€ 165.8 million) over the 
coming ten years for this purpose (ibid., 36). 
It was this background that paved the way for the conclusion of a compre-
hensive agreement on transboundary lake-basin management and the crea-
tion of a commission devoted to the task. On November 29, 2003, at a 
meeting of the EAC's Council of Ministers, the three riparians signed a 
protocol on the sustainable development of the Lake Victoria Basin and 
the establishment of a Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC). The 
commission is an EAC institution, and the agreement is an integral ele-
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ment of the 1999 EAC agreement. The LCBC, in its capacity as an imple-
menting agent, has been given the task of implementing the Protocol for 
Sustainable Development of the Lake Victoria Basin. The protocol out-
lines the commission's general competences: support and coordination of 
the activities of various actors in the field of sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in the Lake Victoria Basin (Mngube 2004, 2). 
The agreement sets out the following goals: promotion of "equitable eco-
nomic growth, measures aimed at eradicating poverty, sustainable utilisa-
tion and management of natural resources, protection of the environment, 
compliance on safety of navigation" (Protocol Lake Victoria 2003, Article 
33). 
The commission's tasks and functions are to include: "harmonisation of 
policies, laws, regulations and standards; promotion of stakeholder 
participation; guidance on implementation of sectoral projects; promotion 
of capacity building and institutional development; promotion of safety 
and security; promotion of research development" (ibid.). 
The commission is to have a highly differentiated organizational struc-
ture. It is made up of the Sectoral Council, the Coordination Committee, 
the Sectoral Committees, and a secretariat headed by an executive secre-
tary (Articles 34–42). The Sectoral Council is the political decision-
making body, the Coordination Committee is responsible for 
implementation. Both meet at least twice a year. The Sectoral Council's 
"core members" are to include the ministers responsible in the partner 
countries for water, fisheries, agriculture, transportation, the environment, 
and natural resources. Its "essential members" will continue to be the 
foreign ministers and the ministers for internal security. The Sectoral 
Council "shall link" with other EAC sectoral councils to the extent that 
this proves necessary (Mngube 2004, 4). 
The Coordination Committee is to be made up of the permanent secretar-
ies responsible for water, fisheries, agriculture, transportation, the envi-
ronment, and natural resources and the permanent secretaries responsible 
for external relations and internal security (Mngube 2004, 3). 
From case to case, Sectoral Committees are to be set up by the Sectoral 
Council on the recommendation of the Coordination Committee. The 
committees may include both government officials and representatives of 
business, industry, and civil society (Article 37).  
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In addition, so-called National Focal Points are to be set up in all of the 
countries concerned; their task is to coordinate between the national level 
and the commission. 
The task of the secretariat, a permanent institution, is to support the work 
of the other commission levels. The secretariat is the commission's execu-
tive arm, responsible for cross-cutting coordination, providing support for 
the commission's work, and cooperation with the EAC secretariat, the 
partner countries, and development partners / donors (Mngube 2004, 2). It 
is headed by an executive secretary appointed by the council to a five-year 
term of office. Among other tasks, the secretariat's functions are to:  
"establish a regional database and promote sharing of information and 
development of information systems and data exchange (...) disseminate 
information on the Commission to stakeholders and the international 
community; mobilise resources for the implementation of the projects 
and programmes of the Commission; develop a sustainable funding 
mechanism for facilitating sustainable development in the Basin" (Arti-
cle 42). 
On the LVBC's funding, the protocol states:  
"The sources of funds for the Commission shall be from the East Africa 
Community budget, stakeholders' contribution, development partners 
and such other sources as shall be established by the Council" (Article 
43). 
While the LVBC is not to replace other institutions, it is to have the role of 
a lead organization:  
"The Commission, as established by the Protocol, shall perform its 
functions as provided for by the Protocol, however, in relation to other 
existing or new institutions, programmes and projects, it shall be the 
lead organization in formulating, reviewing and coordinating proposals 
for in-house policy and strategy towards development activities in the 
Basin. The EAC Secretariat will commission a study to work out the op-
erational linkage between LVBC and Lake Victoria Fisheries Organi-
sation" (Mngube 2004, 4). 
Since that time a so-called Vision and Strategy document has been 
adopted (EAC 2004). This  
"shall be the guiding document in identifying the scope, priorities and 
type of activities, which could be included in the Commissions work 
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programme. Other stakeholders, governments, international organiza-
tions, NGOs and scientific institutions should ensure that their activities 
are also guided by the same document. This will also include the activi-
ties of the Local Authorities and the other organs of the EAC." (Mngube 
2004, 4) 
The protocol explicitly provides for cooperation with "development part-
ners" (Article 44). By funding a study examining the legal and institu-
tional aspects, SIDA played a key role in the development of the protocol. 
In the framework of the Swedish Lake Victoria Initiative (since 2000), 
Sweden has generally committed itself to a 20-year engagement.16 Canada 
is also strongly engaged here. German DC is providing support for the 
EAC secretariat on the one hand, and bilateral support for water manage-
ment in individual riparian countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) on 
the other. The EU Water Initiative is to concentrate on the Kagera River 
Basin and providing support for the NELSAP program (Nile Equatorial 
Lakes Region Subsidiary Action Programme), both of which belong to the 
NBI context. This EUWI Kagera Programme (EUWIKP) follows up on an 
existing SIDA-NORAD program. 
Article 46 of the protocol covers dispute settlement. If a dispute between 
two parties cannot be resolved by direct negotiations, each party, or the 
EAC executive secretary, can bring the dispute before the East African 
Court of Justice. This body's decisions are final and binding (Article 46). 
It is noteworthy that the agreement also obliges the parties to define a 
common policy vis-à-vis third-party countries.17 This may prove signifi-
cant in the context of the Nile River Basin. It is furthermore noteworthy 
that the new agreement supersedes other existing agreements: Article 48 
states that the provisions of the protocol have precedence over any existing 
agreements concerning the Lake Victoria Basin. If other agreements prove 
to be inconsistent with the protocol, these agreements are null and void. 
                                                          
16  Sweden is focused here on the five following areas: "capacity building for sustainable 
development, empowering communities and individuals, sound environmental and 
sustainable use of natural resources, combating HIV / Aids, private sector development 
for economic growth" (Swedish Strategy 2004, 22). 
17  Article 33 of the LVBC requires the partner countries to prepare and harmonize joint 
negotiating positions vis-à-vis all other countries as far as the Lake Victoria Basin is 
concerned. 
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The protocol has now been ratified by all of the parties (communication 
from Mngube Jan.3, 2005). It remains to be seen whether the commission 
will be able to contribute to improving transboundary lake-basin manage-
ment. Lake-basin activities continue to be organized largely at the national 
level, and there is at present little harmonization between the parties' poli-
cies. While all three riparians have been engaged in reforming their na-
tional water legislation, policies, and strategies, these efforts lack coordi-
nation both at the national level (between different ministries / 
departments) and in the transnational context. 
3.4.3 Destabilization risks, cooperation potentials, and 
options for German Development Cooperation 
Apart from environmental problems, Lake Victoria continues to be faced 
with – escalation-prone – conflicts between different users, not the least of 
which is an international conflict between Kenya and Uganda. In addition, 
the lake is also part of the larger Nile conflict constellation. Destabilization 
risks are thus given at different levels, particularly in view of the fact that 
the riparians are pursuing plans for further utilization of the lake's waters. 
On the other hand, the prospects for successful cooperation have improved 
appreciably since the (re)establishment of the EAC, and in particular since 
the establishment of the LVBC. The organizational structure planned for 
the LVBC is a promising one, although not much of it has been realized 
thus far. This could be one starting point for German DC (organizational 
development, capacity-building). And in view of the fact that there is a 
risk that incompatibilities may emerge between managing Lake Victoria 
and the Nile Basin, German DC could furthermore work for a linkage 
between Victoria Basin management and the Nile Basin Initiative. This 
risk should be avoided at all costs. At present a window of opportunity 
seems to be opening up on Lake Victoria, and German DC should 
undertake efforts to make use of it and to expand it. This could play a key 
role for crisis prevention in particular; and beyond that, German DC, 
which until now has focused mainly on river basins, could build expertise 
bearing on support for lake-basin management. However, it would first be 
essential to reach understandings with other donors already active in the 
field. 
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3.5 Lake Chad 
3.5.1 Characterization of the lake basin 
The Lake Chad basin has an area of roughly 2.39 million km2.18 The lake's 
surface is extremely variable, fluctuating as a function of season and mac-
roclimatic events (droughts). One of the features typical of the lake is its 
dramatic shrinkage since the mid-1960s, a development due on the one 
hand to climate change and on the other to man-made environmental deg-
radation (overexploitation of the lake's waters, overgrazing, deforestation, 
nonsustainable irrigated agriculture). In the 1960s the lake had an area of 
some 25,000 km2, today its average size is 2,500 km2. In extreme cases it 
has even shrunk to 2,000 km2. The lake is very shallow (with an average 
depth of 1.5 m and a max. depth of 12 m). Its most important tributaries 
are the Chari (Shari) (950 km in length), its tributary the Logone, and the 
Komadougou-Yobe river system (as well as the El Beid and the Yede-
seram). The Chari and Logone account for 90 % of the lake's inflows. In 
recent years natural factors and the damming up of the lake's tributaries 
have severely reduced the quantity of water flowing into it.19 
The annual average precipitation in the basin is distributed very unevenly. 
The southwest receives an average of 1,600 mm/annum, while the north 
has less than 155 mm / annum. The evaporation rate, i. e. 2,300 mm / 
annum, is very high. 
The countries that share the Lake Chad Basin are Chad (45.5 %), Niger 
(28 %), the Central African Republic (CAR) (9 %), Nigeria (7 %), Algeria 
(4 %), Sudan (4 %), Cameroon (2 %), and Libya (0.5 %). Over one half of 
the territory of Chad and Niger are located in the Lake Chad Basin. The 
lake's direct riparians are Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Three 
quarters of the lake's waters come from the CAR and Cameroon, countries 
that themselves either do not border on the lake (CAR) or share only a 
                                                          
18  The so-called conventional basin that falls under the responsibility of the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission originally encompassed an area of 443,000 square kilometers. Since the 
CAR's accession to the commission the figure is 967,000 km2 (Burchi / Spreij 2003, 2). 
19  "The total annual mean river inflow decreased from the pre-drought value of 39.8 km3 
to the present value of 21.8 km3. This reflects a decrease of 47%. During the same time, 
the total lake input (including direct rainfall on the lake) decreased by 50%" (Odada et 
al. 2004, 8). 
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small part of it. There is also a discrepancy between the relatively rain-rich 
south, which feeds the lake, and the arid north. One typical feature of Lake 
Chad is its extensive inundation areas (Sategui-Deressia in Chad, Yaeres 
in Cameroon, and Hedejia-Nguru in Nigeria).  
The environmental degradation of the lake and its basin is described as 
follows: shrinkage of the lake's surface, constant decline in the quantity of 
water in its tributaries, decline of the groundwater table, soil erosion, loss 
of plant and animal species, pollution and toxicity from agricultural 
chemicals, sedimentation, salinization, overfishing, and invasive plants 
(water hyacinth). 
The Lake Chad Basin is home to some 22 million people; population 
growth is high (2.4–2.6 %). The lake provides livelihoods for over 
150,000 fishermen. The average catch per year is 60–70,000 tons (as 
compared with 130–140,000 tons in the 1970s). Both (nomadic) 
pastoralists and settled farmers are dependent on the lake's waters and 
groundwater. Farmers use the fertile lake soil when its waters recede for 
seasonal reasons. At present the land used for irrigated agriculture in the 
basin amounts to some 115,000 ha. Nigeria accounts for most of this 
(some 83,000 ha), followed by Chad (14,000 ha), and Cameroon (13,000 
ha). The basin's potential is estimated to be 1.16 million ha; realizing this 
potential would mean utilizing some 80 % of the volume of the lake's 
present tributaries. Water use for irrigated agriculture has experienced a 
fourfold increase since the early 1980s. The larger irrigation projects are 
generally regarded as inefficient.20 Several larger-scale irrigation projects, 
e. g. the South Chad Irrigation Project in Nigeria and the Mambi Polder 
Project in Chad, have already been abandoned or indefinitely suspended 
because of the lake's shrinkage. 
The largest project currently under planning is an IBT system designed to 
stop the lake's shrinkage by supplying it with water from the Congo River 
Basin. The plan is to divert 900 m3/s of water from the Oubangui River in 
the Congo Basin to Lake Chad through a pipeline and a navigable canal 
some 2,400 km in length. In addition, there are plans to build a dam near 
                                                          
20  The WWF has come up with a devastating assessment of these irrigation projects: "A 
few large-scale irrigation schemes (polders) developed on some parts of the lake shore 
have proven totally unsuited to the hydrological, climatic and cultural conditions in the 
Lake Chad region, and can be considered as complete failures" (WWF Lake Chad, 2). 
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Palambo (CAR) on the Oubangui to generate electricity. The aim of this 
project is to expand irrigated agriculture to an area of 5–7 million ha; the 
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) has already signed a no-objection state-
ment. The countries involved have earmarked US$ 1 million for the proj-
ect and intend to tap donors for an additional US$ 5 million for feasibility 
studies. These studies, on which a decision was reached by the Lake Chad 
Bain Commission in January 2002, are set to look into the project's social, 
economic, and environmental impacts. 
Environmental changes in the lake region have given rise to a good num-
ber of conflicts at different levels, some of which have taken a violent 
course. There have been conflicts between upstream and downstream 
communities along tributaries concerning dam projects, and there have 
also been heated conflicts between nomadic pastoralists and settled farm-
ers. These groups are in competition for the region's growingly scarce 
natural resources, land (for grazing) and water. Some have organized in 
well-armed militias that combat one another. There are, however, also 
numerous nonstate, traditional dispute-settlement mechanisms in place for 
farmers and cattle breeders that are used to address disputes over grazing 
and transit rights, access to water, etc. 
There have at times also been conflicts between the lake's riparian states. 
In the late 1970s, for instance, there were clashes between Nigeria and 
Chad along their 85 km-long border, which runs through Lake Chad, and 
in April 1983 fighting between the armed forces of the two countries 
claimed more than 100 lives. The conflict was settled only in 1986. The 
Lake Chad Basin Commission was also involved in the mediation efforts. 
There is also a more serious, continuing border conflict between Nigeria 
and Cameroon that in 1993 led to fighting between the armed forces of the 
two sides. The conflict involved the whole of the border between the two 
countries (1,600 km in length) as well as the Bakassie Peninsula far to the 
south. The Lake Chad Basin is also part of the conflict, since the shrinkage 
of the lake has blurred the course of the borders: local groups, formally 
Nigerian citizens, followed the receding waters and founded villages on 
Cameroonian territory; the Nigerian administration moved in to fill the 
vacuum, and this triggered official protests from Cameroon. For some 
years now the two sides, with international support, have been working to 
settle the conflict, and a special Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission 
was established for the purpose (see below). 
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In addition, in the countries of the region there have been massive tensions 
between different user groups, upstream-downstream conflicts along the 
tributaries, and disputes over (planned) dams (e. g. on the Mape River in 
Cameroon) – and in particular in Nigeria between the county's individual 
federal states. 
3.5.2 Description and analysis of lake-basin institutions 
Lake Chad Basin Commission 
On May 22, 1964, the four riparians Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad 
signed the Fort Lamy (today N'Djamena) Convention, creating the Lake 
Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). In March 1994 the CAR became the 
fifth member of this intergovernmental institution. In July 2000 Sudan was 
also granted membership; Sudan, however, has yet to ratify the founding 
convention and therefore has only observer status. The LCBC is Africa's 
oldest river- /lake-basin organization. In its founding document (the Con-
vention and Statutes relating to the Development of the Chad Basin) the 
parties commit themselves to a shared use of the basin's natural resources. 
Individual countries are required to provide other member countries with 
prior notification, and they are furthermore obliged to rule out any adverse 
impacts on these countries:  
"The Member States undertake to refrain from adopting, without refer-
ring to the Commission beforehand, any measures likely to exert a 
marked influence either upon the extent of water losses, or upon the 
form of the annual hydrograph and limnograph and certain other char-
acteristics of the Lake, upon the conditions of their exploitation by other 
bordering States, upon the sanitary condition of the water resources or 
upon the biological characteristics of the fauna and flora of the Basin. 
In particular, the Member States agree not to undertake in that part of 
the Basin falling within their jurisdiction any work in connection with 
the development of water resources or the soil likely to have a marked 
influence upon the system of the water courses and levels of the Basin 
without adequate notice and prior consultations with the Commis-
sion...“ (LCBC Convention and Statutes 1964, Statutes, Article 5). 
In practice, however, these obligations have been violated again and again 
by the member countries (dam construction and irrigation projects without 
prior notification). 
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The functions of the LCBC  
"are advisory and coordinating, and can be summarized as follows: 
Preparing joint rules, which will enable the application of the princi-
ples defined in the Convention and Statutes, and ensuring their effective 
application. Collecting, examining, evaluating, and disseminating in-
formation on projects prepared by member states and recommending 
planning for joint works and research programs within the basin. 
Maintaining liaison among member states in order to facilitate the most 
efficient use of the waters of the basin. Following up the execution of 
works and studies. Promoting regional cooperation and the coordina-
tion of regional projects. Examining complaints and proposing the set-
tlement of disputes" (Burchi / Spreij 2003, 3). 
The LCBC has an independent legal status; the commission is made up of 
three commissioners from each member country. It meets at least once a 
year (Statutes, Art. 8). Decisions are taken by consensus. The commis-
sion's supreme body is the assembly of the heads of government and state 
(which is supposed to meet once a year, although it rarely does so). Its 
organizational underpinning consists of an office (original seat: Fort 
Lamy) headed by an executive secretary (appointed for a three-year term 
by the heads of state and government on recommendation of the commis-
sion). An assistant executive secretary, a financial controller, and four 
departments (Administration and Finance; Planning and Project Execu-
tion; Documentation, Information, Remote Sensing and Advanced Tech-
nologies; Water Resources) report to the office. Since the adoption of the 
Strategic Action Programme (SAP) in the framework of the GEF (see 
below), the commission has also had a Steering Committee responsible for 
implementing the SAP; it has two directors, one responsible for the techni-
cal management of large water resources projects, the other for aspects of 
environmental management. 
The LCBC has also set up a Basin Committee for Strategic Planning 
(BCSP) whose task is to serve as a liaison body for LCBC work and local 
activities in the member countries. The BCSP is made up of "senior coun-
try officials, across key ministries such as environment, agriculture, and 
finance" (Odada et. al. 2004, 8). 
LCBC staff is recruited from the ministries and administrations of the 
member countries. Its executive secretary is always a Nigerian (because 
Nigeria contributes the largest share to the LCBC's budget) (Communica-
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tion from Issa, Dec. 12, 2004). No single member country is allowed to 
provide more than one third of the LCBC's staff; the salaries of LCBC 
staff members are paid from the LCBC's budget (communication from 
Lambert, 20 Dec. 2004). 
It is not possible here to go into the LCBC's work at any length. Evidently, 
longer phases of inactivity are followed by more brief phases of activity. 
The noteworthy results of the LCBC's work include: elaboration of an 
Accord Pertaining to the Creation of Funds for the Development of the 
Chad Basin Commission (1973, not yet implemented), an Agreement on 
Common Regulation of Flora and Fauna in the member countries (Enugu 
Accord, signed in December 1977, ratified only 11 years later), and a 
Master Plan for the Development and Environmentally Sound Manage-
ment of the Natural Resources of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin (con-
cluded in 1992, ratified in 1994). It should also be noted here that the mere 
existence of the LCBC for several decades now in a region that has almost 
constantly been the scene of civil and international strife and other violent 
conflicts is a fact that must be judged positively. This has ensured that 
communication between the member countries has never wholly broken 
down – even in times of severe crisis – one of which, the civil war in 
Chad, forced the commission to move its headquarters out of N'Djamena, 
leaving behind some important collections of documents. 
The member countries make contributions to the commission's funding 
based on an agreed-upon key. At present the contributions are assigned as 
follows: Nigeria 52 %, Cameroon 26 %, Chad 11 %, Niger 7 %, the CAR 
4 % of the commission's US$ 1 million annual budget (Niger and Chad are 
in arrears with their payments). 
Harmonization of the national water legislation / policies of the individual 
member countries is a task that still needs to be addressed. Each of the 
LCBC member countries pursues its own water policy, largely without 
reference to the other members and the LCBC, which is "not always in-
formed of national projects (communication from Lambert, Dec. 20, 
2004). However, since 2002 the WB has made its support for national 
water projects conditional on the consent of the LCBC, a move that has 
certainly served to strengthen the commission's hand (communication 
from Lambert, 12 Dec. 2004). 
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More recently, numerous external actors / donors have become involved, 
a fact that appears to have given a new boost to the LCBC's activities. 
These actors / donors include above all France (which also provides bilat-
eral support for the water sectors of all LCBC member countries), but also 
the Netherlands, the UK, Finland, Italy, the US, Canada, the EU, the 
World Bank / GEF, UNDP, the African Development Bank, the Islamic 
Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, 
and the BMZ. The BMZ – together with EUWI – has provided € 1 million 
in support of the LCBC and is set to provide € 2 million for each of the 
years 2006 and 2007. Concretely, the funds will be used to support the 
collection, processing, and exchange of data prepared in accordance with 
agreed-on, formalized methods. Furthermore, Germany also provides 
bilateral aid to the individual LCBC member countries for their work in 
the area of water supply. 
At present the largest support program is the above-mentioned GEF proj-
ect with the SAP, which was adopted in 1998 (see GEF, s. a.). The pro-
gram involves a long-term vision (projected for 20 years) as well as a five- 
and an eight-year program of action. Initial projects were approved by the 
GEF in January 2003 and got underway in September 2003. The program 
(GEF title: Reversal of Land and Water Degradation Trends in the Lake 
Chad Basin Ecosystem) presently has US$ 9.6 in funds from the GEF 
(plus an additional US$ 350,000 from UNDP, US$ 412,000 from the 
LCBC, and US$ 618,000 from the BMZ). The aim is to set up a coordi-
nated, integrated, and sustainable management of the international waters 
and natural resources of the Lake Chad Basin and to reverse the trend 
toward degradation of the soils and water resources of Lake Chad and its 
basin (GEF, s. a.).  
The organizations in charge of implementation are WB and UNDP. An 
environmental and social assessment and a transboundary diagnostic 
analysis (TDA) have been conducted in connection with the program; five 
other projects are in the pipeline. The project is run by a project manage-
ment unit with lead agencies in the individual member countries. One 
point of criticism voiced in connection with the GEF projects is that:  
"Projects are often run from thousands of kilometers away resulting in 
unnecessary project delays. The Lake Chad GEF PDF-B project took 
over three years to come up with a report, instead of 8 months initially 
planned. Even then, the output was far short of expectations by the ba-
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sin stakeholders. The Lake Chad PDF-C project has taken the same 
pattern since 2000" (Odada et. al. 2004 , 27). 
Some additional projects are linked with the GEF program: In November 
2002 the LCBC signed an MoU with the Bureau of the Convention on 
Wetlands (Ramsar Convention) (in July 2000 Lake Chad was declared a 
Transboundary Ramsar Site of International Importance). The aim is to 
create a network of national and regional conservation areas in the lake 
basin and to set up institutions dedicated to their sustainable management 
(Memorandum 2002). In this connection the Chad Wetlands Initiative 
(CHADWET) was launched in June 2003, organized by the Ramsar  
Bureau and its Mediterranean Coordination Unit. With the support of 
MEDWET (Mediterranean Wetlands), the Mediterranean branch of the 
Ramsar Convention, and its Coordination Unit, CHADWET is set to be 
developed on the model of MEDWET, again in the framework of the GEF 
program. With a view to obtaining funding, there were plans to present 
CHADWET to the Ramsar Conference in November 2005 as a Ramsar 
Regional Initiative. 
The EU has supported the Inland Fisheries Project since 1999. AMCOW, 
in cooperation with the LCBC, also took steps to ensure that Lake Chad 
was placed on the priority list of the EU Water Initiative. Germany is pro-
viding support for Lake Chad activities in the framework of the EUWI. 
Since 2001 UNEP and Belgium have been supporting a so-called Mega 
Chad Project designed to control land degradation; the project is run by the 
LCBC and the University of Maiduguri (Nigeria).21  
Several international NGOs are also engaged in this context, namely 
IUCN and WWF. WWF (the Living Waters Campaign) is providing sup-
port for a study of Lake Chad conducted by the riparian governments and 
the CAR as well as for efforts to identify and designate new Ramsar sites 
in the five LCBC countries (this in turn is linked with the CHADWET 
Initiative). IUCN's West African Regional Office is providing support for 
a study on wetlands in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad. As part of its Water and 
Nature Initiative, IUCN is also supporting a project on water governance 
                                                          
21  "Promotion of the Use of Renewable Energy Resources and Conservation of the Flora 
Species in the Drylands of Mega Chad of the West African Sub Region: Good Practices 
Model Village Approach in Land Degradation Control." 
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in the Komadugu-Yobe Basin the aim of which is to develop an integrated 
water resources management plan. 
In the projects they support, the international NGOs involved attach great 
importance to stakeholder participation, an aspect that is still underdevel-
oped in the LCBC context. There are some approaches aimed at organiz-
ing various user groups (fishermen, farmers, cattle breeders). The central 
institutions of participation are (or are to be) so-called water users asso-
ciations (WUAs, which have been set up with some delay) in several 
large-scale irrigation projects, e. g. in the Kano River Irrigation Project or 
the Hadejia River Barrage Project. One case that is cited as an example of 
successful stakeholder participation is the settlement of upstream-
downstream disputes in the Komadugu-Yobe subbasin (IUCN project, see 
above). The GEF "Reversal…" program (see above) also attaches great 
importance to participation of the local population. But on the whole very 
little has been done to involve civil society actors in the LCBC context; 
the general public in the member countries is as good as unaware of the 
LCBC (communication from Issa, 15 Dec. 2004; Lambert, 20 Dec. 2004). 
The 1964 Convention and Statutes see dispute settlement as a commission 
task. Article 7 of the Convention also stipulates: 
"Any dispute concerning the interpretation of implementation of the 
present Convention, which has not been determined by the Commission, 
shall be submitted to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration of the Organisation of African Unity for the purpose of de-
cision." 
When environment-related conflicts escalated in the basin in the 1980s, 
the LCBC, on instruction of the heads of state and government of the 
member countries, even took the step of setting up two special commit-
tees,  
"one on security and one on the border demarcation exercise. The 
Security Committee held a series of meetings and finally came out with 
a recommendation that to ensure lasting peace and security in the zone, 
a joint patrol system should be introduced. This was adopted and every 
member country contributed security agents who jointly patrolled 
specifically demarcated areas of Lake Chad" (Odada et. al. 2004 , 13). 
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Beyond that, though, the LCBC has not become active in the field of dis-
pute settlement, the reason being that it lacks the appropriate mechanisms 
(communication from Issa 15 Dec. 2004). 
One organization that has been created outside the LCBC structure is the 
Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC); it was set up in Decem-
ber 2002. Its task is to come up with a final settlement of the border con-
flict between the two countries. In doing so, it can find support for its work 
in a decision of the ICJ of October 19, 2002. The case was brought before 
the court in 2001, and the court decided basically in favor of Cameroon. 
The CNMC set up a subcommission to demarcate the border between the 
two countries. The UN and the EU provided financial support for the sub-
commission's work. In June / July 2004 the Nigerian authorities withdrew 
from the disputed area on Lake Chad, although the problem of the Bakas-
sie Peninsula has yet to be resolved. The LCBD provided advice to the 
CNMC, and it once again, on the occasion of the Nigeria-Cameroon con-
flict, called on the member countries to ratify a treaty on national borders 
in the Lake Chad Basin. The LCBC conducted a boundary survey in the 
Lake Chad region, and while its findings were accepted by Chad, Niger, 
and Cameroon, they were rejected by Nigeria. Discussions between Nige-
ria and Chad and Cameroon continue on the border issue. 
There is also another organization, the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission, 
tasked with finding a settlement for issues of concern to the two countries, 
which include the Komadougou-Yobe subbasin (Nigeria-Niger Agreement 
Concerning the Equitable Sharing in the Development, Conservation and 
Use of Their Common Water Resources, Maiduguri, July 1990). Other 
bilateral agreements between LCBC member countries include the 
Moundou Accord between Cameroon and Chad, which covers abstraction 
of water from the Logone River for agricultural purposes (Aug. 1970), and 
a Nigeria-Cameroon Protocol 
"on exchanging information about hydraulic works and daily 
hydrological data, on coordinated actions concerning dams and water 
retaining, concertation and accord prior to any hydraulic construction, 
joint actions for the mutual benefit of the rural population, inventory of 
equipment etc." (Niasse 2004, 10)  
The existence of these bilateral agreements may be seen as an indication of 
deficits in the regional LCBC approach. Yet even these bilateral agree-
ments have yet to be translated into real practice. The main problem in-
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volved in water management on Lake Chad must be sought in the need for 
coordination between different levels and approaches.  
"Poor coordination is perhaps the most critical managerial problem 
confronting Lake Chad Basin and its national components. The sub-
basins are often granted limited autonomy, which produces artificial 
divisions and precludes long-term planning. Consequently, the project 
approach to development in the basin area involves schemes which are 
developed in isolation" (Odada et. al. 2004 , 23). 
And:  
"There is lack of co-ordination at national level between the various 
tiers of government, the private sector and the organized civil society. 
There is need for the authorities of the Basin Countries to evolve 
necessary mechanisms for co-ordination, for listening to and consulting 
with various stakeholders to ensure the awareness of and involvement 
in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and decision-making. 
There is also need for better environmental education at different 
levels" (Odada et. al. 2004 , 25 f.). 
Capacity-building in the LCBC context is described as virtually "nonexis-
tent" (communication from Issa 15 Dec. 2004). Tam Lambert, the LCBC's 
assistant executive secretary characterizes the problems facing the com-
mission as follows:  
"Main problems concerning the performance of the LCBC nowadays 
are the strong national sovereignty, the slow integration of LCBC 
programmes into the national programmes, and the failure of states to 
pay their due contributions to the budget (...). Finally, the commitment 
to implementation by the member states is low. The (water, environment 
etc.) policies remain mostly national (...). Difficulties are also due to the 
consensus principle, the managerial capacities of the Executive 
Secretary, and the human resources in general" (Communication from 
Lambert, 20 Dec. 2004). 
3.5.3 Destabilization risks, cooperation potentials, and 
options for German Development Cooperation 
Lake Chad is massively impacted by environmental degradation. And 
existing plans for overdimensioned, ecologically doubtful, and unsustain-
able projects are good reason to anticipate major problems in the future as 
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well. Environmental changes in the region have led to a good number of 
conflicts at different levels; some of these, including border conflicts be-
tween riparian countries, have already been played out by violent means. 
In the individual countries there are in some cases also massive tensions 
between various user groups, upstream-downstream conflicts along 
tributaries, and conflicts over (planned) dams. Destabilization risks can 
thus be identified at different levels. On the other hand, the willingness of 
the countries concerned to engage in cooperation must be seen as weak, 
and the reason for this must be sought not least in weak statehood and 
markedly underdeveloped civil society structures in the region. 
Despite its long history, the LCBC, too, is a weak institution. Recent ef-
forts to strengthen and improve the commission and lake-basin manage-
ment in general are certainly a good sign, although the future prospects of 
these efforts are uncertain. In cooperation with the LCBC, AMCOW has 
seen to it that Lake Chad was placed on the priority list of the EU Water 
Initiative. In the framework of the EUWI Germany has taken the lead on 
the Lake Chad Basin / LCBC and therefore now has a duty to act. In view 
of the numerous positive experiences that have been made with trans-
boundary water management in other Sub-Saharan countries, there are 
now good chances for a new start. Efforts to transfer these experiences to 
the Chad context may be an important first step toward such a new start, 
and German DC would be well advised to become engaged here. It would 
also be important to include the issue of groundwater in such efforts. This 
could make Lake Chad into a model case for groundwater-related issues. 
In view of the fact that more will have to be done to include groundwater 
in efforts concerned with transboundary water management, the case of 
Lake Chad could assume substantial significance in this connection. 
4 Higher-level African institutions and the role they play 
for transboundary water management 
In the past both higher-level African institutions and programs such as the 
African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Minis-
ters’ Council on Water (AMCOW) and regional communities like the East 
African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) have played different roles as far as transboundary water 
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management in general and river-basin organizations in particular are 
concerned. Calls for cooperation projects involving transboundary water 
resources have been made by all of the above-named institutions and pro-
grams and can be found e. g. in AMCOW's Abuja Declaration (Points 3a, 
4a) and the NEPAD environmental action plan, and they play a prominent 
role in connection with cross-cutting regional integration efforts in Africa. 
The important role played by regional actors in the formation and work of 
RBOs is best illustrated by SACD. Its members have committed them-
selves to integrated and cooperative management of the transboundary 
waters in the SADC region. The SADC Water Sector and the SADC Wa-
ter Division may be seen as the institutional groundwork needed to im-
plement the – now – Revised Water Protocol on Shared Watercourses (see 
below). 
4.1 South African Development Community 
SADC has developed from an anti-apartheid coordinating conference of 
southern African countries (Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference – SADCC, founded in 1980) into a regional community of 
states dedicated to the task of supporting the development-related efforts 
of its member countries. SADC has 14 members: Angola, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Zambia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanza-
nia, and Zimbabwe. The goals and institutional structure of SADC were 
laid down in a treaty signed in 1992 by the heads of state of the member 
countries. 
SADC's genesis is closely linked with the community's water policy. In 
the early 1980s South Africa's later President P. W. Botha, in connection 
with his "total national strategy," proposed the establishment of a Con-
stellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) (Turton 2003a, 144). 
Botha's idea was that intensive mutual economic ties would increase the 
dependence of South Africa's neighbors on the country. One essential 
element of this policy was to make more intensive use of transboundary 
rivers and to step up South Africa's water imports from water-rich coun-
tries in southern Africa. In 1980 Zimbabwe, then an independent nation 
under President Robert Mugabe, countered by initiating SADCC – 
SADC's predecessor organization – together with Botswana, Lesotho, 
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Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania. The 
idea behind this conference of the so-called frontline states was to reduce 
these countries' dependence on South Africa. With the political changes 
underway in South Africa in 1989 / 1990, SADCC seemed to have lost its 
raison d'être; but when, in 1994, one-time foe South Africa was accepted 
for membership, the community was reestablished as SADC, a regional 
organization dedicated to intensified integration. SADC has now also set 
its sights on market-based integration and cooperation in politics and on 
security issues (Croll / Wirkus 2003). 
SADC's declared goal is to promote political, economic, and environ-
mental cooperation and regional integration among its 14 member coun-
tries. With the "Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses," the "Regional 
Strategic Action Plan," and the "Report on Environmental Sustainability in 
Water Resources Management in Southern Africa," SADC operationalized 
this goal in the water sector, and it now plays a pioneering role both within 
Africa itself and in relation to other regional organizations. 
4.1.1 SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
Based on Articles 22 (1) and 21 (3) of the SADC Treaty, the Protocol on 
Shared Watercourses was adopted in 1995 as the community's first legally 
binding framework program (Ramoeli 2002, 104). In 2000, in view of the 
adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, the protocol was replaced by a new, thor-
oughly revised document, the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Water-
courses, which was signed by all of the member countries in 2000 and has, 
since 2002, been ratified by a two-thirds majority of member states, thus 
obtaining legal force. 
But the path leading to 2002 was a thorny one, and several countries were 
reluctant to sign; Angola, for instance, because of the protracted civil war 
raging there, and Mozambique, which harbored political reservations vis-
à-vis South Africa. This was the beginning of a long consultation process 
involving regular national and regional meetings of the parties concerned. 
The Revised Protocol adopts the principles of the UN Convention as the 
basis of the community's practical action and constitutes the legal frame-
work for integrated water resources management. Four river-basin com-
missions have since been established in connection with the protocol. All 
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of them, keyed to the principles of integrated water resources management 
(IWRM), are tasked with jointly – i. e. together with all riparians – manag-
ing the transboundary rivers and aquifers concerned: ZAMCOM on the 
Zambezi (see Chapter 3.2), OKACOM on the Okavango, ORASECOM on 
the Orange-Senqu (see Chapter 3.1), and LIMCOM on the Limpopo (see 
Chapter 3.3). The protocol thus, for the first time, provided the SADC 
countries with a framework for cooperation projects binding under inter-
national law as well as with the tools they need to settle possible disputes. 
This meant that SADC had left the path defined by purely bilateral agree-
ments and embarked on a course keyed to cooperative agreements involv-
ing all of a river's riparians. It should be noted in this connection that all 
bi- and multilateral agreements that had been signed up to this point re-
main unaffected by these developments, that is, they continue in force 
alongside the newly created RBOs.  
SADC's framework for action is defined by the Regional Strategic Action 
Plan for Integrated Water Resources Development and Management 
(RASP-IWRM) (see below). The experts who conducted an evaluation of 
the RASP-IWRM are right in noting  
"that the RSAP-IWRM of the southern African community is a unique 
experiment in international co-operation directed at achieving an 
integrated approach to water use development and management 
crossing national borders and river basin boundaries. It is the most 
advanced and comprehensive multi-country freshwater programme in 
the world and it has no parallel on this scale anywhere else in the 
world. It is a quite remarkable achievement that the original and 
amended Shared Watercourse Protocol, which codify the regional 
IWRM policy, have been signed by all SADC Member States and 
ratified by a working majority" (Halcro-Johnston et al. 2004, 3). 
4.1.2 Dispute settlement in the Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses 
In addition to adaptation to the UN Convention, Article 7 of the Revised 
Protocol provides the member countries with a legal framework and a set 
of dispute-settlement instruments. "It follows the spirit of the SADC Treaty 
in its focus on amicable settlement, failing which arbitration can be 
pursued" (Ramoeli 2002, 109). Article 7 (2) covers disputes between 
member countries concerning the interpretation and / or application of the 
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provisions of the Revised Protocol that cannot be settled amicably. In 
accordance with Article 16 (1) of the SADC Treaty, such disputes are 
referred to the SADC Tribunal for final and binding decision. Should a 
dispute occur between SADC and a member country, Article 7 (3) of the 
Revised Protocol, in accordance with Article16 (4) of the SADC Treaty, 
stipulates that an advisory opinion be obtained from the SADC Council. 
4.1.3 SADC Water Sector Coordination Unit  
SADC Water Division  
In the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, the member countries 
defined the SADC Secretariat's tasks as regards the water sector. The Wa-
ter Sector Coordination Unit (WSCU) was set up to monitor the imple-
mentation of the Revised Protocol.22 The process of structural reform of 
SADC, which got underway in 2001 and took two years to complete, had 
important implications for the SADC water sector. "The core of the reform 
was to concentrate the 21 coordinating units formerly located in the mem-
ber states in four directorates and to place them with the SADC 
Secretariat in Gaborone" (Adelmann 2005, 2). The dissolution or 
transformation of the SADC Secretariat's former coordinating units was a 
step-by-step process. Following a lengthy discussion process, the Water 
Division (WD) was relocated with the Directorate of Infrastructure and 
Services in April 2003, and since then it has been responsible for the tasks 
of the former SADC-WSCU. In addition, it is also responsible for the 
implementation of the Regional Strategic Action Plan on Integrated Water 
Resources Development and Management (RSAP-IWRM). Even though 
the reform process was officially declared complete at the end of 2003 
(Adelmann 2005, 2), there are still some open questions that have 
provided for frustration both within the SADC member countries and in 
the RBOs. This situation has appreciably slowed down processes and 
prevented stakeholders from developing a sense of ownership for these 
processes. One factor that has contributed to this situation is lack of 
                                                          
22  "The Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses is very explicit on the role of the SADC 
Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit (the Water Division (WD) in the restructured SADC). 
The main function of the WD is overseeing and facilitating the full implementation of 
the provisions of the Protocol, which will require a number of activities to be carried 
out by countries who are signatories to the Protocol" (Mushauri 2004, 17). 
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communication between the parties during the restructuring process. 
SADC-WD's role in managing the implementation of the RSAP is not 
defined adequately,23 as the RSAP-IWRM Mid-Term Review Report notes 
(Halcro-Johnston et al. 2002, 6). In addition, prior to the restructuring 
process, the SADC Sectoral Committee of Ministers Responsible for 
Water, the Water Resources Technical Committee (WRTC) and its 
technical subcommittees, and the RSAP Focal Persons Forums played a 
far more instrumental role in integrating the member countries into the 
RSAP, and thus also into the WSCU. In dissolving well-established 
institutions like the Sectoral Committee of Ministers Responsible for 
Water and by slowing down the work of the technical committees, the 
restructuring process has had a markedly negative impact on the 
implementation of the Revised Protocol.24 The newly created institutions, 
i. e. the Integrated Committee of Ministers, which oversees and 
coordinates the directorates' work, and the National Committees (NCs), 
which are responsible for implementing the measures at the national level, 
have yet to be sufficiently revitalized. A good number of member 
countries have transferred the NCs to departments in their foreign or 
development ministries, burdening them with an additional task, and this 
has meant that the committees are still "(...) far removed from being able 
to exercise the role assigned to them as an interface between the member 
states and SADC headquarters" (Adelmann 2005, 3). However, the task of 
                                                          
23  "However, the function of the unit is sometimes to manage projects, sometimes to 
procure Implementing Agents and to act as the facilitator/co-ordinator, and sometimes 
to do both. This reflects well on the unit’s ability to adapt to changing requirements but 
it demonstrates a fundamental weakness in administration, which undermines the 
confidence of international donors. Also, there is no defined hierarchy in the 
institutional structure of the professional staff within the unit, and most of the staff are 
appointed on short term contracts. Again, this creates uncertainty and a lack of 
confidence in the future of the unit" (Halcro-Johnston et al. 2004, 6). 
24  "(...) that with the uncertainties surrounding the restructuring exercise, the SADC Water 
Division (WD) was a ghost of its former self. It is manned by a skeleton staff whose 
tenure of office is not clear and are poorly resourced. This compromises the vital 
coordination and facilitation role they should play. In addition the 'restructuring SADC' 
seems not to be recognising vital SADC Water Sector institutions such as the Committee 
of Water Ministers and the Committee of Senior Officials. (...) This action has left a 
huge decision-making gap which is also negatively impacting on RBO activities. Most 
RBOs are now caught-up in no-man’s land without the necessary support" (Mushauri 
2004, 16). 
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breathing life into these new institutions is essential precisely for the water 
sector if new success are to be added to those already achieved by the 
SADC-WD, e. g. in coordinating and moderating the critical processes 
involved in developing RBOs or in raising funds for these RBOs 
(Mushauri 2004, 17). This would enable the SADC-WD to better live up 
to its responsibility25 toward RBOs. Mushauri sums up the present state of 
the SADC-WD in the following words 
"(...) the WD itself seems to be in a state of paralysis as it has to both 
manage its present responsibilities, with limited resources, whilst 
planning and negotiating its future and stature in the restructured 
SADC" (Mushauri 2004, 17). 
In order to support the development of existing RBOs and to forge on with 
the establishment of new ones, it is absolutely essential that the tasks and 
functions of the SADC-WD be more clearly defined, that these tasks and 
functions be transparently communicated, and that the WD be staffed in 
accordance with its tasks. 
4.1.4 SADC Regional Strategic Action Plan on Integrated 
Water Resources Development and Management  
The Regional Strategic Action Plan on Integrated Water Resources Devel-
opment and Management (RSAP-IWRM), developed by the SADC Water 
Sector in 1997 / 1998 and approved by the member countries in 1998, is 
SADC's framework program for integrated water resources management. 
Conceived as a water-sector program to support regional integration 
among member countries, its aim is to create the conditions required for 
the joint management of regional water resources. The idea behind the 
RSAP was to create the institutions and the conditions required to imple-
ment infrastructure projects and development initiatives. It serves at the 
same time as a mechanism to coordinate potential donors and regional 
needs and / or demand. 
The RSAP includes 31 projects designed to remove the most pressing 
impediments to integrated water resources management. These projects 
                                                          
25  "(...) liasing with and guiding RBOs on matters of interpretation and implementation (of 
the Protocol)" (Mushauri 2004, 17). 
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were summed up in seven categories, one of which is "River Basin Man-
agement." 
The RSAP-IWRM, and with it projects and initiatives on river-basin man-
agement, are largely funded by the international donor community, and 
this of course also implies that the success of the RSAP depends in large 
measure on this donor community.  
"The procurement of funding for projects is therefore one of the 
principal determinants of the rate at which the programme can be 
implemented. (…) The success of projects (…) is therefore to a large 
extent a reflection of the degree to which the projects are aligned with 
the changing agenda and priorities set by the international donor 
community. This factor more than any other, has impeded the ability of 
SADC to implement a well coordinated and integrated programme 
toward achieving the original goals of RSAP-IWRM" (Halcro-Johnston 
et al. 2004, 3). 
The RSAP-IWRM is a component of the Regional Strategic Indicative 
Development Plan (RISDP), the long-term strategy paper on SADC's 
economic and development sector, and it is therefore immediately linked 
with the community's higher-level economic development goals. This is 
also visible in the great number of overlaps between the goals set out in 
the RASP and the water-related goals of the RISDP (Halcro-Johnston et al. 
2004, 33–35). As Halcro-Johnston et al. (2004, 22) point out, dependence 
on other SADC regional programs is highly important to the implementa-
tion of the RSAP-IWRM, whose River Basin Management category is 
relevant for all transboundary projects and initiatives in SADC:  
"(…) a number of other programmes at regional level need to work 
together in order to ensure that the goals of integrated development are 
met. Such a co-operative approach means that the full delivery of 
intended outcomes of the RSAP-IWRM are dependent on the 
performance of divergent role-players and a variety of actions that 
serve as essential 'links' in the 'delivery chain."   
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4.2 AU, AMCOW, NEPAD, and AfDB: The role they 
play for transboundary water management  
As mentioned above, there are in Africa a total of 63 international river 
basins. Agreements have already been completed for 20 of these basins, 
including all of Africa's important transboundary waterbodies, and river-
basin organizations have also been set up in 16 of these basins. In Africa 
Figure 4: African institutions and programs concerned with 
transboundary water management  
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the uneven distribution of water resources, different levels of demand, and 
the role played by water resources for the further development of individ-
ual countries has already given an international character to competition 
for water resources. This is shown e. g. by the discussion over the export 
of water from central Africa to southern Africa.26 This is not the only 
reason why there is a need for a coordinated Africa-wide approach to the 
management and utilization of transboundary water resources. This 
problem has been identified and given programmatic shape by both 
regional organizations like SADC and Africa-wide initiatives like NEPAD 
and AMCOW. Alongside the NEPAD Water Programme, with its Short-
Term Action Plan (STAP) for Transboundary Water Resources, it is not 
least AMCOW, with its Abuja Declaration and its first Pan-African 
Implementation and Partnership Conference on Water (December 2003), 
that has injected a promising dynamic into the development of African 
capacities in the water sector. It must also be noted here that beside the 
national engagement of individual donors, the international initiatives of 
the G8 – the Africa Action Plan – and the EU – the EU Water Initiative 
(EUWI) – play an important role in this connection. 
There is still a lack of effective institutions and sufficiently developed 
inter institutional processes and procedures, although it must be said that 
some of the institutions and initiatives referred to here are still relatively 
new. In the course of the consolidation process some ideas have been 
developed on what roles the institutions under discussion here should be 
assigned in the future in addition to their political mandates (if they have 
been given a political mandate in the first place). It is safe to assume that 
the present obstacles to the coordination of programs and the implementa-
tion of projects will gradually be broken down. Thus far these initiatives 
have not been particularly relevant for the formation or the work of RBOs. 
However, all levels – AMCOW, NEPAD, SADC – underline the impor-
tance of RBOs for the implementation of any basinwide water resources 
management. NEPAD STAP for Transboundary Water Resources notes in 
this connection:  
                                                          
26  "There is no doubt that water resource planning should look north for a strategic supply 
on which the economic development of the more arid south can be based. This is 
already happening with a desktop level study currently underway to determine the 
feasibility of transferring water from the Congo down to Namibia" (Halcro-Johnston et 
al. 2004, 3). 
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"River Basin Organisations (RBOs) are the main agencies for 
cooperative development and management of water resources in the 
respective river basins. RBOs would be responsible for planning, 
implementation, and monitoring of basinwide activities in water 
resources development and management" (NEPAD 2004, 45). 
4.2.1 African Union  
The African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 to succeed the Organisation 
for African Unity. It has direct influence on the NEPAD water program 
through its Commissioner for Agriculture and Water. It defines the 
political framework, lays down the course for policy, and generally 
influences the overall development agenda. When disputes or conflicts 
arise, the member states have recourse to the Peace and Security Council 
(AU 2002) and the Court of Justice of the African Union. The Court of 
Justice also has a close partnership with the dispute-settlement institutions 
and mechanisms of various regional organizations (AU 2003). 
4.2.2 African Ministers' Council on Water  
The African Ministers' Council on Water (AMCOW) was established in 
2002; it sees its role as the supreme political organ for the continent's wa-
ter sector. Its legal basis is the Abuja Declaration on Water of April 30, 
2002. In programmatic terms, AMCOW is closely linked with NEPAD 
(AMCOW 2002b). AMCOW has a four-person secretariat in Abuja, Nige-
ria. AMCOW serves as a partner for the European Water Initiative 
(EUWI) and a central liaison partner for other donors (AMCOW-TAC 
2004). In the near future AMCOW is set to assume the function of a min-
isterial technical management group in the AU. But it will be some time 
before AMCOW is actually equipped to meet its own goal of assuming the 
task of supraregional coordination of water management in Africa. This 
point is clearly illustrated by the low frequency of the joint meetings of the 
Council and the Executive Committees; while two meetings per year are 
planned, only one took place in 2004. In other words, it takes some time 
for important decisions to be taken, and they then have to be adopted po-
litically at the national level and implemented by national water ministries. 
In 2003 the Technical Advisory Committee was set up to prepare deci-
sions and to accelerate the overall process. The committee is made up of 
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three experts from each of the AU's five subregions.27 The AMCOW 
initiative finds very different levels of acceptance in these five regions, a 
fact due not least to the cultural diversity and the different political orien-
tations encountered in the countries involved. Not unlike the case of 
SADC, some of AMCOW's members harbor a suspicion that Nigeria and 
South Africa, the continent's most successful and influential countries 
when it comes e. g. to river-basin management, have hegemonic 
ambitions. This of course does nothing to simplify the coordination 
process in AMCOW's bodies, which is complicated enough the way things 
stand (oral communication from T. Schmidt, 16 Dec. 2004). 
Still, AMCOW may safely be referred to as "the continental voice for 
water issues in Africa" (oral communication from T. Schmidt, 16 Dec. 
2004). As a ministerial steering group made up of Africa's water ministers, 
AMCOW is the political arena for water issues in Africa, and it will play 
an increasingly important role in coordinating and moderating develop-
ment processes, above all at the national level (NEPAD 2004, 45). It is 
becoming evident that AMCOW is increasingly assuming the role of the 
initiator and promoter of a sustained political dialogue on the cooperative 
development and management of Africa's transboundary river- and lake-
basin organizations. 
4.2.3 New Partnership for Africa’s Development  
and the African Development Bank  
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), whose supreme 
organ is the Summit of Heads of State and Government, is an AU 
program. It is supported as such by the G8, the UN, and the overall donor 
community, and it plays an important role in the African dialogue with 
these donors. The program, which was initiated in 2001, has several so-
called task teams. NEPAD's water program, managed at present by only 
one person, is represented with the African Development Bank (AfDB) by 
the infrastructure task team. The AfDB also serves as NEPAD's 
implementing agency. The AfDB's water activities are largely derived 
from NEPAD's programs and action plans. Since NEPAD itself has no 
implementing powers, its role vis-à-vis AMCOW may be characterized 
                                                          
27  North, West, East, Central, and Southern Africa.  
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more as a "continental voice for water issues in Africa" (oral communica-
tion from T. Schmidt, 16 Dec. 2004). This is how NEPAD defines its own 
role under the political leadership of the AU:  
"As NEPAD, we will focus on facilitating implementation by mobilising 
technical and financial resources to ensure speedy actions on capacity 
building, project preparation and also direct investment in projects" 
(Prof. Wiseman Nkuluh, Head of NEPAD Secretariat, on 2 Dec. 2004) 
(NEPAD Dialogue 74).  
NEPAD has a so-called Short Term Action Plan for Infrastructure (STAP) 
designed to realize its water program. One element of this STAP is the 
Transboundary Water Resources Strategic Framework and Action Plan 
(STAP-TWR). It defines several focal points aimed at promoting regional 
cooperation, including development of national IWRM plans and man-
agement of transboundary water resources. In this context NEPAD sees a 
key role for RBOs. On the initiative and with the support of the AfDB, the 
STAP has commissioned studies to assess the present situation and to take 
stock of the status quo of transboundary water resources management in 
seven important African river and lake basins,28 and in December 2004 it 
held a workshop to discuss these issues with stakeholders. Also with the 
support of the AfDB, NEPAD is presently working on a Medium to Long 
Term Strategic Framework (MLTSF) (NEPAD 2004). 
5 Conclusions and recommendations  
5.1 General conclusions 
Transboundary river-basin management in southern Africa is a relative 
success story – at least as far as intergovernmental and regional efforts 
(SADC) are concerned, and this despite the problems outlined above. 
Various reasons can be cited for this. It is important to bear the overall 
political constellation in mind here. The RSA, the region's leading eco-
nomic and political power, is pursuing a pro-integration policy in the re-
gion. It has decided against pursuing power-backed unilateral policies 
geared solely to its own interests, although its sheer weight would cer-
tainly permit it to engage in such policies. Indeed, it endeavors to pursue 
                                                          
28  Niger, Senegal, Congo, Lake Chad, Nile, Zambezi, Okavango. 
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its own interests in such a way as to allow for consensus with its neighbors 
and to engage them. This is why the RSA attaches special importance to 
policy-making in the SADC context. This approach is also reflected in 
transboundary water policy.29 Here, too, the RSA would certainly be in a 
position to go it alone; but instead it has opted for a cooperative approach 
and makes relevant resources (know-how, personnel, administrative and 
financial capacities) available to its neighbors. 
SADC in general and the SADC Water Sector in particular are a further 
factor conducive to transboundary water management. They constitute a 
shared, relatively open framework for transboundary cooperation. The 
SADC Water Protocol serves as an orientation point and reference variable 
for specific cooperation projects. All institutional progress made in indi-
vidual river basins is closely linked with SADC and the SADC Water Sec-
tor. This facilitates and paves way for future institution-building efforts. It 
is realistic and appropriate to regard SADC (Water) as the prime point of 
contact and to channel support for individual RBOs through the SADC-
RSAP. SADC is rightly seen as an advanced economic community in 
general and a leading force in the water sector in particular. It may to this 
extent assume a model function for ECOWAS, IGAD, and EAC and their 
water policies. 
It is at present becoming clear that AMCOW is in the process of estab-
lishing a continental context of cooperation that embraces the region's 
economic communities and that may serve to promote the exchange of 
experience among the regions of Africa. By comparison, NEPAD must be 
seen more as a discussion forum that can provide AMCOW with addi-
tional impulses; but AMCOW is and will remain the key structure here. 
What we see emerging at present is a tripartite structure consisting of 
AMCOW / AU, regional economic communities like SADC (Water), and 
river-basin organizations. In the future the latter are also to assume the role 
of implementing organizations. 
It is important in political terms to make reference to the overall context in 
that it clearly shows that it is not possible to view individual river basins 
and RBOs in isolation. In southern Africa e. g. problems and progress in a 
                                                          
29  The South African National Water Act (Act 36, 1998) acknowledges in Article 2(i) the 
RSA's "international obligations" as regards the "use, development, conservation, 
management, and control" of the water resources of transboundary river basins. 
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river basin are always bound up with problems and progress in other river 
basins – and inevitably have reference to the joint SADC framework. This 
sets the stage for a good measure of wheeling and dealing. When one 
country makes concessions to an other country in one river basin, it may 
well expect concessions from this other country in a second river basin 
shared by the two countries. The fact that several countries may share 
several river basins sets the stage for a good number of different tradeoffs. 
This wheeling and dealing is encouraged not least by the fact that are sub-
stantial personnel overlaps among the institutions involved, and these 
make it possible to make use of relationships of personal trust that have 
developed over years, indeed decades. 
Furthermore, relatively weak states (e. g. Namibia, whose rivers all origi-
nate in other countries, or Mozambique, a country that finds itself in the 
classic situation of the downstream riparian) are always able to invoke the 
SADC context. And the reason why this is possible is that heavyweight 
RSA is pursuing a SADC pro-integration course that renders it vulnerable 
to pressure brought to bear through SADC. The political level of SADC 
can define targets and propose clarifications that remove obstacles which 
have accumulated in the 'nuts and bolts' of negotiations between those 
responsible for water policy at the RBO level. It is in this way that the 
primacy of politics unfolds its positive effects. To cite an example, one of 
the main driving forces behind the process involved in forming organiza-
tions must be sought in political considerations aimed at leveling the 
playing field. As a rule, relatively weak countries push for the creation of 
new organizations because they lack the national resources that would give 
them a reasonably equal voice in transboundary river-basin management. 
The RSA, on the other hand, is in possession of national structures that are 
so strong that the country does not necessarily need secretariats or the like 
for an RBO; the picture is of course quite different for Namibia or Mo-
zambique.30  
Even though the present study has dealt separately with the Orange, Zam-
bezi, and Limpopo basins, it is important not to lose sight of these complex 
                                                          
30  Unlike its neighbors in southern Africa, the RSA's state water sector is in possession of 
sizable financial, technical, and administrative capacities. Its Department of Water 
Affairs is relatively well funded and has a good number of well-trained experts among 
its staff. 
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interrelationships. They are also one of the reasons why ORASECOM  
may have model character for the further development of other basin 
commissions. 
Another important factor is the incrementalist, pragmatic approach to 
institution-building pursued in this context, with the relevant actors show-
ing the patience and taking the time they need to get the job done. While 
existing – for the most part bilateral – institutions, which actually run 
counter to the concept of basinwide water management (e. g. since not all 
riparians are represented in basin organizations), have been retained, they 
have at the same time been obliged to harmonize their own work with the 
newly created institutions (as well as with SADC Water). Much time has 
been taken to clarify roles in these institutions. This time has been used to 
build confidence and develop procedural rules (see also Mostert 2005).  
What we find confirmed is that the "management of international river 
basins thus involves a long learning process; a process the participating 
countries have to go through, and for which there are no short cuts. Out-
side assistance can only play a very modest role" (Savenije / van der Zaag 
2000, 28). Once this process has been completed, work can begin on the 
task of assigning RBOs larger, more complex tasks: e. g. development and 
implementation of water-sector plans for an overall river basin, or devel-
opment of action plans to implement the Millennium Development Goals. 
It must therefore be seen as a welcome development that German DC is 
prepared to embark on a longer-tem engagement instead of thinking 
merely in terms of brief, one- or two-year cycles; and another welcome 
fact is that German DC has involved the KfW in the implementation of 
transboundary infrastructure measures. 
5.2 Options for action and recommendations 
It has turned out that a longer phase of conceptual and political discussion 
was needed to reach the state we have today. But now the time seems ripe 
to inaugurate a new stage, one that should have a focus on strategic con-
siderations geared to efficient and effective implementation. The RBOs 
could in this way develop gradually into implementing agencies, while the 
political, standard-setting dimension could be covered by regional eco-
nomic communities like SADC and AMCOW. This phase will also call for 
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patience and perseverance. German development policy and DC would be 
well advised to pay particular heed to the following points: 
1. Transboundary water management is not a purely technical issue – 
indeed, it is a highly political enterprise. German DC should make use 
of this circumstance to realize positive effects above and beyond the 
narrow field of "water management." Such effects may also material-
ize for the fields of crisis prevention and regional security, for efforts 
to strengthen participatory / rule-of-law structures, for civil society, 
and for promotion of economic and political integration. 
2. The SADC region is a "rewarding" addressee for support measures 
concerned with transboundary water management. The political pa-
rameters are relatively favorable, and successes should therefore be 
within reach over the medium term. German development policy / DC 
is well positioned with the support it provides for the SADC water 
sector and the river-basin organizations on Orange and Limpopo. In 
the interest of sustainability it would be important to stick with a 
given support policy over the longer term. Efforts aimed at enlarging 
and intensifying activities in several directions would be both con-
ceivable and recommendable. 
3. As far as existing support for SADC and river-basin organizations is 
concerned, German DC should give some thought to further strength-
ening the organizational structures (RBO secretariats with permanent 
staff) and possibilities for civil society to participate. The latter can 
contribute both to boosting the intrasocietal legitimacy of transbound-
ary basin management and strengthening democracy, the rule of law, 
and civil society in general. There is, however, some question as to 
how far official development policy and DC – which are of course 
aligned with state counterparts – can in fact actually go in this regard. 
It would therefore be important to look into indirect approaches, e. g. 
support for German and international NGOs, which could in turn pro-
vide support for NGOs and CBOs in recipient countries in their efforts 
to work for participation in transboundary water management. 
4. It should also be examined whether other river basins in the SADC 
region could be included for support, along the lines of the Orange 
and the Limpopo. There are still a good number of transboundary riv-
ers without cooperative transboundary structures in the region, to say 
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nothing of the rest of Africa. By providing support for transboundary 
water management in "out of the way" river basins, it would be possi-
ble to overcome the present concentration on a relatively limited 
number of countries. 
5. The experiences made on the Limpopo and the Orange could be 
turned to account by providing support for the exchange of South-
South experience. Instead of being restricted to the SADC region, this 
could be extended to include other regions in Africa (and the South). 
In the future more efforts should be made to step up information-
sharing between river basins / basin organizations. This could be done 
in both the North-South context (twinning) and the South-South con-
text. The German DC approach of supporting the creation of centers 
of competence as a means of sharing experience and disseminating 
best practices is one that points in the right direction. In addition it 
might also be conceivable to support other forms of information-
sharing: mutual working visits, exchange of staff, expert conferences, 
and the like. 
6. Furthermore, efforts should be made to utilize and to support the 
potential inherent in AMCOW. While AMCOW is at present weak in 
organizational terms and would be overburdened if it had to assume 
new, concrete tasks, the council could develop into a structure that 
would be in a position to assemble and focus the experiences made by 
individual RBOs and to provide crucial impulses needed to create new 
RBOs and to optimize the work of existing ones. Targeted support for 
AMCOW would furthermore give additional momentum to efforts to 
strengthen pan-African cooperation and integration. German DC 
should promote networking between AMCOW and individual African 
RBOs. In the long term AMCOW could become a vehicle for specifi-
cally African approaches to transboundary water management. Over 
the longer term this could possibly mean gradually terminating the 
support provided to individual RBOs. 
7. Transboundary lake-basin management (Lake Victoria, Lake Chad) 
involves problems of a very specific nature. It could prove interesting 
for DC to become more intensively engaged here. At present a prom-
ising window of opportunity for new activities appears to be opening 
up on Lake Victoria. To identify specific niches, more exact informa-
tion would be needed on the activities of other donors, with under-
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standings being sought with them in given cases. Such niches could 
include the field of crisis prevention. 
8. Lake Chad can look back on a long, though not particularly success-
ful, history of efforts in the field of transboundary water management. 
At present an attempt to make a new start appears to be underway, 
and German DC would appear to be called upon to act. In view of the 
numerous positive experiences that have been made with transbound-
ary water management in other regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, pros-
pects would appear good. One important first step would be to trans-
fer these experiences into the Lake Chad context. It would in any case 
be essential to include the issue complex of groundwater in any such 
efforts. This might possibly make Lake Chad a model case for trans-
boundary groundwater management. In view of the fact that in the 
future efforts will in any case have to be stepped up to include the is-
sue of groundwater in transboundary water management, this could 
prove to be a very important move. Any DC engagement on Lake 
Chad should be prepared for a long haul, and one that is not without 
its potential pitfalls.  
9. One important desideratum is to improve the communication between 
and coordination of the actors involved and to ensure that policy is 
coherent. This applies for coordination of both donor countries and 
the German agencies and units involved (i. e. interagency and interde-
partmental coordination). Agencies geared more to bilateral country-
specific work and agencies oriented to regional sector-specific work 
should aim for closer coordination, for one of the basic prerequisites 
of transboundary water management is that the countries involved 
harmonize their national water policies – to name only one example 
that calls for communication and coordination. 
10. Another aspect in need of due consideration is the time factor. While 
the logic of DC more or less requires recipient countries to adapt to 
donor timeframes and rhythms, efforts should be made to open up 
time spaces as far as possible. One way or the other, successful trans-
boundary river-basin management takes time – and this time should 
be provided. 
11. In the future more attention will have to be paid to the fact that in the 
end sustainable transboundary river-basin management can be suc-
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cessful only if the approach pursued is a multilevel and a multiactor 
one. Experience shows that the competence and skills needed for wa-
ter resources management are not the monopoly of the governments 
and authorities of riparian countries in transnational river basins. For 
some time now such river basins have, to one extent or another, been 
"internationalized": with regional organizations, international organi-
zations, international NGOs, transnational corporations, and a global-
ized civil society and public taking part, more or less intensively and 
through more or less formalized channels, in transnational water gov-
ernance. And on the other hand a good number of subnational, often 
nonstate actors are also involved: local communities, diverse groups 
of water users, traditional authorities, and private sector actors.  
Precisely in regions with relatively weak statehood and a relatively 
weakly developed economy (i. e. in large parts of Africa), it will be 
essential to undertake far greater efforts to include nonstate actors, their 
so-called informal activities, and their traditional forms of water man-
agement (and water-related dispute settlement) in modern (inter-)na-
tional water management if the aim is to achieve a more effective and 
efficient water management at the grassroots level in the interest of 
pro-poor and sustainable development (and at the same time to 
strengthen democratic structures rooted in the rule of law). A water 
governance that is in this sense networked and process-oriented will 
be in a far better position to involve stakeholders, and involve them 
more intensively, than RBOs have been until today – and we are talk-
ing here about stakeholders that have thus far not been perceived by a 
development policy and DC oriented toward state structures and mod-
ern civil society structures (e. g. traditional religious and political au-
thorities and traditional associations). In the end, the task is to view 
together the various and in many ways interwoven levels of water pol-
icy – from the local to the global – and the various actors engaged at 
each of these levels, and to give meaningful organization to their 
combined efforts. 
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Cooperation on international rivers from an economic 
perspective: the concept of benefit-sharing 
Axel Klaphake, in collaboration with Olivia Voils 
1 The study's aims and methodological approach 
The basic principle of benefit-sharing is simple: Countries located on 
transboundary rivers are well advised to focus on the benefits that may 
result from a cooperative management of water resources and to reach 
agreement on solutions that benefit all of the parties involved (so-called 
win-win solutions). Following the concept, countries should focus less on 
the potentially conflictual issue of water allocation than on the benefits 
that may accrue to all parties if they reach agreement on some form of 
joint management.1 
The concept of benefit-sharing, i. e. distribution of the benefits resulting 
from cooperation, is an important building block in the programs of nearly 
all actors engaged in development cooperation and international water 
policy. The World Bank is without doubt the one actor who especially 
accentuates this concept, assigning particular priority to pursuing its reali-
zation. The Nile Basin Initiative is generally seen as a prime example of 
ongoing efforts to develop shared visions and win-win solutions on rivers 
marked by a high degree of competition between possible uses. This "Nile 
approach" differs in terms of both its sequencing and priorities from the 
policy pursued in the framework of the SADC process. At present the 
focus in southern Africa is less on shared programmatic visions linked 
with the realization of mutual benefits at project level. Here the driving 
force of cooperation is more the conviction that it is preferable to start out 
by establishing joint legal rules and agreements on transboundary water 
use and creating functioning river-basin organizations. 
However, the marked emphasis placed on benefit-sharing when it comes 
to political rhetoric and programs continues to contrast sharply with the 
quite limited state of our knowledge of the conditions and success factors 
                                                          
1 Stated in the terms of economic game theory, the point is to transform the zero-sum 
game of negotiations on water rights into a positive-sum game. Viewed from a theoreti-
cal perspective, the latter offers far better prospects of reaching agreement. 
 Axel Klaphake 
108 German Development Institute 
required to come up with effective agreements on transboundary rivers. 
Against this background, the present study aims to present an overview of 
the actual practice of win-win solutions on international waterbodies and 
to analyze this practice with a view to its potential usefulness for the fur-
ther development of development cooperation. 
The present study's aim is to systematically describe existing forms of 
benefit-sharing and to identify factors both conductive and obstructive to 
efforts to forge relevant agreements. The findings obtained will then be 
used to formulate recommendations for action by development coopera-
tion. Particular attention will be devoted to the question of whether, going 
beyond context-specific particularities, it is possible to come up with gen-
eralizable propositions on benefit-sharing in an overall strategy conceived 
to foster transboundary water cooperation. The discussion of the practical 
experiences made with benefit-sharing will be applied to the present 
framework involved in developing transboundary water cooperation in 
Africa (including e. g. the Nile Initiative, the SADC process). 
The present investigation is conceived as a desk study; it focuses on evalu-
ating available literature and documents. This approach was broadened to 
include a few written and oral queries to national and international experts, 
although due to the narrow timeframe involved only a limited number of 
responses were received, and they did little to broaden the study's knowl-
edge base. For purposes of information-gathering, the study made use of 
existing databases and carried out a comprehensive literature search based 
on the snowball principle. 
Eighteen cases were chosen from the universal set of internationally iden-
tifiable benefit-sharing approaches obtained through a literature search; 
these 18 cases are presented in a systematized manner. The criteria used to 
select the case examples were (i) geographic location of the waterbody in 
question, with priority assigned to cases from Africa; (ii) availability of 
material and data; (iii) the nature of the coordination problem addressed by 
a given case of benefit-sharing (e. g. water power, flood protection, water 
abstraction, irrigated agriculture, water pollution), (iv) the form of the 
benefit-sharing mechanisms concerned, with special attention being paid 
to possibly innovative approaches. 
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2 The study's limitations 
One of the weakness of a desk study is that the approach largely rules out 
access to insider knowledge. Nor can a desk study check whether or not 
the information obtained from the literature is in fact correct – e. g. as far 
as efforts are concerned to assess whether certain organizations operate in 
an effective manner. Finally, another important factor involved is that 
many of the relevant agreements with win-win character have not been 
documented. This applies e. g. for linkages between water agreements and 
"tradeoff deals" in other sectors. While the latter play a major role in ne-
gotiations, they tend to be reached behind closed doors and are often not 
referred to either in public or in scholarly discussions. It is also difficult to 
gain access to decentral forms of transboundary water cooperation (e. g. 
between municipalities on either side of a border) which might well be 
conceived with an eye to benefit-sharing, even though little heed is paid to 
them in the international discussion. Generally speaking, the literature 
available strongly emphasizes the benefit-sharing involved in "big proj-
ects" agreed to between national governments (e. g. bilateral dam con-
struction), while smaller or informal win-win solutions are not docu-
mented in the same way. 
3 Terminological issues and conceptual principles 
Even though benefit-sharing plays an important role in many programs 
and political statements, the term itself has not been defined exactly and is 
used differently in the literature. There is, however, general agreement on 
the starting hypothesis:2 
Cooperation on transboundary rivers entails benefits, the reason being that 
such cooperation increases the overall utility derived from water use in-
volving coordination and optimization across national borders.3 Conse-
                                                          
2  The first authors to deal with the benefits of cooperation on rivers from an economic 
perspective include Kneese and Bower (1968) and – for transboundary rivers – Krutilla 
(1967). LeMarquand's (1977) approach is the first to link economic and political-sci-
ence research on cooperation along international rivers.  
3  The economic reasoning is that countries that go it alone in their water-use policies will 
achieve suboptimal results as regards water use in an overall river basin. To cite an ex-
ample, water used in one country for low-productivity irrigation could, used on the 
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quently, noncooperation entails economic costs because it bears the possi-
bility of taking advantage of efficiency gains. 
Furthermore, the concept is based on the assumption that these coopera-
tion-related gains exceed the costs associated with cooperation (e. g. costs 
bound up with negotiations, administration, and monitoring). In keeping 
with this assumption, transboundary cooperation may thus be said to give 
rise to net benefits. 
One particular feature encountered on international waterbodies is that, as 
a rule, instead of being distributed uniformly, the (net) benefits of coop-
eration tend to accrue to the riparian countries in very different quantities, 
with the distribution and the level of cooperation-related gains being influ-
enced by the location of the countries in a river basin, the uses to which 
water has until now been put, the economic context, as well as other pa-
rameters. Due to the incentive structure resulting from the unequal distri-
bution of cooperation-related gains, agreement on cooperation, and with it 
the possibility to achieve cooperation-based efficiency gains, is bound up 
inextricably with the often contentious issue of how cooperation-related 
benefits are allocated among riparian countries (see Just et al. 1998).  
Cases involving transboundary rivers inevitably center on upstream-
downstream problems that as a rule lead to a spatial divergence of the 
benefits and costs of transboundary cooperation. Often the decision situa-
tion encountered on transboundary watercourses is typified by the fact that 
individual countries would actually be negatively affected by a trans-
boundary water management geared to optimization of the total utility 
involved, e. g. in the case that former water uses were set to be given less 
consideration under a new, future water regime. If it proves impossible in 
such situations to reach agreements designed to compensate for relevant 
cooperation costs, as a rule no agreement will be reached. Benefit-sharing 
thus generally implies that means must be found to compensate all ripari-
ans for benefits that do not accrue uniformly or symmetrically to all coun-
tries concerned. 
                                                                                                                         
other side of the border, achieve greater marginal utility. The level of the efficiency 
gains that could be achieved through cooperation of course depends on water scarcity in 
the river basin concerned as well as on the specific water productivities in the countries 
involved.  
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Even though the economic discussion on benefit-sharing tends to focus on 
benefits that can be assessed in economic and – as a rule – monetary terms 
(Sadoff et al. 2002; Barrett 1998; Rogers 1997), the net utility arising from 
cooperation may also be non-monetary in nature. In some cases it is diffi-
cult if not impossible to monetize certain utility variables. Similarly, it is 
also conceivable that the mechanisms used to allocate the benefits of co-
operation are themselves not (exclusively) monetary in nature, and here, 
viewed from an economic point of view, transboundary monetary transfers 
or cost-sharing are plausible instruments of benefit-sharing. What effects 
of cooperation are in fact perceived by the countries concerned as benefits 
is context-specific and strongly dependent on interests that may be more 
accessible to articulation in one national context than in another.  
It can generally be said that it is not supposedly "objective" benefits and 
drawbacks that play the key role in defining riparian countries' propensity 
to cooperate; indeed, one important determinant at work here is the do-
mestic "market" for transboundary cooperation that exists in given coun-
tries (Durth 1997). Put differently: Country interests are themselves often 
heterogeneous, and the pursuit of given objectives in water negotiations is 
dependent on national political contexts.4 To cite an example, on some 
international rivers differences in transboundary interests may be masked 
by intersectoral or policy-related conflict lines (e. g. energy generation 
versus agriculture, river development versus environmental interests). 
Furthermore, cooperation-related benefits that may be of central impor-
tance for some countries may play as good as no role as a decision-rele-
vant parameter for other countries, since their political systems do not 
honor the pursuit of such goals. 
A distinction proposed by Sadoff and Grey (2002) has now gained wide-
spread acceptance in the international discussion when it comes to outlin-
ing and systematizing the totality of conceivable cooperation benefits. 
Accordingly, in analyzing win-win solutions we can distinguish the fol-
lowing categories (see Table 1): (I) benefits for water resources; (II) bene-
fits from the use of water resources (e. g. hydroenergy, irrigated agricul-
ture, shipping); (III) benefits stemming from fewer conflicts over water 
                                                          
4  The question of the political perception of benefits as well as the way in which they may 
be articulated and asserted in given national political systems is not addressed in most of 
the literature on benefit-sharing; see e. g. Sadoff et al. (2002). 
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resources; (IV) economic and political benefits that extend beyond the 
actual water resources in question. 
Table 1: Benefits from the cooperative management of transbound-
ary water resources  
Categories Problem structure Possible benefits 
(I) Benefits for 
water resources 
Water quality, ecosystems, 
biodiversity 
Improved water quality, im-
provement of land / soils in 
catchment areas, morphological 
structure of waterbodies, etc. 
(II) Benefits from 
water use  
Suboptimal use and de-
velopment of water re-
sources  
Improved energy generation 
and irrigated agriculture, flood 
protection, etc. 
(III) Fewer costs 
stemming from 
water conflicts  
Regional political and, in 
given cases, military ten-
sions  
Altered political relations tend-
ing toward cooperation, lower 
costs due to self-sufficiency in 
food and energy supply; lower 
military costs  
(IV) Benefits ex-
tending beyond 
water use  
Low degree of political and 
economic integration  
Cost reduction based on inte-
grated infrastructure planning 
(e. g. energy), development of 
trade relations  
Source:  Based on Sadoff / Grey (2002) 
Generally, the literature distinguishes two forms of benefit-sharing  
(Table 2). 
In the first place, an immediate transboundary compensation (and as a rule 
one linked directly to the project in question) can be used to strike a bal-
ance between the benefits and costs of cooperation, and this compensation 
may be provided in the form of money (sharing of project costs, price 
guarantees) or noncash benefits (e. g. certain quantities of water). 
In the second place, it is conceivable to link a given cooperation with co-
operation on another project with an opposite allocation of costs and bene-
fits (so-called issue linkages). For instance, a win-win situation may be 
achieved if one party offers to improve lower-course navigability in ex- 
change for improved water quality, requiring another party to reduce pol- 
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Table 2: Different forms of benefit-sharing 
Benefit-sharing 
mechanism 
 Examples of applications  
1. Compensation Monetary Untied international financial transfers  
  Sharing of project costs for infrastructure 
financing or other measures (e. g. reduc-
tion of harmful discharges) 
  Payments for water-use rights to their 
previous holders  
  Acquisition of shares / joint ventures / 
direct investments  
  Price- and/or quantity-related agreements 
on deliveries of water or energy 
 Non monetary Assignment of water-use rights  
  Agreement on quantitative allocation en-
ergy  
2. Issue linkages  Within water 
sector 
Realization of tradeoff deals with oppo-
site cost-benefit allocation (e. g. im-
provement navigability to sea against 
reduction of discharges on upper course) 
  Concessions on water allocation in other 
river basins  
 Outside of  
water sector  
Trade concessions, transportation agree-
ments, immigration issues, border con-
trols, supply agreements (e. g. energy, 
oil), and the like  
lutant or nutrient discharges on the upper course of a river.5 Issue linkages 
(or package deals) may be effected within the water sector or they may be 
extended to tradeoff deals in other policy fields (e. g. trade concessions). 
The literature also refers to outright compensation as a direct incentive 
mechanism, terming issue linkages an indirect incentive mechanism 
(Marty 2001). 
                                                          
5  This constellation is given for the example of the Scheldt. 
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In looking at benefit-sharing from an economic standpoint, the most 
marked accent is generally placed on the benefits deriving from water use 
itself. This goes in particular for the development context, where, in both 
substantive and institutional terms, issues associated with energy genera-
tion and irrigated agriculture are very closely linked with water policy. 
Table 2 points out some possible forms of benefit-sharing. However, it is 
not always possible to unambiguously assign actual cases of benefit-shar-
ing to one of these categories. 
Another aspect constitutive for our understanding of benefit-sharing and 
the implementation-related difficulties that may be involved is that, unlike 
negotiations on water quantities, this case implies a change or a need to 
wholly redefine both the object and the style of negotiations. While 
negotiations on water quantities are concerned with a relatively easily 
quantified, tangible variable that is often bound up with historical claims 
to sovereignty, possession, and power, the matter under negotiation here, 
"utility or "cooperation-related benefits," is a variable that is not always 
immediately tangible for the negotiating parties and may be associated 
with substantial uncertainties as to anticipated levels (Elhance 2000). 
It may furthermore be assumed that the feasibility of benefit-sharing 
agreements depends in large measure on the preferences of the riparians 
concerned as regards the possible relationship between water rights and 
financial transfers or other "tradeoff deals." Countries that, as a matter of 
principle, do not regard "sovereign" water rights as "tradable" against 
money or other benefits are very unlikely to accept such arrangements. On 
the other hand, countries that tend more to see a substitutive relationship 
between these two variables may be regarded as open to such arrange-
ments. 
In any event, the relationship between the variables "water rights" and 
"benefits from a resource" is a quite complex one. The conventional eco-
nomic view, with its marked tendency to simplify matters, proceeds on the 
assumption that it is possible, starting out at the conceptual level, to 
maximize the economic utility stemming from water cooperation; the next 
step would then be to negotiate the allocation of the benefits of coopera-
tion, in order then, finally, to reach agreement on transfers designed to 
apportion the benefits. However, this view presupposes that agreement has 
already been reached on the water rights in question, in other words, that, 
viewed in economic terms, the property rights to a given transboundary 
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waterbody have already been clearly defined and are no longer a conten-
tious issue. This, though, is typically not the case on transboundary rivers. 
This in turn is the reason why it is often necessary to negotiate simultane-
ously over water rights and allocation of the benefits stemming from co-
operation, and that efficiency and allocation issues are inseparably 
intertwined from the outset of negotiations (Rogers 1997). 
Finally, we can formulate the hypothesis that growing water scarcity has a 
positive influence on the probability that benefit-sharing agreements will 
be reached, since as a rule growing scarcity goes hand in hand with an 
increase in the potential of cooperation-related benefits. Accordingly, any 
failure to accept appropriate mechanisms designed to equitably allocate 
benefits could, in the future, have more or less grave economic 
repercussions for the countries concerned (Elhance 2000). In any case, 
growing water scarcity increases the relevance of the logic of economic 
efficiency in resource use in connection with compensation mechanisms. 
4 Differentiation of coordination problems and 
implications for benefit-sharing 
The need for benefit-sharing results from the fact that optimization of 
water use is associated with distributive effects that, in view of present or 
planned water uses, are not seen as acceptable by all countries concerned. 
This coordination problem can be further differentiated (see especially 
Marty 2001; as well as Dombrowsky 2005; Haftendorn 2000; Eaton / 
Eaton 1996; Rogers 1997). 
Case 1: Coordination problems involved in infrastructure provision 
Generally speaking, the countries concerned will have a parallel interest in 
realizing certain measures, and cooperation will be beneficial for all par-
ties. Examples would include flood-protection measures on rivers forming 
a border, navigability, or water-infrastructure development, in which the 
countries concerned normally pursue compatible interests. When collec-
tive goods are involved, the cooperation problem typically has two sides, 
since the riparians concerned must on the one hand find the project with 
the highest overall efficiency benefits (the so-called production problem) 
and on the other hand come up with decisions on the allocation of effi-
ciency-related benefits (the so-called distribution problem). Even though 
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reaching agreement on the allocation of costs and benefits is in no way a 
politically trivial problem, thanks to the symmetrical incentives and ho-
mogeneous interests involved, the chances that agreement will be reached 
are relatively high here. 
Case 2: Cooperation problems in the management of transboundary wa-
terbodies  
In this case, too, the countries concerned may achieve cooperation-related 
benefits by working together on international waterbodies. Unlike Case 1, 
however, the main aspect of the cooperation problem here is that noncoop-
eration may be more advantageous than cooperation for some of the 
parties concerned.6 One example would be joint management of 
groundwater resources when scarcity problems are involved. Here 
coordinated and sustainable management would be advantageous for all 
countries concerned, and compared with fully uncoordinated water use, 
each individual country could also realize benefits in this case. However, 
there is a strategic incentive problem involved here, since individual 
countries would fare best if all other countries were to opt for cooperation 
while they themselves managed to evade any restrictions (the so-called 
free-rider problem). Compared with Case 1, in this case the probability 
that the countries concerned will opt for cooperation to solve relevant 
cooperation-related problems will be lower if it is not possible to use 
negative or positive incentives to encourage and support cooperation.7  
Case 3: Unidirectional externalities / upstream-downstream coordination 
Upstream-downstream problems are among the classic problem con-
stellations encountered on transboundary rivers. Activities on the upper 
course of a river are inevitably bound up with positive or negative exter-
nalities downriver. This limits the possibilities available to engage in co-
                                                          
6  This is the classic situation of the so-called prisoner's dilemma. Viewed from their own 
perspective, individual actors / players would be better off if other actors / players 
showed cooperative behavior, while the former were not themselves forced to cooper-
ate. 
7  Viewed in terms of game theory, another factor relevant to free-rider problems is whether 
the decision situations are unique in nature or recur regularly. It is in turn far more likely 
that agreement will be reached in recurrent decision situations, since in this case the other 
countries involved are in a position to "penalize" noncooperative behavior. 
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operation in that individual countries may have no interest in coming up 
with cooperative solutions which, at least initially, entail no benefits for 
them. One example would be reduction of discharges into waterbodies or 
the realization of flood-protection measures on the upper course of a river, 
which would benefit only the countries on the river's lower course.8 
Reallocation of water rights in a river basin faced with scarcity problems 
also involves similar characteristics, since present water users will not be 
interested in any such reallocation unless they are provided (financial) 
compensation. Haftendorn (2000), for instance, distinguishes between 
cases of relative water scarcity – in which, in principle, all parties obtain 
water, though not the quantities they desire – and the situation of absolute 
water scarcity. The latter case is characterized by the fact that there is no 
possible way to satisfy some legitimate claims to water use. Even though 
in actual cases it may be quite difficult to distinguish between these two 
forms, it may plausibly be assumed that the chances of reaching agreement 
will be lowest in cases involving absolute water scarcity. 
Under the condition of water scarcity, rational actors will in any event 
only agree to limitations on their water use if they see a possibility of 
gaining compensation, e. g. of sharing with another country the benefits 
accruing to it from the use of additional water resources. It is, for instance, 
conceivable – despite national borders – to link water rights to use pro-
ductivity or to reallocate water rights from low-productivity users to eco-
nomically more efficient uses. But any such efficiency-oriented water 
allocation in international river basins is realistic only in the case that 
previous users are given financial compensation for their (temporary or 
permanent) surrender of their water rights. In fact, however, the probabil-
ity of that agreement will be reached on compensation in such cases also 
hinges on the power-political setting given in river basins, and one critical 
variable here is the position taken by lower-course riparians, who may lay 
claim to additional quantities of water from upper-course riparians 
(Mitchell / Keilbach 2001). 
The probability of cooperation declines from Case 1 to Case 3, and in Case 
3 agreement may in general be expected only if the losers of cooperation 
are given compensation in exchange for their cooperation (Rogers 1997; 
                                                          
8  One example here is the Euphrates, where dams in Turkey have a positive effect for 
flood protection in Syria and Iraq (see Scheumann 2003).  
 Axel Klaphake 
118 German Development Institute 
Marty 2001). Generally, compensation of this kind should not be allowed 
to fail for lack of means, since, on the whole, cooperation at the river-basin 
level leads to benefits for all. But transboundary benefit-sharing may also 
be called for in Cases 1 and 2 as a means of facilitating or realizing an 
agreement. 
Against this background there is reason to expect in principle that in prac-
tice benefit-sharing mechanisms will materialize far more often and prove 
easier to implement when the interests involved are homogeneous and 
symmetrical (Case 1) than in situations in which upstream-downstream 
problems are at stake. 
Here we can distinguish between cooperation-related benefits depending 
on whether they occur in concentrated or more diffuse forms. Due to the 
lobbying activities and clientelist policies normally associated with them, 
concentrated benefits that will clearly accrue to a limited number of actors 
and can be pinned down spatially generally have far greater chances of 
being politically articulated and realized across borders than diffuse bene-
fits that are more scattered in spatial terms and often are advocated by 
actors with less influence (Bernauer 2002). It may thus as a rule be said 
that these diffuse and less tangible benefits are also more difficult to esti-
mate reliably in terms of their levels as well as in terms of monetary vari-
ables, and this in turn tends to render them less communicable when it 
comes to benefit-sharing mechanisms. Examples of benefits that are at the 
same time concentrated and relatively easy to quantify can be found in the 
field of hydroenergy. Examples of more diffuse benefits from cooperation 
would include small-scale farming, flood protection, or measures designed 
to protect aquatic ecosystems. As far as benefit-sharing mechanisms are 
concerned, concentrated cooperation-related benefits also have another 
advantage: They are easier to "tap" in a transboundary setting; examples 
here would include setting up joint ventures, allocation of energy quanti-
ties, or agreements on prices. 
In addition to a symmetrical interest structure, it is thus also easier to im-
plement benefit-sharing mechanisms when the cooperation-related benefits 
involved pose no problems to quantification and tend at the same time to 
accrue in concentrated form; this tends to tangibly highlight the benefits of 
joint projects and then to set the stage for the process of allocating them. 
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Finally, it can generally be assumed that there are a number of factors 
influencing the realization and, in given cases, the effectiveness of benefit-
sharing; these factors can be broken down in keeping with the fields of 
action presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Influencing factors involved in reaching agreement on 
benefit-sharing mechanisms on transboundary rivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Benefit-sharing in practice: Subject matter and 
articulation 
This section is devoted to a description of the forms of benefit-sharing that 
have been implemented in practice and the relevant parameters involved. 
Section 5 analyzes factors that may prove obstructive or conducive to the 
implementation of win-win solutions on transboundary rivers in Africa. 
Box 1 lists all cases on which the assessments are based. 
Joint river 
management based 
on benefit-sharing 
Hydrological 
conditions 
Type of coor-
dination prob-
lem involved 
(asymmetrical 
– symmetrical 
interests) 
Political rela-
tions between 
the riparian 
countries 
concerned
International-law 
framework for water 
use (conventions, 
protocols etc.) 
National 
political 
priorities 
National legal and 
administrative 
conditions 
Type of 
benefits that 
can be achieved 
through 
cooperation 
Level of 
economic 
development 
and relations 
between 
riparians 
concerned 
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Box 1:  Selected case studies  
Africa 
Lesotho Highlands Project (Senqu-Orange) (South 
Africa, Lesotho) 
Infrastructure development on the Senegal River 
(Mauritania, Senegal, Mali) 
Infrastructure development on the Cunene River 
(South Africa, Portugal) 
Owen Falls (Nile) (UK) 
Aswan Dam (Nile) (Sudan, Egypt) 
Dam construction on the Komati-Lomati (South 
Africa, Swaziland)  
Incomati / Maputo Agreement (2002) (South 
Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique) 
Kariba Dam (Zambezi) (Zambia, Zimbabwe)  
Cahora Bassa Dam (Zambezi) (Portugal, South 
Africa, Mozambique) 
Molatedi Dam (Limpopo) (South Africa, 
Botswana) 
Incomati River, KaNgwane (South Africa, 
KaNgwane) 
North America 
Columbia River (Canada– 
US) 
Tijuana River (US – Mexico) 
 
 
South America 
Parana (La Plata Basin) 
(Brazil, Paraguay) 
Salto Grande region 
(Uruguay River) (Argentina, 
Uruguay)  
 
Asia 
Syr Darya (Aral See) (Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) 
Infrastructure development (Mekong) (Thailand, 
Laos) 
Pancheshwar Project (Ganges – Brahmaputra –
Meghna) (India – Nepal)  
Kosi Project (Ganges – Brahmaputra – Meghna) 
(India – Nepal) 
Chukha Hydro-electric Project (Ganges –
Brahmaputra – Meghna) (Bhutan, India) 
Europe 
Scheldt / Meuse (The 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
France) 
Rhine (Chloride Prevention 
Agreement, 1976) (The 
Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland) 
 
As far as the general diffusion of benefit-sharing mechanisms is con-
cerned, it can be said that several relevant agreements have been con-
cluded on transboundary rivers, and that, generally speaking, existing 
agreements are more and more keyed to water uses and related 
needs/demand. Some such agreements explicitly state that the allocation of 
water resources will be geared not to the principle of equal water quanti-
ties but to the principle of equal benefits from water-resource use – as is 
the case e. g. in the agreements between the U. S. and Canada on water-
bodies forming the border between the two countries (Wolf 1999). Still, 
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the overall number of existing win-win solutions involving agreement by 
the parties on sharing the economic benefits stemming from cooperation is 
still relatively modest, above all when viewed in relation to the number of 
agreements involving purely qualitative allocation or technical coopera-
tion. The Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database shows that less than ten percent of the transboundary river 
agreements covered involve arrangements on compensation or tradeoff 
deals designed to strike a balance in the allocation of (economic) benefits; 
but the great majority of existing agreements contain no linkages provid-
ing for financial transfers or package deals (Wolf 1999). 
The known cases are broadly dispersed in spatial terms, and there are no 
clear-cut regional tendencies or accumulations recognizable. It can be said 
that – at least – the information available provides no evidence to confirm 
the higher frequency of benefit-sharing in political and economic integra-
tion spaces assumed by some relevant authors (Bernauer 2002; Durth 
1997).  
The best-known cases in Africa are the cooperation project between South 
Africa and Lesotho in the so-called Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the 
cooperation-based infrastructure-development project between three 
riparians on the Senegal, and the joint South Africa-Swaziland river-
development project on the Komati River. In addition, we may also cite 
here the more recent agreements on water allocation for the Incomati-
Maputo Basin, which also display features of a win-win solution. There 
are also some older agreements, most of which are concerned with the use 
of hydropower in colonial contexts or must be viewed against the 
background of South Africa's foreign-policy situation before the era of 
apartheid came to an end. The present study does not document the more 
recent development of cooperation on the Nile in the context of the Nile 
Basin Initiative. For one thing, the initiative is well known and 
documented (see e. g. Nicol 2003a); for another, the brief span of time 
involved is not really sufficient to come up with any reliable statements on 
the effectiveness of the shared-vision approach pursued in the Nile Basin. 
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Aside from these African cases, several non-African cases have also been 
reviewed with a view to better capturing the possible breadth of benefit-
sharing mechanisms. In the European context these would include efforts 
to reduce the saline load of the Rhine (Chloride Agreement 1976) and the 
cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands, and France on the Scheldt 
and Meuse rivers. The North American Columbia Treaty may be seen as 
one of the most extensive cases of benefit-sharing between industrialized 
countries; this can also be said of the US-Mexican cooperation project on 
wastewater treatment on the Tijuana River. Two more recent large-scale 
projects with clear-cut benefit-sharing mechanisms are relevant for the 
development context: the cooperation between Nepal and India in the 
Pancheshwar Project and the Thailand–Laos cooperation on hydropower 
generation. Other relevant cases would include the agreements concluded 
in 1998 between the Syr Darya riparians (Aral Sea); this case, which in-
volved a decision not to use upstream water resources for hydropower, 
included agreement on compensation in kind (fossil energies). Finally, two 
cases from South America have been used. 
Table 3 presents some of the central parameters used to describe the bene-
fit-sharing mechanisms for the African cases investigated in the present 
study. These cases have the following characteristics: 
(i) Development phases across time 
The cases presented clearly indicate that benefit-sharing – even though the 
concept has gained popularity only in recent years at international water 
conferences – has played a role in practical international cooperation for 
many years now, and thus cannot at all be said to be a new phenomenon in 
water cooperation. For the situation in Africa we can distinguish three 
phases. 
An early phase can be identified in the colonial context; it includes, 
among other things, some first agreements with benefit-sharing character 
on the Nile from the 1940s and 1950s (e. g. the Aswan Dam).9 One of the 
                                                          
9 Wolf also reports on some cases from the early 19th century that are not documented 
here; these include an agreement between the UK and the Sultan of Abdali on financial 
transfers for the use of Aden groundwater (1910) or payments by the UK to Eritrea, the 
upstream riparian in the Nile Basin, as its share of the profits from cultivation of the 
Gash Delta (1926) (Wolf 1999). 
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particular features of the colonial phase of river cooperation was that de-
spite sharply divergent interests the colonial powers in part pursued paral-
lel interests and embraced similar organizational concepts when it came to 
managing large river basins; these were keyed to the model of the US 
Tennessee Valley Authority, which at that time figured prominently in the 
international discussion. Examples would include early proposals on de-
veloping cooperation on the Senegal (1930s) or plans to set up a Zambezi 
Valley Authority, which, in keeping with notions current among the colo-
nial powers in the 1930s and 1940s, was to have extensive powers in the 
field of river development. 
A second phase can be made out between the end of the 1960s and the end 
of the 1980s. The projects relevant here must be viewed in the context of 
the newly won independence of a number of countries on the one hand and 
a positive perception of river development on the other. The latter also led 
to support being provided by major donor organizations like the World 
Bank, which saw promotion of large-scale projects as a good means of 
fostering the economic independence of newly independent countries. The 
typical cases include the above-mentioned cooperation on the Senegal and 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Two other projects on the Zambezi 
River are the Kariba and Cahora Bassa projects, both of which, however, 
had already been planned in the colonial era. The special features typical 
of this second phase include the existence of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the external (in part military) tensions associated with it as well 
as a number of specific political coalitions that emerged in southern Af-
rica. The projects agreed on in this phase (Lesotho Highlands, cooperation 
in Botswana) bear marked traces of this particular regional situation (Tur-
ton 2003; Meissner 2003), one in which countries willing to cooperate on 
other bilateral issues (e. g. security) could in part count on South African 
concessions on water issues. 
Finally, we can distinguish a third phase, the period from the end of the 
1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. It was marked by new set of political 
parameters (the end of the Cold War and the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, processes of political and economic integration, e. g. SADC etc.). 
This phase saw the adoption of extensive institutional reforms, above all in 
southern Africa in the context of the SADC process. The implications at 
the level of concrete benefit-sharing agreements have, though, been more 
or less modest. The cooperation in the Incomati Basin can, however, be 
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specified as a prime example of the possibilities offered by the new set of 
political conditions (above all the 2002 agreement). There are also a num-
ber of planned projects that cannot be discussed in detail here and that will 
not be able to be implemented without agreements on benefit-sharing 
mechanisms. This applies in particular for a number of international water-
transfer projects (Heyns 2002; Turton 2003) that will also alter the water-
policy situation in southern Africa. One factor of relevance for this phase 
of water cooperation is the growing role played by environmental issues, 
and this has already found expression e. g. in agreements on minimum 
ecological runoffs. 
(ii) Types of benefit-sharing mechanisms 
Section 2 breaks down conceivable forms of benefit-sharing into direct 
mechanisms, in which compensation or benefit-sharing are immediately 
project-related, and indirect mechanisms (i. e. intra- or intersectoral issue 
linkages). Based on this classification, we find that the examples under 
consideration, as few in number as they may be, reveal a sizable range of 
practiced forms of benefit-sharing. Table 4 provides an overview focusing 
on direct incentive mechanisms. 
The arrangements made in connection with the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project are extensive and highly differentiated. The project consists in the 
joint realization of a number of river-development measures, although it 
basically focuses on classic infrastructure projects (dams, water pipelines). 
In this project benefit-sharing hinges largely on allocation of water-use 
rights, South Africa's willingness to assume a large measure of the project 
costs, and payments that are keyed to given shares of water, which are 
explicitly defined with an eye to allocating the benefits of cooperation. In 
general terms, it was agreed that 56 % of the benefits from the project 
would go to Lesotho. The basis used to calculate these cooperation bene-
fits – an overall volume of some US$ 1 billion is expected when all stages 
of the project have been completed – is the cost differential between this 
project and a technically alternative project (the so-called Orange Vaal 
Transfer Scheme) which South Africa could have realized on its own ter-
ritory, though at costs (both fixed and variable) that would have been far 
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higher than the Lesotho project. Above and beyond the payments it re-
ceives from South Africa, Lesotho also derives a further benefit from the 
option it now has to generate hydropower. One factor of considerable 
importance for the constellation involved in the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project may be seen in the low opportunity costs of selling water to South 
Africa, and it was this that made the project attractive from the perspective 
of Lesotho, a country which, by regional comparison, is very well 
endowed with water resources. The breadth of the agreements reached on 
the Senegal is seen as exemplary; here the parties agreed on an allocation 
of the benefits stemming from two dams – cost-sharing in connection with 
allocation of electricity and water resources. Another interesting aspect 
here is the far-reaching and legally innovative institutional context: The 
parties acknowledged in an earlier treaty (1972) that the riparian countries 
would regard the Senegal's water resources as a "common resource" and 
recognize the Senegal as an "international river," and for this reason – and 
unlike the case of most other African rivers – the negotiations were from 
the outset focused less on sovereignty issues than on aspects of water use. 
Generally speaking, cost-sharing in joint infrastructure projects appears to 
the most widespread form of benefit-sharing, and in some cases purely 
cost-related agreements have been concluded. In other cases both the re-
alization and the operation of the infrastructure concerned have been un-
derpinned by transboundary shareholdings or joint ownership of the plant 
and equipment involved (e. g. Senegal). One common practice used in 
infrastructure development projects is to reach agreement on deliveries or 
sales of given quantities of water or electricity, and here, in a number of 
projects (dam construction on the Senegal, the Cunene, and the Zambezi), 
transfers in kind (primarily hydropower) constitute a central mechanism of 
benefit-sharing. Allocation of irrigation areas also plays a role in coopera-
tion between the Senegal riparians. Here agreements have been reached on 
volumes and locations in a joint development program. As far as the ar-
chitecture of shared benefits is concerned, the Senegal is in any case a 
highly illustrative example in that here the parties succeeded in linking a 
number of different benefits – benefits that are substantially more signifi-
cant for some of the countries involved than for others – to form an overall 
package acceptable to all.  
Some projects also feature complex linkages involving allocation of water 
and energy. One example here would be the Kagera Dam; according to the 
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terms of the relevant agreement, each of the two countries involved in the 
project are entitled to 50 % of the water resources, while power allocation 
depends on the amount of water available. In other words, instead of being 
allocated on the basis of absolute variables (e. g. kWh), the quantities of 
power to be distributed are determined by the amount of water available. 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project operates with a flexible benefit-
sharing mechanism in which changes in water availability affect the rules 
governing the allocation of financial transfers between Lesotho and South 
Africa. The agreements on the Lesotho project thus also implicitly entails 
a distribution of risks between the project parties concerning future water 
availability, although this arrangement is heavily biased in favor of 
Lesotho. The ways in which (primarily hydrological) risks are dealt with 
in agreements on benefit-sharing mechanisms is a central aspect that will 
be addressed again in Section 5. 
As far as the context of dam construction is concerned, apart from alloca-
tion of water or electricity, we also find cases in which simple compensa-
tion-based solutions are used to address immediate disadvantages suffered 
by other riparians in connection with projects. Such disadvantages, which 
may be compensated for either in money or in kind, include e. g. loss of or 
damage to land in connection with backwater zones in border regions or 
temporary flooding, both of which are as a rule compensated for by finan-
cial means (e. g. Aswan Dam; South Africa / KaNgwane; Drieskoppies 
Dam South Africa / Swaziland). 
On the other hand, there are no known cases of compensation for con-
sumptive uses of additional quantities of water, e. g. for irrigation pur-
poses, on Africa's transboundary waterbodies. Nor are there any cases in 
which countries on the upper course of a river are obliged to compensate 
downstream riparians for lower water availability, or to share the benefits 
they derive from their own increased water use with downstream riparians. 
While there have been numerous discussions on a mechanism of this kind 
for the Nile, the talks have failed as a result of political problems and 
mistrust between Egypt and Ethiopia (Barret 1998; Schiff / Winters 2002; 
Niol 2003a). In addition, another limiting factor at work in this context is 
Egypt's marked power position, which has in the past helped Egypt to push 
through its own interests in obtaining given quantities of water, largely 
without having to engage in any benefit-sharing. 
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Outside of Africa we can cite in this context one recent and interesting 
agreement concluded in the catchment basin of the Aral Sea. Here irriga-
tion-related water losses incurred in connection with power generation are 
compensated for in kind (i. e. in the form of fossil energy resources) (see 
the fact sheet on the Syr Darya), although, in practice, the effectiveness of 
this agreement between the three riparian parties is still limited. This bene-
fit-sharing agreement on the Syr Darya provides for compensation for 
seasonal fluctuations in water availability or for reduced upstream energy 
generation in periods of cold weather; it does not entail any permanent 
transfer of water rights. 
Worldwide, only very few cases have been documented in which 
downstream riparians are required to share costs bound up with reduced 
discharges upstream of a transboundary river. But upstream compensation 
of this kind was included in the Rhine Chloride Agreement (1976) 
(Bernauer 1995). This situation is similar in the case of the plant built on 
the Tijuana River to treat Mexican wastewater, roughly 90 % of the costs 
of which were borne by the U. S. (Marty 2001). In Africa, where thus far 
virtually no transboundary emission-control agreements have been 
concluded, there are at present no such mechanisms. 
There are some projects in which no (financial or in-kind) benefit- or cost-
sharing is provided for; in these cases the intention is to use project plan-
ning to achieve, uno actu, positive effects for lower-course countries that 
will serve as compensation for any possible disadvantages these countries 
may have to contend with. Examples would include agreements on the use 
of dams to reduce the risk posed by downriver floods or artificial flooding 
designed to reduce damage in connection with regulated water runoff on 
the lower course of a river. Agreement was reached on the latter point e. g. 
on the Senegal in the 1990s with a view to providing compensation for 
negative effects of dam operation. There are no reports from Africa on 
more complex agreements on the economic effects stemming from a com-
bination of flood control and power generation of the kind concluded be-
tween Canada and the US in the 1960 for the Columbia River.  
There are several examples for issue linkages within the water sector, 
although these are as a rule highly context-specific in nature. Aside from 
the above-mentioned example of infrastructure development on the Sene-
gal, other examples would include the more recent Incomati-Maputo 
Agreement between South Africa, Mozambique, and Swaziland (2002), 
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which managed to resolve (at least provisionally) a seemingly intractable 
conflict over allocation of the waters of the Incomati by including the 
Maputo, another transboundary river, in the negotiations. Concessions that 
South Africa made to Mozambique on use of the waters of the Maputo 
paved the way for an agreement on allocation of the waters of the Inco-
mati. In any case, the context defined by the overall water-policy complex 
in southern Africa has increased regional interdependencies,10 and this has 
increasingly meant that, apart from the project under consideration, water 
negotiations are conducted with an eye to the willingness of the parties to 
cooperate on other projects that may involve different interest complexes. 
To cite an example, one reason why agreement was reached on South 
Africa–Botswana water transfers was that Botswana had legally 
recognized certain claims to water use raised by South Africa, and South 
Africa itself was – based on water cooperation between the two countries 
extending back to the apartheid era – able to assume that Botswana would 
adopt a cooperative stance on other water projects. The cooperation 
between Botswana and South Africa in the water sector may thus already 
be said to be characterized by a good measure of diffuse reciprocity 
(LeMarquand 1977), and this means that, instead of insisting on achieving 
a balance of benefits for every project, the two countries may look to 
diffuse reciprocal benefits that accrue from a large number of projects that 
entail different transboundary impacts. 
Looking beyond Africa, we find examples of creative tie-in deals in the 
water sector between riparian countries such as the Netherlands and Bel-
gium on the Scheldt, where the parties came up with a linkage between 
efforts to improve navigability and measures designed to control pollutant 
discharges (Meijerink 1999; Mostert 2003). Generally speaking, it may be 
said that efforts to link navigability with other management issues on 
transboundary rivers have a high level of plausibility for smoothly func-
                                                          
10 This applies in particular in the context of international water-transfer projects, the 
reason being that such projects not only modify hydrological interactions but also alter 
specific future benefit flows stemming from water cooperation. It is interesting to note 
that some projects planned with a view to increasing the availability of water in South 
Africa would require the country to seek cooperation with countries with which, at 
present, it has no cooperation-based relations in the water sector. Another important ex-
ample for the significance that water transfers may have for the realization of win-win 
solutions is the Okavango River. 
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tioning issue linkages in that countries on the upper course of a river for 
the most part stand to benefit more from improved navigability, while as a 
rule lower-course countries benefit more from improvements in water 
quality. At the international level, for instance, intensive discussions have 
been conducted on water-related issue linkages between the US and Mex-
ico, e. g. regarding the Colorado and the Rio Grande (LeMarquand 1977). 
While cross-sectoral issue linkages play a major role in water negotiations 
– most instances cited in the literature are concerned with countries with 
markedly different levels of development (Wolf 2001) – very few such 
cases have been documented for Africa. But it is emphasized in the litera-
ture that during the apartheid era South Africa used cooperative behavior 
on water issues to pursue clear-cut foreign policy objectives and security 
interests (Turton 2003). On the Euphrates, water-related conflicts between 
Turkey and Syria have long been heavily intertwined with security as-
pects, and here positive developments in security cooperation have had 
markedly conducive effects on water cooperation.11 
Hardly any example has been reported in which countries suffering from 
water scarcity or water stress have agreed to a reallocation of water re-
sources in connection with financial benefit-sharing with a view to maxi-
mizing their overall utility from water use. Most existing benefit-sharing 
agreements are concerned with the distribution of benefits from "new" 
water resources, most of them deriving from dam construction. There are 
no cases known in which one country has permanently relinquished a 
given water use in favor of another riparian, receiving compensation in 
return. 
(iii) Types of coordination problems addressed by means of benefit- 
sharing 
With reference to the differentiation of cooperation problems undertaken 
in Section 3, we can assign a large share of the benefit-sharing mecha-
nisms identified here to Case 1 (coordination problems involved in infra-
structure provision) a case characterized largely by homogeneous interests 
and a symmetrical incentive structure, the reason being that here, in prin-
                                                          
11 Even the Turkish-Syrian negotiations on the 1987 Protocol covered energy and security 
issues alongside water issues. 
Cooperation on international rivers from an economic perspective 
German Development Institute 135 
ciple, all parties involved stand to benefit from the realization of a given 
project. This would apply, for instance, for a number of dams built to gen-
erate hydropower for joint use (including e. g. the Kariba Dam on the 
Zambezi, infrastructure on the Senegal). 
But it is not possible in all cases addressed to cleanly assign all such cases 
to the three categories set out above, because certain aspects of given pro-
jects would place them under Case 1 (parallel interests/benefits), while 
others would best be assigned to Case 2 (unidirectional – positive – exter-
nalities). And in many instances it is not possible to assign a given project 
"objectively" to the one case or the other, because assignment depends on 
the way in which the cooperation problem is defined specifically in the 
countries concerned. The forms that are more hybrid in nature would in-
clude e. g. the Lesotho Highlands Water Project; due to its financial 
impacts and the energy-policy interests involved, the project was more in 
line with Lesotho's overall interests, but for Lesotho the project would not 
have been possible without the cooperation of South Africa and a 
substantial engagement on the part of international donors. While cases of 
compensation for largely unidirectional, positive effects of a trans-
boundary nature provide little in the way of hard evidence, the case of 
cooperation on the Cunene River (which for many years was very limited 
because of the civil war in Angola) has been assigned to this group.12 
Looking beyond Africa, however, we find few examples of compensation 
for river development or protection measures with unidirectional 
downriver effects; these would include e. g. India's assumption of the costs 
for erosion-protection measures on the upper course of the Kosi River 
(India – Nepal Kosi River Project). 
Apart from joint infrastructure projects, there are few examples in Africa 
of compensation for negative transboundary externalities. Interestingly, 
these cases are concerned primarily with "upstream" externalities involv-
ing land utilization for dam backwaters, e. g. in the cases of the Drieskop-
pies Dam in the 1990s and the agreements on the Aswan Dam in the 
1950s. 
                                                          
12 However, this, too, is not a case involving purely unidirectional externalities, since it 
also entails positive effects for the upstream riparian (Angola). 
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(iv) The functional and sectoral focus of the relevant agreements 
The points addressed thus far clearly indicate that most existing forms of 
benefit-sharing have a comparatively narrow and functional focus and are 
as a rule legally anchored in functionally specific agreements on joint 
water-infrastructure planning and management. Important examples here 
would include the treaties on the Lesotho Highlands and Kagera projects 
or the cooperation between Swaziland and South Africa on the Komati 
River. These initially involved project-specific agreements that, at least in 
part, were later anchored in a broader treaty framework. For instance, the 
Komati cooperation project was given a new framework in the agreement 
signed in 2002. The cooperation between South Africa and Lesotho has 
also been embedded in a broader institutional framework through the 
agreements reached on the Orange / Senqu River – although this has no 
immediate effects for the Highlands Project. Put differently: The function-
ality of bilateral river-development projects does not depend directly on 
the existence of cross-sectoral, multilateral agreements (Mohammed 2003; 
Marty 2001). 
The situation on the Senegal was different in nature from the very start. 
Aside from project-specific – and decidedly multisectoral – provisions, the 
treaty lays down basic rules governing the joint use of water resources by 
the three riparian parties. But on the Senegal, too, not all of the riparian 
countries are among the signatories; Guinea withdrew from the coopera-
tion project at an early point of time, and has only recently shown renewed 
interest in developing closer ties to this river-basin cooperation project. 
It can thus generally be said that in the majority of cases close functional 
cooperation has preceded any broader agreements on cooperation on water 
management, not vice-versa (Marty 2001). Some agreements provide 
explicitly for further development and enlargement of cooperation as soon 
as a given project has been successfully realized; one example here would 
be the agreement on construction of the Kagera Dam. 
In southern Africa the sectoral focus is primarily on joint power genera-
tion, a benefit that is very well suited for such agreements because of its 
tangible character. Such monosectoral agreements include e. g. those on 
the construction and management of the Kagera and Cahora Bassa dams. 
One cooperation venture with a multisectoral perspective is the project on 
the Senegal, which, in addition to power generation – an area in which 
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thus far little headway has been made in implementation – is geared to 
improving watercourse navigability, and the joint transboundary devel-
opment of irrigated agriculture. The focus of the older, 1972 Senegal 
agreement has recently been appreciably enlarged through two new 
agreements, which include protection of freshwater ecosystems (wetlands 
in the river delta) and artificial flooding designed to promote small-scale 
agricultural structures. The cooperation project on the Komati River 
extends to efforts to coordinate the objectives of power generation and 
development of irrigated agriculture. 
The examples from southern Africa also show that use of shared water 
infrastructure only for agricultural purposes may not justify the high in-
vestment costs involved. For South Africa e. g. the economic profitability 
of the Lesotho project is bound up with the context of urban and industrial 
water use in the country's economic centers, i. e. of highly productive 
water uses that require relatively low subsidies. On the other hand, a joint 
South Africa – Botswana dam project failed because South Africa would 
have been able to use the projected dam only for purposes of irrigated 
agriculture, and the economic utility that could have been derived from the 
dam would not have justified the investment costs. 
In fact, ecology-oriented win-win cooperation is still the absolute excep-
tion on the African continent. Benefit-sharing and win-win solutions are 
nearly always associated with river development and large-scale dam 
projects. It is therefore not particularly surprising that some of the positive 
examples of win-win solutions referred to here include projects that are 
highly controversial at the international level because of their social and 
environmental impacts (Senegal, Lesotho, Kagera, and others). 
(v) The mainly bilateral character of cooperation 
Finally, nearly all forms of cooperation involve bilateral approaches; we 
find virtually no cooperation projects that include all riparian countries in 
a benefit-sharing agreement. One reason for this is that the countries not 
involved in such cooperation projects are not affected by them and thus do 
not pursue any particular interests bound up with them. In some other 
cases, though, other countries were not included, even though there was 
reason to expect that a project would give rise to impacts extending be-
yond the borders of the negotiating parties (Kagera Project). In some cases 
the intention may well have been to exclude individual countries from the 
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benefits of cooperation (e. g. power generation), a state of affairs that must 
be interpreted in the context of the political tensions and coalitions that 
emerged in southern Africa in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
This bilateralism may also be due to more intensive sociocultural, lan-
guage, and religious relations between individual riparian countries, a state 
of affairs that may impede multilateral forms of cooperation and, at least 
initially, prove conducive to bilateral cooperation; examples here would 
include the cooperation between Egypt and Sudan on the Nile or coopera-
tion projects in Muslim, Francophone West Africa. 
In fact, the question of bi- or multilateral cooperation projects hinges, as 
might be expected, in large measure on the type of benefit-sharing agree-
ment under consideration. It is mainly cooperation on concrete water proj-
ects that displays a functionally narrowly defined and bilateral character. 
These projects in turn are for the most part forms of cooperation in which 
the countries involved pursue parallel interests (Mohamed 2003). On the 
other hand, cooperation in the form of issue linkages has other particular 
features in that the recondition required for their realization is inclusion of 
all interests and countries in a river basin (e. g. the Incomati Project or the 
efforts undertaken in the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative). Inclusion 
of additional countries from the river basin in question may prove to be a 
key precondition for cooperation if, in negotiations that lack a generally 
accepted mediator, one riparian is able to assume the mediator role, and 
that country pursues no specific interests of its own.13 
Outside Africa as well, an approach that is at once relatively narrow in 
functional terms and generally bilateral, is one of the most important char-
acteristics encountered in water-infrastructure projects. Even recent 
agreements reached in regions marked by a large measure of political and 
economic integration – e. g. in the EU – continue to be far removed from 
any fully multilateral and integrated perspective (one need think here only 
of the example of the Scheldt). With its river-basin agreement and the 
Mekong Commission, the Mekong region also has a multilateral and inte-
grated framework for cooperation; but the actual cooperation here on so-
called win-win projects is as a rule bilateral in nature and has a functional 
focus. 
                                                          
13 Some commentators see Swaziland in this role in the negotiations between South Africa 
and Mozambique. 
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Some of the examples discussed here also show that benefit-sharing 
agreements may have negative impacts on third parties – as a rule lower-
course riparians – although these effects may play no role or only a subor-
dinate role in the agreements themselves. This is an obvious feature of 
e. g. the Laos – Thailand cooperation in energy generation: The effects of 
the dam on the Mekong impact negatively on the downstream riparian 
(Vietnam). The case is generally seen as similar for the Kagera Dam and 
Lesotho Water Highlands projects. 
(vi) Organizational implementation of projects  
Although we find a quite broad range of variation in the organizational 
implementation of projects, one salient feature shared by the treaty-based 
forms of cooperation in the SADC region is the existence of solidly insti-
tutionalized forms of organization, most of which have been conceived as 
multilevel systems. Most of them have joint, functionally specific com-
missions with a legal status of their own, and these commissions are re-
sponsible for project development, monitoring of implementation, and, in 
some cases, for project operation as well. Implementation itself – con-
struction, for instance – tends more to be in the hands of national authori-
ties or of authorities or organizations created specifically for the purpose 
(e. g. in Lesotho). Finally, most projects have specific, multilevel organ-
izational approaches to conflict resolution or mediation; an example here 
would be the use, in the context of the Lesotho Highlands Project, of a 
neutral arbitrator to settle technical disputes, e. g. on the appropriate levels 
of water-use fees. 
The Kagera Dam on the Zambezi also has a multistage organizational 
framework. There, in a bilateral cooperation project, Zambia and Zim-
babwe are jointly operating the dam. While the Zambezi River Authority 
(ZRA) has far fewer powers than originally provided for in plans devised 
by the colonial powers, and is in fact responsible for little more than power 
generation, the ZRA is seen as a possible organizational nucleus for the 
development of multilateral cooperation on the Zambezi – although this 
would call for a separation of regulatory and operational responsibilities 
(Chenje 2003). 
Figures 2 and 3 document the administrative implementing structures of 
the Lesotho Highland Project and the cooperation project on the Senegal 
with a view to outlining some of the organizational options available for 
 Axel Klaphake 
140 German Development Institute 
transboundary benefit-sharing mechanisms. Unlike the cooperation be-
tween Lesotho and South Africa, the cooperation between the West Afri-
can Senegal River riparians shows an even more pronounced focus on 
joint transboundary commissions in combination with private-sector forms 
of organization in dam operation.14 While in most cases in Africa it is state 
authorities that assume the key functions in developing and implementing 
cooperation projects involving the construction and operation of dams, we 
find outside of Africa a number of more clear-cut approaches geared to the 
involvement of private-sector investors (e. g. the hydropower cooperation 
between Thailand and Laos). Another interesting observation is that the 
organizational anchoring of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project has 
changed over the course of time, with, to cite one important example, the 
Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) being upgraded in 1999 to 
the status of a Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC). This 
change is also designed to do justice to the altered challenges that emerged 
in connection with the transition from the building phase – construction of 
dams, tunnels, and pipelines – to the operational phase, which involves 
water delivery in connection with targeted financial transfers and control 
mechanisms (Turton 2004). 
One aspect of major practical relevance must be seen in the joint structures 
developed to monitor cost development in project implementation, since 
experiences made in connection with various African (but also European) 
projects (e. g. development measures on the lower course of the Scheldt) 
show that cost overruns hold considerable conflict potential. Another fac-
tor relevant in this context is that most of the agreements signed thus far, 
e. g. the Komati River agreement between South Africa and Swaziland, 
provide for a phased approach to project implementation, with the signato-
ries committing themselves only to implement the next phase of a project. 
This permits the parties to condition further project phases on the effec-
tiveness of the implementation of previous project phases. 
                                                          
14 A similar form of organization may also be found on the Komati. 
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 (vii) Allocation of benefits and water 
While the concept of benefit-sharing would seem to suggest that the coun-
tries concerned negotiate not on the allocation of water rights but merely 
on the allocation of benefits stemming from water use, possibly also 
seeking to avoid conflictual negotiations on water-use rights, the practice 
associated with such mechanisms in fact indicates more that negotiations 
on water rights and projects with win-win character are complementary – 
and not substitutive – in nature. In practice, benefit-sharing mechanisms 
have evidently not replaced agreements on water rights; indeed they either 
presuppose the latter or may serve to facilitate agreements on water quan-
tities, the reason being that e. g. water allocation tends to be linked to 
concessions on cost-sharing or deliveries of electricity. Viewed from the 
angle of individual countries, however, an offer to engage in joint projects 
as a rule implies that such countries are interested in gaining water rights. 
 
Figure 2: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project: Organizational 
structure of coordination and implementation  
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Figure 3: Senegal River : Organizational structure 
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upstream riparian, define the relevant context here. Aside from cost-
sharing provisions, one integral element of the agreement between South 
Africa and Swaziland on river development on the Komati is an agreement 
governing the allocation of certain water quantities between the two 
parties, and without such an agreement no rational operation of the 
infrastructure involved would have been possible. An initial agreement on 
qualitative water allocation that turned out to be detrimental to a third 
party – Mozambique – was corrected by the agreement reached in 2002. 
But in other cases contentious, nonconsensual water-rights issues have 
thwarted agreements on benefit-sharing mechanisms. This was the case 
e. g. in the attempts of the Nile Basin Initiative to reallocate water rights 
for the countries on the upper course of the Nile. The reason why these 
attempts failed must be sought not only in a lack of trust in the willingness 
of the relevant riparians to cooperate but also in specific controversies 
over water rights. 
In other words, what we have here is a two-sided relationship between 
water-use rights and benefit-sharing. On the one hand, many agreements 
on the distribution of the benefits of cooperation presuppose first of all 
safeguards for (or at least acceptance of) existing water rights. Many forms 
of transboundary compensation depend in crucial ways on acceptance by 
the country expected to provide compensation (e. g. in the form of finan-
cial transfers) of the relevant riparian's water-use rights. In political terms, 
this is of course by no means a trivial condition, e. g. because this may, on 
some rivers, run counter to established environmental principles (e. g. the 
polluter-pays principle).15 On the other hand, agreements on water-use 
rights themselves offer a possibility to allocate benefits deriving from joint 
projects, e. g. benefits derived from joint dam projects on rivers that form 
borders. In this case, the use of quantitative units of water as a basis for 
allocating benefits has the one advantage that it is relatively easy to calcu-
late.  
                                                          
15 To cite an example, U.S.-funding for a treatment plant for pollutant loads from Mexico 
in the Tijuana was delayed because of major resistance in the U.S. against the (implicit) 
abandonment of the polluter-pays principle which the deal entailed. 
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(viii) Calculation of benefits deriving from water cooperation 
Although the data used as a basis for given agreements tend to be quite 
heterogeneous, in most cases the rough estimates used to calculate the 
benefits expected from water cooperation are based on highly complex 
hydrological and – in some cases – econometric models. Some more 
recent examples of the modeling approaches that have been used in actual 
negotiations include those used in the Incomati-Maputo talks to calculate 
water runoffs and impacts on infrastructure as well as those used as a basis 
for infrastructure development on the Komati. The models used for 
preparatory calculations for the Lesotho Highlands Project might also be 
cited as an example here. A complex approach was also selected for the 
cooperation project on the Senegal; it served as a basis for a model of the 
multisectoral use aspects relevant for dam management and as a means of 
modeling the sectoral implications involved. 
One interesting, and at the same time pragmatic, approach used to calcu-
late the net benefits expected from the water cooperation between Lesotho 
and South Africa was the decision to use as a frame of reference a purely 
national river-development project on the South African side – the national 
OVTS Project, a second-best solution that was used as an anchor to cal-
culate the additional benefits expected to accrue to South Africa from the 
Lesotho project. The cost data for the theoretical alternative project were 
then used for the actual agreement on the Lesotho Highlands Project, spe-
cifically as a basis for cost-sharing calculations and to come up with rough 
estimates of water-use fees. But despite the use of this approach, differ-
ences of opinion and disputes still emerged on the levels of expected bene-
fits as well as over the water-use fees to be paid by South Africa. Use of a 
different project as a reference variable to calculate cost savings does not 
always prove acceptable to all parties. To cite an example, in the negotia-
tions on implementation of the Pancheshwar Project the Indian govern-
ment rejected any use of purely national costs as a reference variable for 
calculating costs for the irrigation water and the flood-protection benefits 
expected from the project, arguing that this approach would lead to exag-
gerated estimates of the value of these benefits. 
Another relevant aspect is that in many cases third parties have been in-
vited to participate in negotiations as "neutral" or "objective" experts with 
a view to coming up with a set of data acceptable to all parties; these ex-
perts were in most cases representatives of international organizations or 
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private consultants. In some cases all of the parties have included private 
international consultants in their delegations at the negotiating table, a 
state of affairs that most authors regard as conducive to efforts to reach 
agreement.  
While hydrological models of water availability and – depending on the 
problems involved – flood events or water quality constitute a central pre-
condition for negotiations, the same cannot always be said of economic 
models. Some agreements have been concluded without any detailed eco-
nomic assessments of project benefits and drawbacks, relying instead on 
"rule-of-thumb" estimates of expected effects. 
(ix) Time requirements for benefit-sharing agreements 
Even though the numerous context-specific parameters involved invaria-
bly mean that the time required – to say nothing of the complications that 
may emerge in the process – to conclude any given agreement will vary 
substantially, the experience made thus far in establishing benefit-sharing 
mechanisms do indicate a) that there is every reason to assume that such 
efforts are very time-consuming (this is often true of water-related plan-
ning cycles) and b) that hardly any projects have been planned and imple-
mented in no more than a few years. To cite an example, the period that 
elapsed between the initial, more or less concrete planning for the Lesotho 
Highlands Project and the final agreement on the project was over 30 
years; the time required for the Senegal project was 20 to 30 years – and 
that despite a relatively conducive postcolonial regional setting and strong 
support provided by donor organizations. The case studies indicate that 
this is due to the following factors: 
First, the long period of time needed is due to extensive project-planning 
efforts, especially when possible alternatives are looked into and compre-
hensive economic and impact assessments are conducted. If the process of 
project scrutiny and planning are bound up with uncertainties, one impor-
tant variable – and one that may prove very time-consuming, depending on 
the initial situation given – is the availability of complex and consensus-
based decision-support systems. This phase may even prove to be the end 
of the planning cycle – e. g. in the case that a years-long project cost-bene-
fit assessment leads one of the countries involved to conclude that no 
positive outcome may be expected. This in fact happened on the Limpopo 
(Botswana / South Africa) after a close look into the possibility of devel-
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oping joint infrastructure projects there indicated, at least to South Africa, 
that the overall project was not worthwhile.  
Second, the progress made on projects depends on the political dynamics 
that develop in the course of negotiations, and here issues bound up with 
the allocation of benefits or costs may prolong the negotiations. Changes 
in the political situation in the countries involved may also lead to rapid 
progress – or to seemingly insurmountable blockades; e. g. in the case that 
a new government has no interest in further pursuing a project or when it 
becomes necessary to clarify disputes over the responsibilities of different 
levels of administration. 
Third, general intergovernmental relations are a central determinant that 
may contribute importantly to accelerating or blocking the progress of a 
project. To cite an example, for years agreement on the Lesotho Highlands 
Project was thwarted by the conflictual relations between the parties; then, 
however, a coup brought Lesotho a new government, and this paved the 
way for finalization of the agreement within a period of months. 
Fourth, project completion may be obstructed by funding shortfalls that 
may lead to delays of many years. Examples here would include the long-
delayed power-generation project on the Manantali Dam in Senegal or 
problems that long delayed the rehabilitation and maintenance of the infra-
structure on the Cunene.  
(x) Cases of dual asymmetries in negotiations 
A good number of transboundary water cooperation projects point to the 
difficulties that may emerge from a problem structure involving what is 
known as dual asymmetry (Marty 2001). While asymmetric interest com-
plexes of riparian countries result as a rule from the specific problem con-
stellation given on transboundary waterbodies (upper-course-lower-course 
problems), strongly divergent interests may also develop between national 
governments and local or regional actors, e. g. in cases concerning the 
realization of river-development measures. Local interests or resistance 
may focus e. g. on land rights and resettlement issues, damage feared in 
connection with dammed-up water, or dangers to subsistence farming or 
fisheries that may result from reduced or regulated water flows. However, 
such decentral interests have not been integrated into most of the benefit-
sharing agreements presented here, and only in a few cases have specific 
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arrangement been added later to take account of local interests (e. g. in the 
Lesotho Highlands project, stakeholder forums in connection with the 
environmental and social programs implemented in the 1990s, including 
arrangements to compensate the local population).16 
The positive assessment given here of the functionality and effectiveness 
of individual benefit-sharing agreements, at least in terms of the way in 
which they serve to balance out transboundary interests, would conse-
quently have to be enlarged to include a detailed look at the ways in which 
local-national asymmetries are dealt with and how these asymmetries are 
integrated into the relevant bilateral, international negotiations. A look at 
the Kariba Dam e. g. shows that there were far fewer problems involved in 
transboundary, sectoral cooperation on power generation than in efforts to 
find a balance for the interests of the rural population as well as for nega-
tively affected environmental interests. This situation is similar on the 
Senegal and in the Lesotho Highlands Project, where local interest groups 
have raised massive objections. There is no doubt, for instance, that the 
river-development project on the Senegal has positive effects on irrigated 
agriculture and power generation, though not to the extent originally envi-
sioned. But there is also no doubt about the negative economic and social 
consequences for water use in small-scale agriculture in the river's over-
flow areas or the impacts on freshwater fisheries. 
Even though progress has recently been made in efforts to integrate local 
interest groups, the question is whether and to what extent national politi-
cal systems are sufficiently capable of integrating local interests into inter-
national negotiations. The consequences of dual asymmetries for the es-
tablishment and formulation of transboundary benefit-sharing agreements 
played an important role e. g. in the extremely tenacious negotiations on 
the Tijuana River (U.S. – Mexico), where local U.S. interests did not 
really get a fair hearing. 
                                                          
16 Yet one aspect of the Lesotho project that continues to be controversial is whether or 
not sufficient efforts have been undertaken to provide for compensation for the negative 
impacts on the population and the environment. While an economic assessment would 
come to the conclusion that compensation has been provided for the negative impacts, 
and that Lesotho's population is thus left with a net benefit, various actors in the region 
see the matter quite differently. 
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6 Factors central to reaching agreement on benefit-
sharing mechanisms 
The assessments of international water cooperation found in social-science 
publications indicate that the present state of our knowledge does not per-
mit us to derive any propositions on the conditions required for successful 
cooperation on transboundary rivers (Bernauer 2002; Dombrowsky 2005: 
Mostert 2003). All of the studies referred to clearly indicate the context-
specific determinants that result in the countries concerned from the inter-
play between given natural-spatial and climatic conditions, political and 
economic relations, and the legal, administrative and cultural conditions 
given in the countries concerned. But despite the large number of individ-
ual studies that have been published in the field, the present state of re-
search on international river cooperation is not sufficient to permit us to 
draw any viable general conclusions on the determinants essential for 
cooperation (Bernauer 2002). In particular, as far as fundamental issues 
bound up with the formulation and design of water cooperation are con-
cerned (functionally specialized versus integrated multisectoral ap-
proaches; bilateral versus multilateral agreements and forms of organiza-
tion), research in the social sciences has yet to come up with any really 
clear-cut statements. Even as far as prioritization and sequencing and time-
scheduling are concerned, what we find at best are statements on trends, 
but not any viable findings. 
Bearing this proviso in mind, we will nonetheless attempt to derive some 
conclusions from the case studies under consideration here. 
6.1 Factors obstructive to the establishment of benefit 
sharing 
a) Sovereign national water rights 
One central obstacle to agreements on benefit-sharing mechanisms must 
be seen in the claims to sovereign water rights often raised by riparian 
countries. The most clear-cut example in the African context is the situa-
tion on the Nile, where this continues to be a crucial aspect in negotiations. 
But the same also goes for most rivers in southern Africa, where efforts 
continue to center on water-allocation issues and water-related legal 
agreements.  
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In principle, contentious claims to certain quantities of water regularly 
lead to the failure of efforts to establish benefit-sharing mechanisms. Put 
differently: Since the (legal or de facto) allocation of water rights deter-
mines the point of departure for water negotiations, and thus as a rule also 
defines the framework for benefit-sharing agreements, any failure to reach 
agreement on this issue ex ante constitutes a serious obstacle to negotia-
tions. The only negotiations in which this problem is not so relevant are 
talks that are not conducted under pressing scarcity problems and/or that 
are concerned with the allocation of "new" water resources (obtained e. g. 
through dam construction).  
When in this context countries insist on national sovereignty, they for the 
most part have national energy or agriculture-related objectives in mind. 
Development of joint sectoral goals – e. g. in the context of energy coop-
eration in regionally integrated areas – may, however, serve to relativize 
national self-sufficiency ambitions and thus to facilitate agreements. 
b) Water projects as prestige projects 
The cases under consideration here also make clear that for those in 
positions of political responsibility decisions on large-scale water projects 
may also be linked with various external and domestic interests. Water 
projects are often highly symbolic and prestigious in nature (Blatter 2003), 
and for this reason the actors involved often are unwilling to forgo a major 
project for lack of adequate compensation. This hidden agenda in the 
planning of large-scale projects tends to function as a brake on nego-
tiations concerned with location issues when the primary issue at stake is 
the planning of transboundary water projects. In many countries even 
irrigation projects tend to be seen as prestige projects, because they (are 
thought to) symbolize national autonomy and sovereignty. The situation is 
often further aggravated, e. g. in most countries of the Middle East, by 
continuing ambitions to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, and 
this aim implies as a rule a need to further develop irrigated agriculture in 
national territories. 
c) External obstacles 
Studies on the influence of general external relations on intergovernmental 
efforts to resolve water-related conflicts indicate that this variable plays a 
key role in this connection (Giordano 2002). Put differently: Countries that 
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maintain close and cooperative mutual relations as a rule resolve their 
water conflicts by cooperative means, while countries that maintain highly 
conflictual mutual relations often show precisely the opposite pattern.17 
The situation becomes problematic above all when water issues have al-
ready become part of an overriding conflict involving contentious claims 
to national sovereignty. There is little reason to expect benefit-sharing 
agreements in a context of this kind, because the basic prerequisites are 
simply not given. 
The experience available indicates that progress in such constellations 
presupposes the inclusion over the long term of conflict mediators, mod-
erators, and donor organizations. One of the few examples for the realiza-
tion of a benefit-sharing project in a conflictual setting is the cooperation 
between Thailand and Laos in the field of hydropower and the agreement 
on barter trade on the Syr Darya, although in the latter case implementa-
tion does not appear to be making much effective progress (Wegerich 
2004). In southern Africa the cooperation project on the Cunene River was 
kept up for a relatively long period of time, despite high levels of tension. 
d) Uncertainty as to the benefits to be expected from cooperative agree-
ments 
Often individual countries are unable to estimate with sufficient certainty 
the economic utility that would accrue to them from water cooperation. 
The usual uncertainties involved in hydrological modeling and the extreme 
fluctuations in precipitation and runoffs encountered in parts of Africa are 
exacerbated by the problems posed by the need to precisely estimate future 
economic utility variables, since the latter depend on a good number of in 
part highly variable parameters (e. g. market prices for agricultural goods, 
electricity prices), and it is more than difficult to predict reliably how these 
variables will develop over long project cycles. These uncertainties are 
often bound up with economic conditions and related priorities in riparian 
countries, and this makes it quite difficult to come up with a consensual 
                                                          
17 Although water cooperation may be possible even in such situations involving difficult 
external relations, in some cases individual countries may use cooperation in the water 
sector as a targeted means of improving their general external political relations. Exam-
ples here would include the India-Pakistan cooperation on the Indus or efforts to im-
prove water cooperation on the Rio Colorado, which were also bound up with foreign-
policy objectives. 
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assessment of all of the economic implications involved for different water 
uses and countries. 
The more uncertain the economic benefits from cooperation are, however, 
all the more probable it is that the negotiations will be geared to the "tan-
gible" variable of "water quantity" and all the more likely it will be that the 
parties will insist on retaining the status quo instead of seeking to trade 
water rights for benefits that may be uncertain. Elhance (2000) e. g. sees 
the difficulties involved in coming to a safe estimate of all cost-and-bene-
fit variables as a crucial obstacle for the further development of water 
cooperation. Viewed against this background, the use of accepted, meth-
odologically well-developed approaches to assess the impacts of projects 
is obviously one central building block for the development of such 
agreements.  
Yet even reliable modeling of anticipated effects is bound up with uncer-
tainties as to the economic benefits of win-win projects. In addition, due to 
the long investment cycles involved, water projects ties up capital for long 
periods of time and require long-term commitments on quantitative water 
allocations. Countries that have a marked preference for keeping their 
water-development options open will therefore be reluctant to make long-
term commitments – as regards e. g. any permanent surrender of water 
rights. 
Realistic assessments indicate that some countries will – despite their posi-
tive cooperation rhetoric – insist on achieving their long-term interests 
(Nicol 2003b). Precisely countries that hold a dominant economic and 
political position may, however, not see themselves in an improved situa-
tion in the long run if they trade water rights for benefits, since for them 
such benefits are not sufficiently calculable and may prove very difficult 
to secure in a problematic political environment.  
Finally, the ways in which costs and benefits are anchored in agreements 
is a highly important factor with regard to possible conflicts, particularly if 
such agreements fail to define precisely the ways in which the specific 
variables involved are to be estimated. To cite an example, the Mahakali 
agreement between Nepal and India provides for apportionment of project 
costs in direct relation to the benefits that accrue to the parties. However, 
major disputes over the dimensions of the benefits accruing to India in the 
fields of irrigated agriculture and flood protection have served to impede 
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project implementation. This example is also a good illustration of the 
importance of careful treaty design, i. e. of the need to ensure that provi-
sions are unambiguously defined. 
e) Uncertainties as regards project costs and strategic behaviors 
It was shown in Section 4 that financial transfers play a relatively small 
role as a mechanism of compensation on transboundary rivers; the excep-
tions would include the bilateral dam projects in Africa outlined above, the 
Chloride Agreement on the Rhine, or the project on improving the naviga-
bility of the Scheldt. The fact that international financial transfers are not 
particularly frequent is bound up with some fundamental problems in-
volved in cost-oriented financial transfers: They tend to foster strategic 
behaviors on the part of recipients, who may e. g. exaggerate their costs in 
negotiations or not adhere to agreed-upon budget frameworks when it 
comes to implementation (see e. g. the example of the Scheldt) (Finus 
2003). 
But strategic behavior may also be assumed on the part of paying coun-
tries, e. g. in cases where the levels of payments depend on the specific 
benefits that a given country derives from a cooperation project. As a 
means of getting around this problematic, some successful projects have 
chosen a "real" anchor as a basis for calculating their benefits, e. g. the 
costs of other projects with a similar thrust as far as their effects are con-
cerned.  
But the fact that the benefits involved in energy cooperation can generally 
be calculated reliably goes to explain why the majority of win-win projects 
cited are taken from this sector. In the energy sector there is as a rule con-
sensus on the use of market prices as a reference parameter, and this fact is 
thus also often reflected in relevant agreements. However, uncertainties 
and information asymmetries regarding the costs associated with water 
cooperation go to explain why – with the exception of the limited number 
of examples cited – at the international level financial transfers, which are 
actually highly plausible as an instrument of compensation, have not be-
come very widespread (Finus 2003). 
Cooperation on international rivers from an economic perspective 
German Development Institute 153 
f) Weak administrative capacities 
This factor is of central significance, because the countries involved must 
be able to demonstrate credibly in international negotiations that they are 
capable of implementing the agreements in question. In Africa, however, 
there is, in most cases, little reason for any such confidence in national 
administrative capacities. Benefit-sharing agreements on the Nile, for 
instance, have, in concrete cases, failed to materialized precisely for this 
reason. Similar difficulties are also encountered in southern Africa, where 
administrative capacities and know-how in the water sector tend to be very 
unequally distributed. 
Another key obstacle to agreement on and implementation of joint projects 
must be seen in unstable domestic political situations, a fact that can be 
unambiguously demonstrated with reference to the large measure of ero-
sion experienced in water cooperation in civil-war-torn countries like 
Angola (the case of the Cunene project). 
One possible way to work around weak national implementation structures 
is to upgrade forms of bilateral cooperation and to delegate competences 
to these structures. Structures of this kind have in fact been set up in suc-
cessful benefit-sharing projects in Africa, e. g. for the Lesotho project, 
where South Africa has been accorded extensive control functions in the 
implementation of the project in Lesotho. One alternative would be joint 
operation of the infrastructure in question or having projects implemented 
by authorities in possession of a legal status and sufficient resources of 
their own; examples of this may be found on the Senegal and the Zambezi. 
g) Low economic capacities and lack of creditworthiness 
Countries that could engage in benefit-sharing need to have a minimum of 
economic capacity and creditworthiness; otherwise any bi- or multilateral 
cooperation on long-term, investment-intensive infrastructure projects is 
virtually inconceivable. In fact, however, we sometimes find huge dispari-
ties between African countries as regards the refinancing options open to 
them; this also applies for the situation in some SADC countries, where 
South Africa tends to be the dominant factor in negotiations – not only on 
account of its water situation but also because of its economic clout. 
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Creditworthiness and investment climate are the main factors that deter-
mine the possibility to attract private capital into benefit-sharing projects, 
and precisely this will become more and more important in the future 
because of growing funding needs.  
h) Unequal negotiating situations due to marked disparities in develop-
ment levels  
The basic idea of benefit-sharing is the economic principle of exchange. 
However, such agreements presuppose that the countries concerned are not 
hobbled by disparities in their bargaining power so extreme as to allow a 
hegemonic water power to reach its goals even without have to "trade." If 
one country is able to use its position of hegemony to push through its own 
interests unilaterally and without having to make concessions to other 
riparians – e. g. by threatening to take coercive steps – the principle of 
benefit-sharing has no chance of realization, since the principle of course 
implies that every country involved can (at least in principle) improve its 
own position in negotiations. One view found in the literature is that there 
is reason to expect that compensation will be provided on transboundary 
rivers only if lower-course riparians do not play the role of a dominant 
political, economic, or military power in their own basin area (see Mitchell 
/ Keilbach 2001). 
Looked at against this background, efforts designed to level the playing 
field between the negotiating parties are highly desirable and plausible in 
that they increase the probability that cooperative win-win solutions will 
be adopted. And one reason why the efforts underway to intensify coop-
eration in the SADC region must be seen as positive is that these efforts 
have served to define rights and obligations as well as procedural rules that 
are binding for all countries concerned. 
Experiences with issue linkages in water-related situations marked by 
sharp inequalities between the negotiating parties also show that efforts to 
broaden the object of negotiations may help to break down obstacles that 
result from lopsided power relations. To cite an example, it turned out in 
the negotiations between the US and Mexico that creation of linkages 
between water issues and security and immigration questions facilitated 
agreement, one of the reasons being that in this case a purely unilateral 
approach to water use no longer appeared feasible to the US side. Instead, 
willingness to cooperate on water use proved to be conducive to coopera-
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tion on other issues (e. g. illegal immigration). In other words, marked 
disparities in national development levels may well prove to be a good 
reason to seek to broaden the topic under negotiation. 
i) One-sided water-policy constellations 
Conditions unfavorable to agreement on projects with benefit-sharing 
character tend – as was noted in the differentiated view of coordination 
problems presented in Section 3 – especially to be bound up with highly 
one-sided water-policy constellations of the kind encountered e. g. in the 
Nile Basin, where there are no waterbodies with a different upstream-
downstream configuration. Accordingly, the possibility of forging issue 
linkages within the water sector are quite limited here. Instead, it would be 
essential that – often costly and time-consuming – political and 
administrative efforts be made to reach agreement across different sectors. 
The problems posed by unilateral water constellations may be exacerbated 
by certain types of water scarcity. If, e. g. in the context of absolute water 
scarcity, agreements on a reallocation of water use would require one 
riparian to surrender a present form of water use, no success should be 
expected unless substantial compensation is provided. Even economically 
appropriate forms of compensation may, however, not prove sufficient in 
the case that reduced rights to water use should imply any surrender of 
high-priority sectoral objectives. This appears to be particularly relevant in 
the context of the agricultural objectives pursued by many African coun-
tries. Many such countries regard any surrender of water-use rights as 
incompatible with their stated goal of self-sufficiency in the production of 
agricultural goods. In a context of this kind, benefit-sharing presupposes 
that fundamental political objectives be revised, or at least scaled back. 
Furthermore, in cases involving one-sided water-policy situations, finan-
cial transfers often fail because lower-course riparians see themselves 
unfairly treated or are unable to gain domestic acceptance for the goals at 
stake. To cite an example, in constellations in which a government may be 
bound at home by the polluter-pays principle for resource use, transbound-
ary payments have little chance of success as compensation for efforts to 
reduce harm to ecosystems. 
Summary of obstacles: Political factors and high transaction costs in nego-
tiations, due to uncertainties and possibly the breadth and complexity of 
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the matter under negotiation, may constitute crucial obstacles to reaching 
agreement on benefit-sharing mechanisms. 
6.2 Factors conducive to the establishment of benefit 
sharing 
a) The existence of confidence-building forums and organizations 
In view of the fact that benefit-sharing mechanisms powerfully affect 
economic interests of the countries concerned and are as a rule bound up 
with complex situations involving considerable uncertainties, cooperation 
would appear to call in crucial ways for a confidence-inspiring environ-
ment capable of stabilizing expectations. Such an environment might 
include e. g. river-basin commissions, which are generally seen as a favor-
able organizational framework for arriving at win-win solutions. In terms 
of data and information exchange, these forms of cooperation can prove to 
be a central determinant for the development of joint projects. Still, em-
pirical observations of the work of long-established river-basin commis-
sions offer no good reasons to equate river-basin commissions with bene-
fit-sharing. 
b) Functional focus as a gateway  
The international discussion has not come to any uniform conclusions as 
to the pros and cons of functional, bilateral cooperation versus integrated, 
multilateral approaches. It is clear, though, that benefit-sharing can be 
developed without a multilateral, broadly defined cooperation framework, 
as long as this is understood to mean joint cooperation projects in the wa-
ter sector. In a good number of cases, cooperation defined in narrowly 
functional terms even appears to have been a success factor that contrib-
uted to lowering transaction costs (costs involved in negotiation and coor-
dination) and boosting the durability of certain forms of cooperation 
(Waterbury 1997), the reason being that the projects concerned have not 
been burdened by negative political developments in other sectors. 
On the other hand, what appears more to be called for to develop larger 
deals is a cross-sectoral approach that leaves room to include trade-off 
deals in negotiations. In other words, context-specific influences are in 
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volved here, although it can be observed that in most cases of successful 
water cooperation the parties have engaged in functional cooperation be-
fore proceeding on to integrated approaches. 
Here we find one of the central tradeoffs involved in the development of 
benefit-sharing mechanisms: While a multilateral and integrated manage-
ment approach generally serves to broaden the options open for compen-
sation-based solutions and package deals, thus boosting the chances of 
cooperation, such approaches also hugely increase the transaction costs 
involved in developing and realizing cooperative projects, a factor that 
makes it accordingly difficult to achieve win-win agreements. 
c) Development perspectives with a similar orientation 
Parallel development strategies, e. g. in the context of energy policy, tend 
to markedly foster the propensity to cooperate. To cite an example, similar 
ideas on development have worked in favor of the joint development of 
irrigated agriculture on the Senegal. In another constellation parallel 
energy-policy interests proved to be a central factor working in favor of 
water cooperation (Zambezi). In southern Africa it is generally assumed 
that energy cooperation is a factor of considerable influence for 
cooperation in the water sector. 
d) Organizational prerequisites 
Looking at the positive forms of cooperation found in Africa (Lesotho 
Highlands, Senegal, Kariba), we find that the factors conducive to coop-
eration include clear-cut organizational competences, precise standards for 
monitoring project progress, including (transboundary) cost control. Other 
important factors include a clear-cut delineation of competences between 
international commissions or transboundary committees on the one hand 
and national authorities on the other. One important prerequisite is a sepa-
ration of regulatory and operational functions; experiences with private-
sector forms of organization in transboundary projects, e. g. on the Sene-
gal, are still relatively limited in scope, and it is therefore too early to 
make any predictions on their effectiveness. 
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e) The conducive role played by international water law 
There is no doubt that acceptance of shared basic rules governing the use 
of transboundary water resources has a markedly positive effect on the 
possibility of reaching agreements on win-win solutions. Such rules may 
serve in certain ways both to clarify the scenario for negotiations and to 
reduce asymmetries between the countries concerned.  
In fact, however, due to their broad scope for interpretation and the limited 
possibilities available to enforce them, the abstract principles set out in 
international law have very little real significance for negotiations on 
benefit-sharing mechanisms. But in the sense of leveling the playing field, 
the procedural rules laid down in international water law may be seen as 
highly relevant; these would include e. g. the obligation to share informa-
tion and to engage in consultations and agreements on public participation, 
which may have appreciable impacts on the negotiating situation. 
Furthermore, principles of international law have an important influence 
on the ways in which fairness is perceived in riparian countries. For in-
stance, the international-law principle of equitable and reasonable use is of 
great importance for the further dissemination of benefit-sharing, since the 
principle itself is rooted in a use-oriented approach and thus provides a 
legal framework for relevant agreements in individual river basins. When 
disputes develop over the appropriate allocation of cooperation-related 
benefits, the principle of equitable and reasonable use may play a helpful 
role, even though no consensus has emerged at the international level on 
criteria that could be used to apply the principle in negotiations and in 
coming to decisions on allocation issues. 
One positive example for the extensive use of an international water-rights 
agreement in connection with a benefit-sharing mechanism is the Senegal, 
where a joint treaty-based recognition of the Senegal as an "international 
river" played an important role in facilitating later negotiations. 
f) The role of third parties, in particular of donor organizations 
Although the economic discussion on benefit-sharing very seldom explic-
itly addresses the matter, in the practice of relevant agreements the in-
volvement of third parties – and here above all large multilateral donors 
organizations – has an important impact on the probability that agreement 
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will be reached on cooperative win-win solutions. In fact, hardly a single 
noteworthy agreement on benefit-sharing has been concluded in Africa 
that does not involve international actors and make use of the financial 
transfers and technical and administrative know-how such actors are in the 
position to make available. The World Bank is e. g. heavily involved in 
financing the Lesotho Highlands Project; and infrastructure development 
on the Senegal has been supported by a number of multi- and bilateral 
donors. 
One the one hand, international actors may play the role of mediator; on 
the other, they may make available the funds needed for compensation, in 
this way helping to pave the way for agreements. One factor that has 
played an important role in a number of cases is the no-objection rule, 
which requires all of the countries concerned to declare that they have no 
objections to a given large-scale water project. This requirement has gone 
some way, e. g. on the Komati River, toward fostering the willingness of 
the parties to cooperate. In providing support for transboundary water 
cooperation, the World Bank generally makes reference to the norms of 
customary international law, which entail e. g. an obligation to inform 
neighboring countries in advance of projects with transboundary impacts 
and to apply the so-called no-harm rule. Finally, the engagement of major 
donor organizations tends to stabilize the expectations of the governments 
concerned, and it may also serve to appreciably attenuate funding-related 
uncertainties. In addition, internationally financed projects (are required 
to) meet certain financial and organizational project-management 
standards, and this in turn may serve to reduce uncertainties regarding the 
national administrative capacities of negotiating partners. 
g) Fairness an important factor; economic optimization less so  
Another important factor is that a given cooperation project be regarded as 
fair by all countries concerned. Put differently, what is relevant for the 
decision-makers is not optimization of a generally abstract overall eco-
nomic utility but a concrete outcome that appears adequate in terms of 
equity and political communicability. Fairness aspects have, in one way or 
another, played a key role in all of the agreements assessed for the present 
study. It is also important to bear in mind here that countries engaging in 
water negotiations are not only interested in ruling out losses of their own; 
they are as a rule also unwilling to agree to any overly one-sided allocation 
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of the net benefits involved. This played an important role e. g. in the 
agreements reached on the Senegal, and it was (in a negative sense) al-
ways an important issue in earlier negotiations on the Nile. Looking out-
side of Africa, the water cooperation between India and Nepal may be 
seen as an illustrative example. Here, Nepal was long reluctant to sign an 
agreement because it took a dim view of the benefits that the project was 
expected to entail for India – even though these benefits would, ad-
mittedly, not have entailed any immediate negative impacts for the Nepal-
ese side. Fairness issues were also at the center of the negotiations on the 
Incomati, which were threaded with deadlock in the 1990s. 
It is also important to understand here that the communicability of eco-
nomic benefits hinges in large measure on their quantifiability and tangi-
bility. An abstract economic utility derived from the preservation of cer-
tain freshwater ecosystems e. g. will certainly not play the same role in 
talks as economic benefits from power generation, because the latter are 
immediately quantifiable and therefore translate out into "effective" reve-
nues. Accordingly, agreements on benefit-sharing may be fostered by 
emphasis on tangible economic utility variables, which may at the same 
time also facilitate coming up with reliable estimates (see above). 
h) External events as windows of opportunity 
One of the central findings of social-science research on cooperative, in-
ternational water management is that external, singular events may alter 
the political constellations in a river basin, paving the way for solutions by 
opening up windows of opportunity. These events may include floods, 
extreme droughts, or severe water pollution due to accidents, all of which 
may serve to bring about a new orientation toward water management. 
i) The influence of regional interests pursued by regional powers 
The cases looked into for the present study also show that the actions of 
the countries concerned are not guided by a purely economic balance of 
the costs and benefits involved, and that economic considerations may 
well be masked by political rationales. Examples here would include 
South Africa's cooperation both on the Incomati and in the Lesotho proj-
ect. It turned out in the Lesotho project that the agreements reached, which 
were highly beneficial to Lesotho, would not, in terms of the "logic" of the 
negotiations, have been necessary to convince Lesotho of the advantages 
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the project held for it (Barrett 1998; Barrett / Senanona 1998). This state of 
affairs must be interpreted in the light of the international isolation of the 
South African apartheid regime and the unstable political situation in 
Lesotho. 
j) Inclusion of other river basins may facilitate benefit-sharing 
Finally, the agreements looked into show that negotiations on water allo-
cation for entire river basins or the inclusion of other rivers in negotiations 
may have a conducive influence on efforts to achieve win-win solutions. It 
should, however, be noted that the water-policy situation given at present 
often restricts the potentials for such agreements that would extend to 
more than one river basin. 
Turton (2003) pointed out that the chances of reaching agreement on bene-
fit-sharing in southern Africa could be substantially improved if the nego-
tiations included possibilities of water transfers between river basins. Con-
cretely, this would apply for the possibility of water transfers from the 
water-rich Zambezi to the Okavango River Basin, an option that could go 
some way toward mitigating the controversy there over water-use rights. It 
must be noted here, though, that large-scale water-transfer projects are a 
contentious issue in the international discussion on account of the negative 
ecological and social impacts they may have (Niemann 2005). 
Summary of conductive factors: The critical organizational issues associ-
ated with cooperation include the existence of institutionalized forums or 
commissions that may play a role in negotiations. Another important fac-
tor is the need – in the sense of confidence-building – for transparent data 
to estimate the economic effects of different management options. Proce-
dural issues are likewise of key importance; generally speaking, in the 
context of water scarcity benefit-sharing must be viewed more as a process 
than in terms of a (one-off) project. 
Functional and bilateral cooperation projects have appreciable advantages 
as far as the costs of cooperation are concerned – although in the future 
benefit-sharing agreements should aim to include more countries and in-
terest groups, e. g. in the context of negotiations on water transfers in 
southern Africa. 
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7 Special considerations involved in the promotion of 
benefit sharing in the African context 
In the African context there are several particularities that in part tend to 
facilitate the conclusion of benefit-sharing agreements, in part, though, 
must also be seen as potential stumbling blocks that must be taken into 
consideration in attempts to promote transboundary water cooperation. 
Although these aspects cannot be discussed in any depth in the present 
study, they will at least be outlined in what follows. 
One important aspect of the given situation is the huge disparities in levels 
of political, administrative, and economic development that we encounter 
in the African context and that are bound to have a marked influence on 
the form and the scope of the further development of water cooperation. 
Egypt is the regional hegemonic power in the Nile Basin, and Egypt's 
economic and military capacities far exceed those of the largely agrarian 
countries on the upper reaches of the Nile. In southern Africa the Republic 
of South Africa has assumed the role of a politically, militarily, and eco-
nomically dominant regional power whose geographic location as an up-
stream riparian on a number of transboundary rivers has at the same time 
placed it in the role of a major player in the water sector. However, South 
Africa has become increasingly cooperative in the water sector, and it now 
plays an active and constructive role in the further development of relevant 
international institutions. The background here must be sought in the 
SADC integration process, which is in South Africa's immediate economic 
and political interest. However, the hugely differentiated hydrological and 
socioeconomic situation in southern Africa implies a powerful need to 
build organizations and institutions that may contribute to leveling the 
playing field there. Cooperation in the water sector must be placed in the 
context of the SADC integration process, and this is it why there is every 
reason to take a positive view of the multitude of efforts underway there to 
build transboundary organizations and river-basin commissions.  
In the end, however, this does not permit us to draw the direct conclusion 
that the SADC approach – i. e. primarily promotion of water-cooperation 
organizations and institutions – can be transferred to other regions. The 
history of SADC or its predecessor organization in southern Africa is 
simply too context-specific, and there is certainly little reason to assume it 
could be repeated in other regions, e. g. in the Nile Basin. Nor is the water-
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related international-law framework comparable with that in other regions 
of Africa, where no agreement has yet been reached on a fixed 
institutionalized form of cooperation at the river-basin level. 
Against this background, and in view of differences in the political and 
economic context conditions given there, the approach pursued in the Nile 
Basin appears at first entirely adequate to the problem in that it demon-
strates more clearly the economic advantages that water cooperation may 
entail for the countries concerned and is conducive to benefit-sharing proj-
ects. However, the approach is faced with the problem of extreme eco-
nomic imbalances and, in some cases, conflictual intergovernmental rela-
tions. The basic question is thus what long-term (economic) benefits e. g. 
Egypt could derive in this situation from any permanent shift in water-use 
rights in the Nile Basin. The factors relevant in this connection include not 
only the extreme disparities in the economic situation, in the role played 
by irrigated agriculture, and in the use of hydropower but also the domes-
tic and intercountry conflicts in the region, which are at present more 
virulent in the Nile Basin than in southern Africa. 
While we find among several countries in southern Africa clear-cut signs 
of political and institutional convergence, the situation in the Nile Basin is 
far removed from any such convergence. This gives rise to a paradox not 
untypical for benefit-sharing agreements. On the one hand, in a situation, 
like that on the Nile, that is typified by a lack of common institutions, a 
focus on concrete projects with prospects of mutual benefits may be con-
ducive to cooperation, or indeed induce a propensity to cooperate among 
individual countries. But on the other hand, the realization of such joint 
projects generally presupposes both confidence in cooperation and an 
institutional and organizational framework between the countries con-
cerned that is not yet given. It is therefore clear that water cooperation 
cannot be discussed independently of the political context and the degree 
of integration between the countries concerned. It may certainly be con-
cluded that the efforts needed to promote water cooperation on the Nile – 
i. e. time, external funding, mediators, etc. – are far greater than they are in 
the SADC context. 
Another aspect particular to benefit-sharing agreements in Africa is that 
the forms presently encountered are strongly associated with the classic 
supply paradigm of water management, with water problems mainly being 
solved through dams and water transfers, i. e. by increasing the water 
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supply, while both the demand side and, above all, efforts to increase wa-
ter-use efficiency have played a more subordinate role. One factor of ma-
jor importance in this connection is the agricultural orientation of the most 
of the countries concerned (national self-sufficiency); this often works 
counter to effective cooperation in the water sector and constitutes a bar-
rier to the objective of an economically more efficient use of the resource. 
In the future efforts to broaden water cooperation on individual rivers will 
therefore also require inclusion of agricultural issues, and here one possi-
ble approach may be seen in the concept of virtual water, i. e. the coun-
tries concerned will have to abandon their aim of achieving self-suffi-
ciency and developing of water-intensive agriculture, while at the same 
time stepping up their imports of agricultural goods. 
Another consideration of great importance in the African context is that 
intercountry hydrological and socioeconomic disparities are masked by 
extreme national social, economic, and ecological disparities and the ine-
qualities in resource use that these entail. This in turn means that the abil-
ity of resource users to articulate their interests is of great significance 
here, as is the question as to what and whose benefits are to be taken as the 
basis of cooperation agreements on transboundary rivers. Thus far, how-
ever, the international water discourse has tended to reduce the benefit-
sharing approach to the intergovernmental level, while as yet no adequate 
conceptual framework has been developed for the integration of general 
development-related goals (poverty reduction, economic development, 
improvement of the environment) into intergovernmental water coopera-
tion. The analysis of existing benefit-sharing projects has, however, clearly 
shown that some projects that have proven quite successful – in the sense 
of promoting transboundary cooperation – have entailed appreciable nega-
tive ecological and social impacts and tended to marginalize certain popu-
lation groups. Viewed against this background, the approach pursued by 
the Nile Basin Initiative – support for various programmatic initiatives and 
efforts to include development goals in water cooperation – appears 
wholly adequate and promising, even though it is still too early to 
adequately estimate the effectiveness of the approach. In fact, the benefit-
sharing approach has yet to prove its worth as a vehicle for improving the 
integration of social and ecological goals. 
This aspect also raises the question of the criteria and indicators that 
should be used to assess intergovernmental water cooperation. While a 
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good part of the discussion in the political sciences regards intergovern-
mental conflict reduction and conflict resolution as key – with intergov-
ernmental cooperation in the water sector seen as positive per se – an ap-
proach to assessment making use of different criteria would be called for 
in view of the far broader development goals at stake. 
Finally, it should be noted that, both internally and externally, not all Afri-
can countries may be regarded as fully sovereign states, as is assumed in 
the concept of benefit-sharing. While some countries that suffer from 
weak political leadership, inadequate administrative capacities, or internal 
conflicts are, in formal terms, sovereign decision-makers when it comes to 
water issues, they are in actual practice unable to play this role and / or are 
dominated by other countries or international organizations. And this in 
turn means that their ability to define and articulate "national" interests is a 
critical variable in the present context. The case studies clearly indicate 
that both the propensity of countries to cooperate and their interest in 
benefit-sharing mechanisms hinge in very large measure on national po-
litical developments – and thus far international research has paid far to 
little attention to these as determinants of water cooperation. 
8 Conclusions for development cooperation 
The thoughts developed in the present study permit us to formulate some 
basic conclusions for development cooperation. They will be outlined 
briefly in what follows. 
(i) At first sight the benefit-sharing approach appears generally to be an 
adequate conceptual and instrumental approach for promoting intergov-
ernmental water cooperation. The discussion of the approach's conceptual 
foundations also leads us to the basic insight that, viewed in the context of 
growing water scarcity, benefit-sharing agreements are bound to come to 
play a growingly important role, since the economic costs of noncoopera-
tion are on the increase. 
(ii) However, this generally positive assessment of the concept stands in 
contrast to the relatively low dissemination of benefit-sharing mechanisms 
in practice, and a number of substantial problems would seem to indicate 
that relevant agreements are not likely to increase in number at a rapid 
pace. The problems involved in reaching agreement on and implementing 
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win-win projects must be sought in part in extremely conflicting interests 
on the part of the countries concerned; other obstructive factors include 
existing claims to national sovereignty focused on water rights, uncertain-
ties over project impacts, low administrative capacities, and/or conflicting 
sectoral interests (e. g. the agricultural sector). 
(iii) One other reason why benefit-sharing agreements fail in practice is 
that the economic benefits do not take on a visible aspect for individual 
countries. Development cooperation therefore can and should start out 
with a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of water coopera-
tion, since such assessments have proven to be an essential communicative 
condition for relevant international agreements. 
(iv) The effects of benefit-sharing agreements reached thus far must be 
seen as a mixed picture. Most such agreements are concerned with water-
infrastructure development, and joint dam construction may be seen as 
prototypical, although such projects have come in for criticism for – at 
least in the past – according insufficient consideration to ecological, social, 
and economic impacts. The majority of the dams jointly financed and in 
part operated by riparians are used to generate hydropower or in some 
cases for irrigated agriculture and flood protection. At present, the only 
example that can be cited for the prototype of joint dam construction, 
including transboundary water transfer in exchange for financial 
compensation, is the Lesotho Highlands Project. Due to the ease with 
which the benefits involved can be estimated – and usually estimated on a 
consensual basis – hydropower can be said to have the largest measure of 
plausibility for benefit-sharing agreements. 
(iv) Due to the structural conditions discussed above, there is good reason 
to expect that benefit-sharing agreements will continue to be concentrated 
heavily on river development and development of additional water re-
sources. In the development cooperation practice the programmatic call for 
win-win solutions in water cooperation may imply (possibly unintended) 
support for dam construction and water transfers, because such projects 
offer the greatest probabilities of coming up with intergovernmental win-
win cooperation, the reasons being that it is relatively simple to calculate 
their economic affects and that their utility variables are quite tangible. 
Accordingly, development cooperation should also undertake efforts to 
work out and present the potentially positive economic benefits of other 
forms of water cooperation (e. g. improvement of water quality, 
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conservation of freshwater ecosystems, minimum runoffs) with a view to 
more strongly promoting their inclusion in relevant, economically inspired 
agreements. 
(v) Viewed against this background, implementation of recognized stan-
dards of project control and process design – e. g. in keeping with the 
guidelines of the World Commission on Dams – would be a factor of great 
significance in the context of intergovernmental water cooperation. In any 
case, there are still a number of ways in which donor organizations may 
intervene in the field of benefit-sharing, since, at least in Africa, no rele-
vant projects have been carried out without massive financial and/or or-
ganizational involvement of donor organizations. 
In southern Africa above all, interbasin water transfers could prove to be 
an important option on the water-supply side that could be used to improve 
intergovernmental water cooperation and to reduce conflicts, because 
allocation of these additional water resources is politically far more simple 
than reallocation of existing water-use rights under the conditions of ab-
solute water scarcity. However, a comprehensive examination of the eco-
nomic, social, and ecological consequences of some planned water-trans-
fer projects has yet to be conducted. 
(vii) It is not possible to derive any blueprints for successful agreements 
from the analysis of the forms of benefit-sharing that have been engaged in 
thus far. There is a need for further studies to deepen our understanding of 
whether and how different institutional and organizational approaches can 
be transferred.  
(viii) It would be important to embed the potential social risks and envi-
ronmental impacts of transboundary benefit-sharing agreements in a com-
prehensive development strategy, since the crucial lines of conflict over 
water use in Africa run not only between countries but within societies and 
between different sectors and forms of water use. In this context it would 
be highly important to ensure that both the general public and interest 
groups are involved in transboundary water cooperation. In the African 
context, benefit-sharing is thus also a question of the distribution of bene-
fits within the countries concerned, above all against the background of the 
socioeconomic situation given at present.  
(ix) In considering benefit-sharing projects, development cooperation 
should not lose sight of the interactions between the building of national 
 Axel Klaphake 
168 German Development Institute 
water-management institutions and the development of related inter-
governmental cooperation. Successful international win-win projects are 
predicated on a variety of national givens in the organization, financing, 
and control of projects, and this means that efforts to strengthen relevant 
national capacities have direct effects on the ability of countries to engage 
in international cooperation. 
(x) At present it is not possible to derive any general statements on 
whether a functional and more bilateral approach could serve to increase 
the likelihood that benefit-sharing mechanisms will be realized or whether 
a multilateral and integrative management approach on transboundary 
rivers would prove more promising. In the past a more bilateral and sec-
toral approach has gained ground and proven to be functional in the devel-
opment of water infrastructure and, above all, in dam construction. 
(xi) Lower transaction costs are one good reason for a narrow definition of 
the object of cooperation as well as for limiting cooperation to those ri-
parians that are immediately affected by a cooperation project. On the 
other hand, in certain problem constellations multilateral and comprehen-
sive approaches to transboundary water management offer the possibility 
of negotiating larger packages, which may be necessary e. g. to establish 
intersectoral issue linkages. 
(xii) Against this background, development cooperation might be well 
advised to adopt a multilevel approach in the development of water 
cooperation, one which seeks to promote benefit-sharing agreements that 
are at the same time concrete and – in many cases – more bilateral in 
nature as well as to support further development of general institutional 
frameworks in given river basins. Depending on the given – historically 
predetermined – situation and the relevant political and economic context 
factors, the focus in many river basins will be more on developing the 
institutional framework, while in others it will first be necessary to work 
out the economic benefits in the process of cooperation with a view to 
promoting a propensity to cooperate among the key countries involved, an 
approach that could later be given a more concrete institutional 
underpinning. 
(xiii) Further development of international and regional water agreements 
can facilitate the establishment of benefit-sharing agreements in that such 
efforts can serve to clarify the situation given for negotiations and to re-
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duce obstructive asymmetries between the riparians concerned. Further 
development of river-basin commissions can also serve to increase the 
probability that win-win projects will come about in that such efforts pro-
vide for a stable and confidence-building institutional environment. 
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1 The study's aim and methodological approach  
Transboundary water resources management can be described as a cyclical 
process involving the negotiation and implementation of relevant interna-
tional agreements (Mostert 2005; Turton et al. 2003). For riparians to 
recognize the potentials for development and cooperation, they must be in 
possession of the information they need to both recognize and negotiate 
win-win outcomes. Information has to be both generated and made avail-
able for this process. Organizing the transmission of information into the 
realm of the transboundary decision making process is one of the core 
tasks involved in transboundary water resources management. The re-
quired information transmissions cause costs in the broadest sense, and 
these costs may at times be prohibitively high. This is reflected in the 
substantial share that information related project components have in the 
funds made available for development cooperation projects aiming to 
promote transboundary water resources management.  
In accordance with the overall aims of the research project to explore 
strategies for development cooperation which have proven to be successful 
in promoting transboundary water resources management, this paper sets 
out to sketch important functions of information-sharing. It begins with a 
theoretical perspective on the role of information in negotiation processes 
and proceeds to look more precisely at types of information and instru-
ments for information transmission that are relevant for basin management 
in general. The paper then proceeds to explore the instruments that basin 
organizations in Africa have assumed to date to facilitate the transmission 
of information. The paper concludes with lessons to be drawn from the 
theoretical and empirical analysis for development cooperation. The pre-
sent study is conceived as a desk study and as such is limited by all the 
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well known constraints this procedure entails. It is focused on an evalua-
tion of the literature as well as of available documents on the internet.1 
2 Why is information important for successful 
transboundary water resources management? 
2.1 Transboundary water resources management as a 
negotiation problem 
The term "transboundary waterbodies " refers to water resources that cross 
national boundaries. These may be either surface waters (rivers or lakes) 
or subterranean waters (aquifers and groundwater reservoirs). There are a 
number of different reasons why it may become necessary to give water 
resources management a transboundary orientation: Water use in one 
country may entail transboundary impacts that are not viewed as accept-
able to all of the actors affected in view of their present or planned water 
uses. In this context, upstream - downstream problems may be seen as the 
classic problem constellation on transboundary rivers. While, for instance, 
abstraction of water on the upper course of a river may entail external 
effects for the lower course, by physically reducing water flows, develop-
ments on the lower course may diminish the quantity of water available in 
the future on the upper course, if downstream riparians appropriate water-
use rights by developing their water uses.  
As available water resources grow increasingly scarce and competition for 
their use intensifies, efficient water allocation between upstream and 
downstream riparians and between water-using sectors assumes new and 
greater significance. This is the core of proposals to classify water as a 
good in the economic sense of the term (Sadoff et al. 2002). Viewed from 
the economic perspective, suboptimal water utilization within a basin may 
result when countries seek to achieve their  water use goals unilaterally. 
This view is based on the concept of system value, which refers to the 
aggregate utility that can be generated by a given quantity of water while it 
is moving through a water-use system and before it is finally lost though 
consumption or evaporation or by flowing into the sea. The paradigm shift 
                                                          
1  I would like to extend my thanks in particular to Volkmar Hartje (TU Berlin), Ralf 
Klingbeil (BGR) and Waltina Scheumann (TU Berlin) for valuable suggestions.  
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implied by the concept of system value calls for an integrated, systemwide 
perspective when it comes to investments. 
This is best illustrated with the example of dam construction. Potentially, 
the water resources in question can for the most part be used at a number 
of potential locations to generate energy. However, power generation at 
more favorable locations involves lower costs. An efficient use of scarce 
investment funds would thus, call for development to begin at the most 
favorable location. Yet the economic benefits of systemwide management 
are for the most part not equitably distributed among the individual ripari-
ans concerned, and, viewed from a system perspective, the most favorable 
development path need not necessarily be the most favorable one from the 
perspective of the riparians affected. Under these circumstances, for ri-
parians to come up with a cooperative solution, possibilities of compensa-
tion or a different allocation of the benefits that accrue have to be negoti-
ated. But negotiations will appear worthwhile to the parties only if they 
see prospects of benefiting from such a cooperation. If the negotiating 
parties reach agreement on cooperation, this may give rise to a surplus 
value, which is also referred to as the negotiation surplus. In attempts to 
systematize conceivable benefits of cooperation, a differentiation among 
the following categories has been established: (i) benefits for water re-
sources; (ii) benefits from the use of water resources; (iii) benefits stem-
ming from reduced conflicts over water resources; and (iv) economic and 
political benefits that extend beyond the actual water resources in question 
(Sadoff / Grey 2002). 
To differentiate different types of negotiation problems, we can use two 
concepts from economics which are used to describe the outcomes of 
negotiations: Pareto-efficient and Pareto-superior outcomes. Pareto-effi-
cient are outcomes that can not make one party better off without nega-
tively affecting the other party's position. An outcome is seen as Pareto-
superior when all parties are able to improve themselves. Depending on 
whether or not the Pareto efficiency of possible outcomes is evident and 
the problems involved can be clearly identified, negotiation problems can 
be differentiated into a distribution problem, an integration problem, and a 
construction problem (Hauser 2002). When it comes to distribution prob-
lems, the parties know from the outset which outcomes will maximize the 
negotiation surplus (are pareto efficient). The concern then is merely to 
negotiate the best distribution of this surplus. The aforementioned problem 
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of site selection for dam construction may serve as an example. When 
integration problems are involved, it is furthermore necessary to determine 
which outcomes can no longer be improved to the benefit of both parties at 
the same time. On account of the negotiating dilemma involved, the shar-
ing of information required for this outcome to be determined cannot be 
taken for granted. Finally, we can speak of a construction problem when, 
even though Pareto-superior improvements would theoretically be possi-
ble, the parties are unable to recognize any such possibility or to believe in 
the possibility of improvements for all parties. In this case the parties will 
describe their situation as a zero-sum game, without yet noticing that they 
could improve their own position without worsening the position of the 
other party. Construction problems can be transformed into integration 
problems if the parties discover the possibility of achieving joint im-
provements. 
Confronted with the problems involved in allocation and management of 
transboundary resources, the parties may opt for one of four different 
conflict strategies: 
— A passive aversion to or disinterest in the negotiation problem will 
result in exit strategies. 
— Attempts to exercise power, either directly or indirectly, will result in 
escalation strategies. 
— Communication that leads to a consensus on action will result in 
negotiating strategies. 
— The use of common standards will result in delegation strategies. 
Instead of engaging in action, however, parties with a common but unre-
solved problem may play for time; this is an alternative to pursuit of a 
conflict strategy. Whether or not the parties are actually willing to negoti-
ate is a matter of their own meta strategic decision. 
Transboundary water resources management can be described as a cyclical 
process involving the negotiation and implementation of relevant interna-
tional agreements (Mostert 2005; Turton et al. 2003). An ideal cycle of 
this kind can be characterized by breaking it down into three phases. The 
first phase involves the formulation of a metastrategic decision to seek to 
resolve the problems concerned via a negotiating strategy. Such strategies 
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Figure 1: The role played by information in different stages of  
transboundary water resources management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mostert 2005; modified by the author 
typically include agreements on the sharing of information on water 
resources, on mutual prior notification of planned measures, and on 
understandings that any possible disputes will be resolved by way of 
negotiation, and if needed by means of arbitration. The second phase 
involves negotiations on concrete agreements on carrying out joint water 
resources assessments or river basin studies, the aim being to work out 
more precise shared information on the potentials of and problems 
involved in joint water-resource use. Such studies may, for example be 
initiated in response to a notification on planned projects, when the 
interests of the riparians concerned are divergent in nature. The third 
phase, finally, involves negotiations on the basis of shared information on 
an equitable and reasonable allocation of remaining water resources or on 
joint infrastructure investments. 
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2.2 Negotiation strategies and the role of information 
Resolving a complex public policy dispute requires that interested parties 
share an understanding of the technical dimensions of the problem they 
face. Different conflict strategies affect the types of information that influ-
ence decisions on bargaining problems. In choosing a conflict strategy, a 
party is also implicitly defining the typ of information that can be used. 
The reason is that information types differ in terms of their accessibility, 
and different conflict strategies call for unequal accessibilities (Hauser 
2002). 
What exactly is meant by the term information? Information may be seen 
as having two basic features: information amounts to the selection of ob-
servations from the universe of observations. Taken on its own, this choice 
is no more than a datum. If we are to speak of information, the datum must 
enable the receiver of the datum to initiate an action. While data per se can 
be recalled and reproduced, they have no further behavioral relevance 
unless they are understood. Understanding in this context means that data 
are assimilated and processed in such a way as to create a new starting 
situation. In other words, information is a new and understood (or newly 
understood) datum with the potential to initiate action. Data on their own 
do not make a difference: it is only as information that they may influence 
decisions. Since the only information relevant to a negotiation problem is 
information that has been understood, the crucial point is what information 
is both available and understood by the negotiating parties. 
Private, shared, and public information 
The availability of information is determined by the accessibility of data 
and information, and their transmission through communication. The ac-
cessibility may be differentiated into private, shared, and public informa-
tion (Hauser 2002). Privately accessible information is information ac-
cessible only to one negotiating party. In negotiations there are various 
reasons why private information may remain private, for example if a 
party chooses not to transmit information for strategic reasons, because it 
sees a possibility of turning its information edge to account or because it 
fears disadvantages from a piece of information that is known only to it 
and that it is unwilling to communicate to the other party. Strategic with-
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holding of information in negotiations leads to a bargaining dilemma, 
since negotiations of course live from the exchange of information. 
In a negotiation process information remains private if there is no commu-
nication between the parties. Communication leads to a duplication of 
information, and communication enables both parties to have the same 
information. But shared information may also be the result of common 
observations, e. g. those made in the framework of a joint monitoring 
program. In this case there is no information asymmetry of the kind found 
in principal-agent constellations. If there is any information asymmetry, it 
exists between the negotiating parties on the one side and outsiders on the 
other (e. g. the public, uninvolved government authorities, donor organi-
zations etc.). Regardless of whether or not shared information has come 
about through joint observation or through communication, it must be 
distinguished from public information, i. e. information that is universally 
accessible. Public accessibility is given for example when one party 
publishes its information, either on paper or on the Internet, and this 
information is accessible to everyone. 
One aspect of communication important for the negotiation problem has 
not yet been elaborated: it does not necessarily follow from the fact that 
information is understood, that this information is accepted or taken for the 
truth. This is given only if a party takes the deliberate decision to accept or 
reject the information communicated to it. If, despite communication and 
understanding of information, the party denies the underlying data, the 
effects of information, communication, and understanding are invalidated. 
This may for example be the case when scarce hydrological data is con-
tested by one of the negotiating parties, for example if it is felt that the 
presented data does not reflect the true availability and use of water in one 
of the negotiating countries. Turton et al. (2003) report an example for the 
Okavango Basin, where the main difficulty relates to the disagreements 
between stakeholders over the use of the scant and often incomplete base-
line data. While there is agreement at national level between the respective 
government departments on the correctness or accuracy of the available 
data for river flow measures, other stakeholders have questioned the va-
lidity of the data. This further emphasizes the need for stakeholders at all 
levels to reach agreement on the accuracy or acceptability of the available 
baseline data. 
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Information transmission and conflict strategies 
Information is used differently depending on the conflict strategy in-
volved. Conflict strategies place different demands on the accessibility of 
information (Hauser 2002; Turton 2003a). In the delegation strategy (ar-
bitration) the arbitrator uses publicly accessible sets of facts as a basis for 
a decision, and will assess these facts on the basis of publicly accessible 
systems of norms or contractual law. Shared information, on the other 
hand, must first be made accessible for the arbitration procedure on the 
basis of a procedure of taking evidence. In negotiations between the par-
ties, shared information can be used directly, assuming it is acceptable to 
both sides. While, in other words, acceptance of the relevant information is 
sufficient in negotiations, an arbitration procedure requires evidence for 
the truth of the information. 
The four conflict strategies also differ in terms of the arena in which a 
decision is made. In a negotiation strategy this space comprises the parties 
involved. A decision to exit a conflict (exit and escalation strategy), leav-
ing the bargaining problem to the remaining parties, is taken in the realm 
of a single party, without regard to any other party. This is the reason for 
the attractiveness of the exit strategy: If there is nothing to be gained, the 
party concerned will at least not make itself dependent on others. In the 
delegation strategy the decision on the conflict involved is taken in a pub-
lic arena (public at least compared to other conflict strategies) that extends 
beyond the bargaining parties; the decision is delegated to a third party 
entitled to reach a decision. The public nature of arbitration may be at-
tenuated somewhat to the extent that e. g. the processes and decisions 
involved in an arbitration procedure may require that the broader public be 
excluded. In this sense, an arbitration tribunal will come to its decision in a 
quasi-public space.  
These qualitative differences in the spaces in which decisions are taken in 
the four different conflict strategies call for different levels of information 
accessibility (Hauser 2002). Any change in the accessibility of information 
may be referred to as transmission. Transmissions are transactions, 
although it must be noted that the concept of transaction is more compre-
hensive than the concept of transmission. Every transmission causes costs  
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in the broadest sense of the term, and these may at times be prohibitively 
high. A first transmission is the transformation of data into information 
and the realization of its relevance for the negotiation problem by at least 
one of the parties. Decisions taken in the context of a negotiating strategy 
are based on information that is at least jointly accessible. Private 
information will certainly influence the decisions taken by a party to 
negotiate; but it cannot be used to jointly work out a win-win outcome. If 
private information is to be used in a negotiation, it must first be 
transmitted into the negotiation arena. This requires a process of 
communication and the willingness of both parties to accept this 
information. The exit strategy on the contrary prevents communication 
between the parties. This may be intended by a party determined to 
prevent strategic private information from being communicated or made 
public. In the escalation strategy all types of information may play a role. 
Escalation makes the transmission of information unpredictable. 
Figure 2: Information accessibility requirements (shaded) for  
different conflict strategies, required information 
transmissions (dashed arrows), and possible exit strategies 
(diagonal arrows) from a negotiating strategy  
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Different approaches exist to compile and pool relevant information and to 
"translate" it into a form that can be used in arbitration and negotiations by 
decision-makers and others to create the foundation for broad-based con-
sensus. McCreary et al. (2002) contrast three styles of science advising for 
public policy: joint fact-finding, the technical "blue ribbon panel" and the 
model of opposing scientific experts ("adversary science") common in 
administrative hearings and litigation. The joint fact-finding method is 
specifically suited for negotiating cooperative transboundary water re-
sources management. The concept rests on a few key ideas. The first is 
that rather than withholding information for strategic advantage, the inter-
ested parties pool relevant information. A second feature is that joint fact-
finding involves face-to-face dialogue between technical experts, decision-
makers, and other key stakeholders. Usually, a nonpartisan facilitator or 
mediator assists in orchestrating this dialogue. Third, this process places 
considerable emphasis on "translating" technical information into a form 
that is accessible to all participants in the dialogue. Another significant 
aspect of the process is that while joint fact-finding is geared to building 
consensus, it tries clearly to "map" areas of scientific agreement and to 
narrow areas of disagreement and uncertainty. A fifth idea is to use a sin-
gle negotiating text to record the results of the joint fact-finding process. 
The concept of a single text, borrowed from the arena of international 
diplomacy, simply means that participants in negotiation use a single 
document to focus discussion, rather than arguing over competing versions 
of facts and recommendations. Usually this document is revised through 
several working drafts and produces a tangible record that brings the joint 
fact-finding effort to closure. Focussing on sharing of information and 
inclusion of key parties, joint fact-finding stands in contrast to two more 
traditional methods of bringing science to environmental decision-making: 
"adversary science" and the "blue ribbon panel". Table 1 summarizes these 
differences. 
2.3 International water law and the role of information 
The obligation to share data and information on a regular basis is a princi-
ple of international customary water law, one that finds concrete expres-
sion in the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (Box 1). Article 9 of this UN convention 
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obliges states to share water-related data; this obligation is derived from 
the general obligation, laid down in the Article 8, of all states to cooperate. 
Table 1: Comparison of three models of science advising for public 
policy: "adversary science," the blue ribbon panel and 
joint fact finding  
 Blue Ribbon Panel “Adversary Science” Joint Fact finding 
Host  
Auspices 
Scientific  
Organisation 
Court or Adminis-
trative Agencies 
Neutral, credible or-
ganisations with 
strong access to 
scientific community
Convenor Senior Scientist Hearing Officer / 
Arbitrator 
Scientist or research 
administrator 
teamed with a non-
partisan facilitator   
Participants Scientific Experts Experts aligned 
with each side and 
guided by attorney 
Experts. decision 
makers, other 
stakeholders 
Methods of 
introducing 
information 
Written reports and 
group discussions 
Depositions, inter-
rogation and cross 
examination 
Various oral brief-
ings, memos, short 
reports, facilitated 
dialogue 
Extent of in-
formation 
sharing 
Information is 
shared mostly 
within the panel; 
often strong empha-
sis peer reviewed 
findings or aca-
demic research  
Information is 
strategically with-
held to bolster 
argument. Choice is 
between two infor-
mation packages.   
Information is 
pooled; may be a 
mix of peer re-
viewed and non 
peer reviewed 
studies as well as 
other documents. 
Technical 
level of dis-
cussion 
Comparable to a 
scientific confer-
ence 
Translated to lan-
guage of decision 
makers – judge, 
jury, legislator 
Strong effort to 
translate technical 
information and to 
make it policy rele-
vant 
Emphasis on 
policy impli-
cations 
Moderate; may be 
more of a focus on 
methods 
Strong emphasis Strong emphasis 
Level of ef-
fort devoted 
to seeking 
consensus 
Strong effort to 
produce consensus; 
minority reports are 
sometimes issued 
Seeking technical 
consensus is inci-
dental to deciding 
the issue 
Emphasis on clari-
fying areas of tech-
nical disagreement 
and uncertainty 
Source: McCreary et al. (2002) 
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Article 9 of the UN convention obliges countries that share a watercourse 
to regularly share available data on the condition of a watercourse (in 
particular hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological, and environ-
mental data), but also relevant forecasts (in particular of flood events). It 
furthermore calls on all riparian countries to undertake all possible efforts 
to collect and keep additional data and information that could be required, 
even if they are not readily available. Article 11 calls on countries to share 
information on planned measures (including technical data and assess-
ments of environmental impacts), and Article 12 calls for prior and timely 
notification of countries that may be affected by planned projects. An 
example of how this principle of prior notification is translated into trans-
boundary agreements is given by the Incomati-Maputo Interim Agreement 
summarized in Box 2.  
Box 1: Obligations to share information under the Convention on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
Article 9 of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, entitled 'Regular exchange of data and information,' states: 
1. Pursuant to Article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange 
readily available data and information on the condition of the water course, in 
particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and eco-
logical nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts. 
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to provide 
data or information that is not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts 
to comply with the request but may condition its compliance upon payment 
by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and where appro-
priate processing such data or information. 
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and where appro-
priate to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its utili-
zation by the other watercourse States to which it is communicated. 
Article 8 of the Convention, referred to in Article 9, sets out a 'General obliga-
tion to cooperate': Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain 
optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 
Source: United Nations (1997) 
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Box 2: Notification obligations for projects and activities in the 
Incomati-Maputo Interim Agreement 
(a) Industrial installations for energy production or mining activities which can 
impact significantly on water quality and quantity; 
(b) pipelines carrying oil or chemical products; 
(c) installations (facilities) for storage of dangerous products; 
(d) reservoirs for river water regulation and storage with a capacity above
250000 m3; 
(e) river training and canalisation of river beds with a length exceeding 500 m, 
provided they are situated in the bordering rivers or in their tributaries; 
(f) surface water abstraction facilities, regardless of their use or destination, 
when the minimum effective consumption exceeds 110 l/s, and in any case of 
water transfers to other river basins in volume exceeding 3.5 million m3 per 
year; 
(g) groundwater abstraction facilities, regardless of the use or destination of the 
water, above 3.5 million m3 per year; 
(h) artificial recharging of aquifers with volumes above 3.5 million m3 per year; 
(i) waste water treatment plants with capacity above 1,000 equivalent inhabi-
tants; 
(j) waste water discharges of urban, industrial, cattle raising or other origin, in 
which the polluting charge is above 1,000 equivalent inhabitants; 
(k) use of water causing the cross border water temperature to change by more 
than 3o C in the aquatic environment; 
(l) deforestation and reforestation works, affecting an area above 500 hectares 
and that have the potential to increase the sediment production or to increase 
flood peaks or to decrease the river flow. 
Source: Incomati-Maputo Interim Agreement (2000) 
It is obvious that the obligation to share information is not absolute and 
that it requires interpretation in the light of the specific constellation of a 
transboundary setting (Burchi 2001). The requirements of the first three 
elements of the obligation are, however, defined in such a way as to ensure 
that all riparian countries have the facts they need to (a) negotiate an eq-
uitable and reasonable allocation of water resources and (b) to avoid any 
significant damage beyond their borders. In other words, the convention 
sees the obligation to share information as directly instrumental as regards 
the fundamental right of the countries concerned to acquire an equitable 
and reasonable share of the use of the watercourse in question and also 
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sets out an equally fundamental obligation not to cause any significant 
damage to other countries. Basically no country can be certain that the use 
it makes of an international watercourse is equitable and reasonable com-
pared to the uses to which other countries put it, unless the one country is 
supplied with regular information on the status of the water resources in 
the other countries.  
The principle of reasonable and equitable use, however, is defined in gen-
eral terms, and is thus prone to subjective interpretation. These principles 
have to be translated into concrete agreements through negotiations be-
tween the countries involved. The information needed to reach agreement 
on an equitable and reasonable share of the uses of water resources is, in 
essence, far more comprehensive than what could be provided on the basis 
of a mere determination of the quantity of water available; this is clearly 
shown by the criteria of the UN convention listed in Box 3. Van der Zaag 
et al. (2002) attempt to define six measurable criteria on the basis of which 
water resources can be allocated to the riparian countries in an equitable 
manner. Such measurable criteria may facilitate negotiations between 
riparians that are in conflict over the issue. Jointly defining such criteria is 
infact a central activity during negotiations.  
The simplest and most straightforward criterion for the equitable sharing 
of international waters may be formulated as: 
— Criterion 1: All surface waters generated in an (international) river 
basin should be shared by the riparian countries equally (as far as 
possible). 
Criterion 1 is insensitive to differences in surface area of the riparian 
countries in the basin. If this is taken into account, the criterion may be 
slightly modified: 
— Criterion 2: All surface waters generated in an (international) river 
basin should be shared by the riparian countries in proportion to each 
country’s area in the basin. 
If water is considered a right of every citizen, the criterion can be based on 
population size: 
— Criterion 3: All surface waters generated in an (international) river 
basin should be shared by the riparian countries in proportion to the 
population. 
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If all water resources are considered, including the green water used for 
the production of rainfed crops, then three new criteria can be formulated: 
— Criterion 4: All blue and green water generated in an (international) 
river basin should be shared by the riparian countries equally (as far 
as possible). 
— Criterion 5: All blue and green water generated in an (international) 
river basin should be shared by the riparian countries in proportion to 
each country’s area in the basin. 
— Criterion 6: All blue and green water generated in an (international) 
river basin should be shared by the riparian countries in proportion to 
the population. 
An example of the problems associated with defining these kinds of “sim-
ple” criteria, is the debate about the extent of the Okavango Basin (Turton 
et al. 2003). The Okavango Basin is hydraulically part of the Zambezi, 
while the most affected riparian States have agreed among themselves 
that, for the purpose of management, the Okavango Basin consist of three 
states – Angola, Namibia and Botswana. One of the tributaries arising in 
Zimbabwe is not considered to be part of the Okavango, because it only 
flows into a terminal pan system. 
 
Box 3: Criteria of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses  
(i) Geographical, hydrographical, hydrological, climatical, ecological and other 
factors of a natural character; 
(ii) the social, economic and environmental needs of the Watercourse States; 
(iii) the population dependent on the shared watercourse; 
(iv) the effects of the use on other watercourse States; 
(v) existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(vi) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water re-
sources of the shared watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that ef-
fect; and 
(vii) the availability of alternatives of comparable value. 
Source: United Nations (1997) 
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The principles of free exchange of information are also set out in a resolu-
tion of the World Meteorological Organization on "exchange of hydro- 
logical data and products" (see Box 4). The resolution reaffirms the 
obligation to freely exchange hydrological data and products, in particular 
if these data and products that serve the purpose of meeting the obligation 
not to cause any damage to other riparians. In concrete terms, we can dis-
tinguish here between the exchange of raw data and the exchange of prod-
ucts which are based on an evaluation of these data (Mosely 2001b). 
2.4 Organization and instruments of information 
transmission 
Organization of transboundary cooperation  
Organization of the required transmissions of information is one of the 
core tasks of transboundary water resources management. Today trans-
boundary water resources management is oriented along the principles of 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) (Global Water Partner-
ship 2000; Millington 2000; Allan 2003). These principles are grounded in 
transparent mechanisms designed to allocate and protect water resources  
 
Box 4: Examples of hydrological data and products that should 
be exchanged to avoid damage  
1. Data (for all available time intervals): 
Precipitation data,* stage and flow data,* reservoir inflow, pool levels 
and outflows* 
2. Information and reports on: 
Dam breaks,* levee failure,* mud flows, landslides,* toxic spills,* storm / 
flood surge* 
3. Products: 
Floods: hydrographs, flood travel times,* flood forecasts,* peak discharges, 
peak stage  
Droughts: hydrographs,* droughts and low flow forecasts,* minimum dis-
charges and stage 
* to be provided in real time 
Source: Mosley (2001a) 
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and to ensure a basic water supply on the basis of clear, nonoverlapping 
institutional arrangements. In addition, the principles provide for planning 
and management at the lowest possible level (principle of subsidiarity), 
involving the participation of all actors affected as well as a clear-cut or-
ganizational division between the tasks of regulation, resources manage-
ment, and infrastructure operation. Whilst this is a normative concept, this 
typology of tasks is helpful for the empirical analysis of organizational 
setups that can be found in practice of river basin cooperation. The  
regulatory task entails the definition of the political framework and the 
goals of resources management as well as to assess the success of re-
sources management. The resource management task includes the respon-
sibility for the implementation of goals, including the necessary strategic 
analysis and planning of water resources and water allocation. 
Infrastructure operation tasks include the design, operation and 
maintenance of water infrastructure, but also the operation of monitoring 
networks. Information needs for these various functions are many and 
varied. Data collected for one purpose, such as operational management, 
may be of use for other purposes such as planning. Often requirements 
differ, so that data collected for one purpose are not usable in another. It is 
therefore helpful to distinguish between the information transmissions 
Box 5: WMO resolution on "Exchange of hydrological data and 
products" 
To ensure the most effective and efficient use of scarce resources, the interna-
tional exchange of water-related data and products must meet current and fore-
seeable future requirements and purposes. WMO Resolution 25 identifies three 
types of requirements: 
(1) "those hydrological data and products which are necessary for the provision 
of services in support of the protection of life and property and for the well-
being of all nations" (shall be provided on a free and unrestricted basis); 
(2) "additional hydrological data and products, where available, which are re-
quired to sustain programmes and projects of WMO, other UN agencies and 
other organizations of equivalent status, related to operational hydrology and 
water resources research at the global, regional and national levels" (should 
also be provided, where available); 
(3) "all hydrological data and products exchanged under the auspices of WMO, 
for the non-commercial activities of the research and education communi-
ties" (should be provided, on a free and unrestricted basis). 
Source: WMO (1999) 
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needed for regulation and management (strategic analysis and planning 
and negotiation of water resource allocation) and those required for the 
operational management of infrastructure with transboundary impacts.  
The relationship that exists between different information providers and 
the users in a transboundary context is a function of the institutional and 
organizational framework that has evolved over time. The nature of the 
transaction between the data providers and users may be hierarchical, 
commercial, informal or statutory or it may not be clearly defined. Re-
sponsibility for the various information related tasks ranging from data 
collection, through processing and analysis to storage and retention may 
also be distributed in various ways between different national actors  and 
river-basin organizations. The nature of the relationships between data 
providers and the users for transboundary water resources management 
governs the manner in which data are shared. An ideal-type of organiza-
tional setup of a transboundary cooperation is presented in Figure 3. The 
spectrum of organizational forms extends from intergovernmental agree-
ments that do not establish any additional organizational structure, to 
agreements that provide for the establishments of commissions with plan-
ning tasks (with or without a secretariat and/or technical working groups), 
or to agreements establishing both commissions with planning tasks and 
international management authorities with operational tasks. The way the 
organizational framework and information flows are structured evolves 
over time and depends on the intensity of cooperation.  
Information needs and basin development 
A useful concept is to distinguish three phases in the development of ba-
sins; initial development, full use and reallocation (Molden et al. 2005; 
Molle 2003). Information needs differ in each of these phases (Burton / 
Molden 2005). These are summarized in Table 2. In the initial develop-
ment phase information-gathering is geared to individual projects, with 
each project developing its own database. Data acquisition is keyed to the 
needs of the project cycle: planning, dimensioning, construction, opera-
tion, and maintenance. Over the course of time the individual data-acqui-
sition tasks are gradually assumed by one or more authorities and the 
measuring networks are operated in a more systematic manner. In this  
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Figure 3: Core elements of the organizational structure of 
international river-basin cooperation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author  
phase, however, data collection may be increasingly determined by estab-
lished routines, and not by the specific needs of basin management. As 
water scarcity increases, the focus shifts from supply expansion to demand 
management. This entails an increase in the demand for information 
needed for integrated water resources management, and, accordingly, 
measuring networks are expanded and increasingly complex analysis  
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methods, like water resource models, are used. Requirements for model 
ling increasingly determine data collection, the aim being to make the best 
possible use of the analytical capacities potentially available. Information 
management also changes during the development, use, and reallocation 
phases: While at first authorities collect data for their own needs, later 
more and more data are made available to the various actors involved 
(Mosley 2001b). Power, which resides in control over data, is increasingly 
shared with additional actors with a view to paving the way for a broad 
dialogue on water resources management (Mody 2004; Bruch 2003). 
Table 2: Data requirements related to development phases of river 
basins 
Phase Data needs Typical data 
collected 
Developments in 
information processes 
Infancy 
• Localized 
use only 
• Rudimentary, 
limited to wa- 
ter levels and 
extent of 
flooding 
• Flood water 
levels, flooded 
areas (through 
experience) 
• Demarcation (and 
avoidance) of 
flooded areas, cor-
relation of flood 
extend and flood 
levels 
Development 
• Water 
allocation is 
supply 
focussed 
• Data col-
lected and 
used by 
small 
number of 
agencies for 
specific 
uses and 
projects 
• Availability of 
water during the 
year and extend 
of agricultural 
land 
• Main focus is 
on surface wa-
ter, though 
some interest in 
groundwater for 
urban and irri-
gation de-
velopment 
• For initial 
planning for 
river basin de-
velopment 
• Project-wise 
collection of 
river flow and 
quality data 
• Climatic data, 
particularly rain-
fall 
• Land use in 
riverine plains 
and extend of 
agricultural land 
• Topographic 
surveys 
• Aerial  
photography 
• Land ownership, 
traditional / 
existing water 
rights 
• Initial data collection 
systems established 
for individual 
projects; gradually 
these are linked up 
and coordinated by 
the development 
agency(s) 
• Basin-wide hy-
drometric stations 
established to gather 
base data 
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continued Table 2: 
Utilization 
• Water allo-
cation is 
supply 
focussed 
• Data related 
processes 
and 
procedures 
well estab-
lished 
• Detailed knowl-
edge of the 
available water 
resources, both 
surface and 
groundwater, 
particularly 
over-year to 
establish stor-
age patterns for 
reservoirs and 
recharge pat-
terns for 
groundwater 
• For river basin 
master planning 
• River flow data 
throughout the 
basin 
• Climatic data 
throughout the 
basin 
• Land ownership 
and traditional / 
existing water 
rights 
• Groundwater 
level and quality
• Some moni-
toring of pol-
lution levels 
• Data collection 
procedures stan-
dardized and co-
ordinated 
• Procedures estab-
lished for monitoring 
pollution levels 
• Procedures estab-
lished for monitoring 
groundwater depth 
and quality 
• Publication of water 
resources and 
climatic data 
• Development of 
simple water re-
sources models for 
river basins 
Re-allocation 
and restoration 
• Demand 
and supply 
focussed 
• Data related 
processes 
and proce-
dures re-
fined and 
more widely 
dis-
seminated 
• To obtain 
detailed knowl-
edge of the 
annual and 
inter-year water 
resource 
situation both 
for supply and 
demand 
• To monitor and 
control water 
abstraction by 
users 
• To make pro-
jections of 
supply and 
demand 
 
• River flow and 
water quality 
data throughout 
the basin 
• Climatic data 
throughout the 
basin 
• Groundwater 
level and quality
• Pollution levels 
• Water abstrac-
tion by all users 
• Data for prose-
cution for over-
abstraction and / 
or pollution 
 
• Hydrometic network 
extended and auto-
mated for direct 
transmission to data 
collection stations 
• Groundwater 
monitoring network 
extended 
• Pollution monitoring 
extended 
• Further computeriza-
tion of data collec-
tion, processing and 
analysis 
 
 
 Malte Grossmann 
200 German Development Institute 
 
continued Table 2: 
 • For water 
resources mod-
elling, using 
remote sensing 
and GIS 
• For scenario 
analysis 
• For river basin 
master plan-
ning 
• To refine and 
update supply 
and demand 
projections, 
scenario analy-
sis 
• To formulate 
rules for allo-
cation of water 
during droughts 
/ shortages 
• Data analysed 
from perspec-
tive of different 
water users 
• Water needs for 
various environ-
mental pro-
cesses 
 
• Development of 
sophisticated water 
resource models for 
river basins, with 
refinement to become 
an operational tool 
• Remote sensing 
incorporated into 
water management 
and decision making 
• Publication of water 
resources supply and 
demand information 
• Analysis and 
presentation of data 
for a wider range of 
stakeholders 
• Scenario analysis to 
enable participation in 
decision making 
Source: Burton / Molden (2005) 
Information Management Strategy and Information Management Systems 
It is essential for any transboundary water resources management initative 
to formulate a management information strategy and from that develop a 
management information system. The information strategy is the pattern or 
plan that aligns the information needs with the management requirements. 
It deals with information needs, the resources required for their collection 
and processing. The information system is the bundle of procedures that 
implement this strategy. The strategy and associated management infor-
mation system should address the following questions (Burton et al. 2005): 
— What are the key management processes to be negotiated at a trans-
boundary level? 
— What data and information are needed for managing these processes 
and evaluating the success of management interventions? 
— How and by whom will data be collected, analyzed and used? 
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— How much will the data collection, processing and analysis cost? 
— What quality control measures are required? 
— How transparent will the information system be for third party users? 
As far as transboundary rivers or groundwater resources in Africa are 
concerned, the operational management tasks include in particular the 
regulation of water flows and management of large aboveground or under-
ground storage basins, reservoirs, and dams. Real-time information is 
needed to adapt management to events as they occur, e. g. floods, or 
droughts. In contrast strategic planning does not require real-time infor-
mation, but a much broader range of information. These needs include 
information on water yield as well as on water demand and water uses – 
under both current and projected future conditions (HR Wallingford / 
DIFID 2003; Nichols et al. 2000). Figure 4 sums up the typical compo-
nents of and steps needed for a strategic basin study or a water-resource 
assessment. There is not necessarily any need to collect enormous amounts 
of information for a basin study. The actors involved should first reach 
agreement on what types of information they need and what level of detail 
this information must have if it is to be used to deal with the specific plan-
ning and management issues concerned. This does, however, presuppose 
rough knowledge of the problem structures. Preliminary studies like trans- 
 
Box 6: Measuring networks  
The core of any water resources management is a river-basin water balance. A 
water balance requires time-series analyses of water yields and uses as well as of 
the ultimate losses from the system. The balance must cover both groundwater 
and surface ('blue') water. It must also consider soil ('green') water. To prepare a 
water balance, data are needed from a network of hydrological, hydrogeological, 
and meteorological measuring points. It takes several years to build such 
networks, and it also takes a number of years of observation to ensure that the 
results meet minimum standards of reliability. 
In many cases measuring networks have been financed through external projects, 
and once such projects are completed, the means needed to continue to operate 
and maintain the networks are often lacking. While it costs time and money to 
build measuring networks and to train personnel to operate them and evaluate the 
data, measuring networks tend very quickly to fall into disrepair if the funds 
needed are not available or if the networks are poorly managed. 
Sources: Burton / Molden (2005); Rutashobya (2003) 
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boundary diagnostic analysis (GEF 2004) can serve to determine (a) what 
information is already available and (b) what information still needs to be 
compiled. Scoping in early phases of transboundary initiatives can help to 
minimize the costs of information acquisition. In this context it will be 
necessary to examine to what extent a more elaborate set of possible man-
agement options may be developed by improving the information base, 
and whether or not the effort and expense this would involve is 
worthwhile. 
Box 7: Basin information management systems (IMS) 
Information-management systems include various electronic systems used to pre-
pare, store, and exchange data and information. Three types that are especially 
important for river-basin management are bibliographic information systems, 
geographic information systems, and databases used to store hydrological, mete-
orological, and hydrogeological time-series data. Using integrated datasets for an 
overall river basin, it is possible to derive an analysis of the condition of water 
resources from both the river-basin and the national perspective. Information 
systems provide a standardized method of data collection and input. This 
furthermore ensures that the input parameters needed for water-yield models and 
water management are readily available. Many regional river-basin information 
systems attempt to maintain a spatial database with the aid of geographic 
information systems (GIS). Developing a database of this kind involves 
compiling the relevant maps (especially of administrative and basin boundaries, 
issue-related maps on geology, hydrogeology, soils, wetland areas, land cover, 
surface waterbodies, annual precipitation as well as potential evapotranspiration, 
land uses, water uses), a tasks which often requires maps to be digitized and 
projections to be standardized, with the results assembled to form a unified map 
base for an entire river basin. 
Source: Global Water Partnership (2005); UNEP (2004) 
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3 Information transmission in the practice of 
cooperation in transboundary African basins 
3.1 Senegal2 
The Senegal River is shared by Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. 
The Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) is 
responsible for the development and management of the water resources 
concerned. Agencies that report to the OMVS are in charge of the opera-
tion of the Manantali und Diama dams, which are jointly owned by the 
three member countries Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Flow data from the 
Senegal have been recorded since 1904, and the large quantities of hydro-
logical data that have been collected are stored in a database operated by 
the OMVS' technical department. The department publishes a monthly 
information sheet for member-country hydrological services as well as for 
other actors. The changes in the Senegal's flow regime that set in once the 
dams were completed have had numerous negative impacts on environ-
ment, health, and traditional water uses. In response to this situation, the 
French Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) and the OMVS 
conducted a series of comprehensive analyses of the river's hydrological 
behavior in relation to abstraction and regulation, and the findings were 
used as a basis to improve dam regulation. In this context a water 
management model was developed to assess the effects of different 
regulation practices. But since Guinea is not an OMVS member, the reli-
able data needed by lower-course riparians to forecast inflows from the 
upper river basin into the reservoirs are unavailable. Whilst data are regu-
larly collected on water quality, population, health, livestock, agriculture, 
fishery, climate, and the environment, the data are dispersed across a num-
ber of different institutions (e. g. government agencies, universities, re-
search institutes or projects). Comprehensive datasets have been collected 
for numerous projects, but the databases are either incompatible or were 
abandoned prior to completion. 
                                                          
2 See Adams (2000); Varis / Lahtela (2002); OMVS (2003b); Uhlir (2003); World Bank / 
GEF (2003); OMVS (2003a). 
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Lack of information on the dams' impacts long posed an obstacle to the 
OMVS' work. The insufficiency or total lack of time- and space-related 
data for many water-relevant areas has stood in the way of a systematic 
analysis of improved water availability, the environmental and health 
problems caused by the projects, and their direct and indirect impacts on 
the living conditions of the affected population. 
The OMVS was reorganized in response to these problems, with new 
indicators defined and strategies worked out to compile the data required 
by the OMVS to continuously monitor the impacts of its water projects on 
water availability, health, the state of the environment, and socioeconomic 
development - and if need be to adjust its management strategy. The up-
shot was the creation of an environmental observatory and a network of all 
 
Box 8: Decision-support systems (DSS) and river-basin / aquifer 
models 
Decision-support systems have a modeling component. Models make it possible 
to describe a water system in simplified terms on the basis of what-would-hap-
pen-if scenarios - e. g. the effects of intersectoral water-allocation policies or 
effects of uncertainty and risk on possible water resources management strate-
gies. Models developed to simulate the water yield and water balance (water 
management) of rivers or aquifers are generally available; but in most cases they 
require investment to acquire the databases needed for them. The typical ele-
ments of a water-management model include a representation of water flow 
system with its main channel and bypass flows, a representation of the precipita-
tion-runoff relation of subbasins, dams and reservoirs, important transfers and 
diversions, and a representation of different water users (hydropower, shipping, 
irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply, minimum ecological runoffs). 
The most important output of such models is a time- and space-related descrip-
tion of the anticipated flows and water levels at important points in the system; 
this is used to assess the impacts of altered water allocation or regulation strate-
gies. Progress in modelling techniques has made it possible for the negotiating 
parties to work out on a joint basis models for a river basin that are at once high-
powered and economical. In view of the fact that the negotiating parties are 
themselves able to influence the approach used to model water uses, they tend to 
be more willing to accept the formulation and analysis of management-strategy 
scenarios. The process of model development and scenario formulation contrib-
utes to a shared understanding of the evidential value of the information used and 
thus also to its acceptance as a basis for negotiations. 
Source: Global Water Partnership (2005) 
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Figure 4: Information needs for water resources assessments  
and strategic planning 
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relevant generators of information on certain issues, the aim being to build 
a central river-basin information system. Agreements have been concluded 
between the relevant organizations and the OMVS with a view to defining 
the role and the responsibilities of the individual organizations involved 
(collection, processing, and storage of data) and the OMVS (preparation, 
dissemination, and exchange of information).  
Lessons learned: The OMVS is an example for cooperation with a strong 
international competence center in charge of organizing cooperation with 
national authorities. The OMVS is responsible for the operational regula-
tion of jointly run infrastructure, and as such it also operates hydrological 
measuring networks. Inadequate monitoring of socioeconomic develop-
ments and the environment long stood in the way of any systematic analy-
sis of the impacts of the dams on health and environment as well as on the 
living conditions of the local population. In order to enable the OMVS to 
continuously monitor the impacts of its water projects and to make appro-
priate adjustments to its management strategy, it was necessary to define a 
set of indicators to be monitored and to develop strategies that permitted 
the organization to compile the necessary data. 
3.2 Nile3 
On the Nile records on flow events have been kept for several thousand 
years now; the Nilometers along the river bear witness to this. Apart from 
an exchange of data among British experts during the colonial period, 
prior to 1960 no attempt was made by the ten Nile riparians (Egypt, Ethio-
pia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) to systematically share data. Agreement on 
a first joint project, the HYDROMET Project, was reached in 1967 be-
tween Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda with the support of 
UNDP and the WMO. The project was motivated by rising water levels in 
Lake Victoria and the purpose of the project was to collect and analyze 
data on inflows into Lake Victoria and to prepare a study on the Nile's 
water balance. Political conflicts in the 1970s between the countries in-
volved caused the project to be prematurely terminated, with Kenya and 
Tanzania withdrawing from it (the project was officially terminated only 
                                                          
3 See Nicol (2003a); Nicol (2003b); NBI (2001); Amer et al. (2004). 
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in 1992). Subsequently two projects were conducted under the auspices of 
the FAO: Operation Water Resources Management and Information Sys-
tems for the Nile Basin Countries and Information Systems for Water Re-
sources Planning and Monitoring in the Lake Victoria Region. These 
projects included significant capacity-building elements in the upper-
course Nile riparians. 
The early 1990s saw the creation of the Technical Committee Nile (TEC-
NONILE). One of its focuses was to build information-processing capaci-
ties, to introduce Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and satellite 
image analysis and to promote cooperation in information-sharing. The 
long-term aim was to prepare the information needed to arrive at an equi-
table allocation of the Nile's water resources; the short term aim was to 
develop national master plans with a view to integrating them into a larger 
Nile plan. Even though the project was not fully implemented, it did lay 
the groundwork for a more intensive cooperation in the Nile Basin Initia-
tive launched in 1999. 
The Nile Basin Initiative is a provisional institutional arrangement includ-
ing all Nile riparians; it is rooted in a shared vision of sustainable devel-
opment based on an equitable and reasonable allocation of the benefits of 
the Nile's water resources. To translate this vision into practice, a strategic 
program was developed that identified and prepared a number of joint 
projects. One of the program's components is the development of a deci-
sion-support system (DSS) for the Nile. The project's aim is to work out 
the infrastructure needed for efficient communication and to develop an 
information-management system and a planning model. At present a re-
gional DSS unit is being set up; it is to work closely together with national 
DSS competence teams on the development of a set of joint instruments 
designed to cater for the needs of both national authorities and basinwide 
cooperation. 
Lessons learned: The Nile is a good example of a case in which riparians 
withhold information for strategic reasons, with a view to avoid being 
drawn into negotiations on an equitable and reasonable allocation of water 
resources. However, efforts to organize a project-level exchange of infor-
mation despite a lack of the political will needed for cooperation may be 
seen as a first step on the road to building the trust that was required for 
entering into the subsequent negotiations on cooperation in the Nile Basin 
Initiative. 
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3.3 Orange-Senqu4 
The countries located in the Orange-Senqu Basin are Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, and South Africa. In 2000 these countries founded the Orange-
Senqu River Commission. One of the most important factors working in 
favor of the process was the cooperation that already existed at that time 
between the national water authorities. One milestone in the process was 
the Orange River Replanning Study (ORRS). The original planning for the 
Orange had already been carried out 20 years previously, even before the 
decision was made to develop the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP) for an intrabasin water transfer. In order to come to decisions on 
the further development of the Orange, it was necessary to conduct new 
analyses on potential water yield and future water demand. Even though 
the initial purpose of the ORRS was solely to clarify South Africa's own 
priorities, it became clear that no meaningful planning was possible with-
out consideration of the needs of the other riparians. This meant that the 
study's hydrological base had to take account of the overall basin. 
South Africa's invitation to Namibia and Lesotho to take part in the study 
caused some uneasiness, since the study was not to be conducted under a 
joint international forum. On the other side, South Africa had some reser-
vations about divulging the ideas it had been developing; but in the end it 
determined that openness toward its neighbors would prove beneficial. 
Once the ORRS had been initiated, Namibia conducted some internal 
planning of its own on its water needs from the Orange and made the re-
sults available to South Africa. Lesotho embarked on a similar study. 
During the work on the ORRS South Africa proposed following it up with 
a joint study designed to focus the information from the country studies 
and to develop a consensual position. An Orange-Senqu agreement was 
signed that provides for the development of a database and a provisional 
integrated water resources management plan. 
Data-sharing and joint hydrological analyses have now become everyday 
practice in the bilateral cooperation between these countries, and the data 
collected by South Africa are regularly shared with its neighbors. Namibia 
provides runoff data and information on present and anticipated water 
                                                          
4 See Conley / van Niekerk (2000); Turton (2003b); Meissner (2000); Mohamed (2003); 
Heyns (2003); Meissner / Turton (2003). 
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demand. Lesotho also provides runoff and precipitation data. South Africa 
has funded measuring weirs in Lesotho to calibrate the data. This informa-
tion-sharing has led to a high level of conformity in assessments of the 
region's water yield. After many years of working separately, the hydro-
logical services of Lesotho and South Africa have now pooled their re-
sources in addressing the sensitive issue of the hydrological interpretations 
used to determine the royalities that South Africa is obliged to pay Lesotho 
for the transfer of water within the LHW Project. Even though the two 
parties have not yet accepted the results of the analysis, cooperation has 
been successful to the extent that it has served to reduce mistrust and dis-
agreements. There is also close cooperation in the field of training, with 
South Africa conducting training sessions for neighboring countries in the 
use of various methods of analysis that are intended, among other things, 
to strengthen the skills that its partners need to engage in transboundary 
cooperation. 
Lessons learned: The example of the Orange-Senqu shows that coopera-
tion at the technical level can provide an important impulse toward over-
coming mistrust. Furthermore, the example of the LHWP points to the 
conflict potential inherent in attempts to interpret hydrological data, in 
particular in cases where such information is used as the basis to allocate 
water resources and/or the benefits associated with them. Finally, the Or-
ange-Senqu Basin, with its economically unequal riparians, is an example 
that clearly shows that weaker riparians are in need of support in the form 
of targeted interventions designed to empower them to cooperate on equal 
terms. 
3.4 Incomati and Maputo5 
South Africa, Mozambique, and Swaziland are riparians on the Incomati 
and Maputo. In 1991 they decided to conduct a joint study on the water 
yield, water requirements, and development potential of the Incomati 
River; the Maputo Basin was integrated into the study in 1999. The Joint 
Incomati Basin Study (JIBS) was completed in April 2001 and presented 
to the Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee (TPTC). Two computer 
                                                          
5 See Carmo Vaz / van der Zaag (2003); Carmo Vaz / Lopes Pereira (2000); Incomati-
Maputo Resolution (2002); Kramer (2003). 
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models (i. e. Water Resources Yield Model, Water Resources Planning 
Model) were developed with the aid of external advisers and in 
cooperation with the South African Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry. The models were used to analyze water availability and water 
supply for various users and to depict the impacts of different development 
scenarios. 
For a longer period of time, it was however unclear to Mozambique and 
Swaziland whether their experts would have access to the model. Later, 
when South Africa finally did permit them access, the experts from Swa-
ziland and Mozambique convinced themselves of the validity of the as-
sumptions involved, but without taking advantage of the opportunity to 
calculate development scenarios of their own, even though this would 
have proven helpful to them in the trilateral negotiations. During the 
course of the talks the three riparians almost always met the requests of the 
other parties for information. But attempts to go beyond information-
sharing and to use the opportunity provided by the Joint Basin Study to 
work out a joint picture of the present state and the future of the basin 
came too late and were not consistently pursued; the result was that it took 
far longer to work out the projected agreement on water resources alloca-
tion than was originally provided for. In 2002 the riparians signed the 
Incomati-Maputo Interim Agreement together with a comprehensive in-
formation-sharing protocol. The intention is to negotiate a final agreement 
at a later date after improved information is available.  
Lessons learned: The negotiations on the Incomati-Maputo as well as the 
Joint Incomati Basin Study show how important it is for all riparians to 
have equal access to the data and model representations on which planning 
is based. Water management models designed to analyze development 
scenarios can be used as an instrument to support efforts to bring the ne-
gotiating parties closer together. The case demonstrates that it is important 
to conduct negotiations in a structured and systematic manner and in such 
a way that the negotiations start out with an exchange of information and 
subsequent efforts to work out a common understanding of water man-
agement potentials and future water needs. Only then is it possible to for-
mulate joint management goals and to reach agreement on a formal and 
comprehensive treaty. The case of the Incomati also shows that attempts to 
abbreviate this process may in the end cost time and cause delays in reap-
ing the benefits of cooperation.  
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3.5 Nubian Aquifer6 
The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) is a major groundwater 
resource of the eastern Sahara that is shared by Chad, Egypt, Libya, and 
Sudan. In the past four decades Egypt, Libya, and Sudan have undertaken 
separate attempts to develop the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System and 
the arid land above it. Since the early 1970s the three countries have 
shown interest in exchanging their experiences and looking into related 
development potentials, and this has led to the establishment of the Joint 
Authority for the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. Following a long period of 
inactivity, the countries concerned acquired the funds for a two-year 
research program. The program had three components: (1) training for 
staff of the four national institutions responsible for managing the NSAS; 
(2) creation of a database; and (3) development of a groundwater model. 
The Nubian Aquifer Regional Information System (NARIS) was 
developed to store and make available data on the aquifer, including 
information on water levels, abstractions, stratigraphy, and hydraulic 
parameters. The database also has a bibliographic component containing 
earlier studies and research findings. The information system amounts to a 
standardized method of data acquisition for the four countries concerned, 
and it is used to prepare the input parameters required for the aquifer 
model. The aquifer model was developed to simulate scenarios on possible 
approaches to exploiting the NSAS. The model constitutes the technical 
basis for a mechanism of intercountry consultations on water abstraction. 
One indirect result of the research program was the revitalization of the 
Joint Authority for the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. It was recognized that 
the basis to ensure the continuity of regional cooperation in the 
management of the aquifer was a regular exchange of information. To this 
end two agreements were signed. The first covers the exchange of data, 
which were assembled and fed into the information system during the 
project. With the second agreement, the parties commit themselves to keep 
the information system up to date by means of continuous monitoring and 
upkeep and maintenance of the database. The data are stored on a server 
operated by the Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab 
Region and Europe (CEDARE) in Egypt. Access to NARIS is restricted to 
                                                          
6 See Salem / Pallas (2004); Burchi / Spreij (2003). 
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the water authorities of the countries involved. Any changes made to the 
data by one of the four water authorities can be controlled by the other 
parties.  
Lessons learned: The Nubian Aquifer Regional Information System is a 
good example for shared, yet nonpublic information, that is accessible 
only to the parties to an agreement (in this case the national water authori-
ties of the signatories). With a view to ensuring the database's acceptance 
for political-level management decisions and transboundary consultations, 
the revitalization of a joint commission of the parties to guide the database 
compilation has proven to be of great significance.  
3.6 Niger7 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d' Ivoire, Guinea, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Chad are riparians of the Niger. The Niger River Commission 
was established in 1964; in 1980 it was transformed into the Niger Basin 
Authority (NBA). Although the NBA was set to implement an ambitious 
program of action for navigation, irrigation, and the environment, it 
proved unable to realize more than a small part of the program. In 1986 
the council of ministers determined that the NBA was not operating satis-
factorily and restricted the scope of its tasks to river basin planning. The 
member countries were to implement selected projects on their own re-
sponsibility; and instead of collecting data itself, the NBA was now to 
work with data made available to it by the member countries. 
In 1987 UNDP and the FAO formulated a five-year program with three 
priority goals: (1) rehabilitation of the documentation and information 
center, expansion of the existing water management model, continued 
implementation of the Hydrological Forecasting System in the River Niger 
BasinProject (Hydroniger Project), and development of a hydrological 
database; (2) the NBA was to conduct a case study to demonstrate its 
competence as a coordinator for river-basin development planning; (3) the 
NBA was to conduct a water resource assessment. Ultimately only the first 
goal was realized. 
                                                          
7 See Burchi / Spreij (2003); Olomoda (2002); Rangley et al. (1994); World Bank / GEF 
(2004); Abe et al. (2004); Andersen et al. (2005). 
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The Hydroniger Project was designed to make real-time hydrological 
forecasts that would be used to issue flood warnings, inform on the navi-
gability and to facilitate dam regulation in the member countries. The 
project was initiated in 1979, and by 1987 65 data collection platforms had 
been installed which simultaneously transmit data by satellite to the Na-
tional Forecasting Centers and the NBA Regional Forecasting Centre. 
Even though over US$ 15 million were invested in the system, the data 
collection network started to fall into deterioration by 1988. Demand by 
potential users for forecasts was low; in addition, the satellite technology 
used proved to be susceptible to breakdowns, and many stations were not 
in proper working order. At present the hydrological measuring network is 
being revitalized for US$ 2.24 million in connection with the first phase of 
the HYCOS-NIGER Program. Furthermore, a study is being prepared to 
formulate requirements for improving the water management model for 
the Niger, because it is expected that the model can be used to develop 
strategies for transboundary water management and cooperation in the 
Basin. There are also plans to set up a monitoring unit at the NBA to 
gather and process information on the condition of water resources as well 
as on land uses that depend on them. It is intended that this unit be organ-
ized in a similar fashion like the environmental observatory for the Sene-
gal Basin. 
Lessons learned: Since the international basin organization was founded 
there have been several attempts to establish a comprehensive information 
base for planning purposes. Initially the Niger Basin Authority was to 
assume all tasks related to information transmission: operation of a hy-
drological measuring network, data generation, modeling and analysis. As 
far as the complexity and the scope of the task is concerned, the experi-
ence made by the NBA indicates that a division of labor between the 
member countries (responsible for collecting data in their own territories) 
and an international river commission (responsible for setting data collec-
tion standards, assembling the data and analyzing it at the river-basin 
level) would offer more prospects of success. The experience of the NBA 
also indicates that in planning and designing hydrological networks it is 
essential to bear two factors in mind: the actual information needs and a 
sustainable approach to funding. 
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3.7 Okavango8 
Angola, Namibia, and Botswana are riparians of the Okavango. In 1994 
they created the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission 
(OKACOM). The parties to the agreement have committed themselves to 
implement an integrated management plan. OKACOM's first success con-
sisted in the development of a project proposal to perform an environ-
mental assessment for the Okavango Basin and to develop an integrated 
water resources management strategy. The aim was to collect comprehen-
sive information on the environmental status of the Okavango Basin and at 
the same time to assess current water availability with a view to identify-
ing further water-use potentials for each of the riparian countries. The 
initiated planning process is intended to prepare a reliable set of data that 
can be used as a basis to negotiate an agreement on the future use of water 
resources. As a first step, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) funded a 
transboundary diagnostic analysis (TDA). OKACOM set up the Okavango 
Basin Steering Committee (OBSC) to manage the project. A project di-
rector was appointed to coordinate the work of over 20 consultants from 
the three member countries. The TDA has since been successfully com-
pleted, and a draft project proposal on a strategic action plan has been 
submitted to the GEF; it contains proposals for detailed studies on devel-
opment potentials as well as on the elaboration of an integrated manage-
ment plan. 
A good number of international organizations are engaged in the region, 
many of them with the aim of protecting the Okavanga Delta. This atten-
tion justifies referring to the Okavango Basin as - at least in part - "inter-
nationalized." The international organizations and their national partner 
NGOs have compiled comprehensive studies on the water balance of the 
Okavango and related wetlands, including for example the IUCN Review 
of the Southern Okavango Water Development Project (IUCN 1993). 
NGOs are organized in a forum, the aim being to develop formal partici-
pation mechanisms in OKACOM. The NGOs play an important role in 
generating and transmitting information. To cite an example, the Sharing 
Water Initiative has developed the Shared Okavango Database with a view 
                                                          
8 See Schultz (2003); Jansen / Madzwamuse (2003); IUCN (2003); Pinheiro et al. (2003); 
USAID (2004). 
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to promoting the dialogue on the management plan; the database has been 
made available to various interest groups, but also to OKACOM.  
Lessons learned: The various initiatives in the Okavango Basin can be 
seen as an example of the influence that international and national NGOs 
may have on the issues involved in negotiating river-basin cooperation. 
Their lobbying work has set environmental concerns high on the agenda in 
the work leading up to the management plan. With a view to promoting 
dialogue on the management plan, NGOs have built a shared database 
which is accessible to various interest organizations, but also to 
OKACOM. In creating a publicly accessible database, NGOs have laid the 
groundwork for broader participation in the negotiation of a water man-
agement strategy. 
3.8 Zambezi9 
The Zambezi riparians are Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, Malawi, and Namibia. One of the most important 
infrastructure projects is the Kariba Dam, which is located on the border 
between Zambia and Zimbabwe. The dam is operated by the Zambezi 
River Authority (ZRA). The ZRA is a binational organization, which also 
operates a hydrological measuring network with 12 telemetric stations 
which are used to control the dam's operation. Since 1994 the ZRA has 
also investigated environmental effects of its operations within its Envi-
ronmental Monitoring Programme (EMP). An environmental policy and a 
water quality monitoring system has been developed in this connection. 
At the overall basin level the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe reached agreement in 1987 on the Ac-
tion Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common 
Zambezi River System (ZACPLAN). The three other riparians, Angola, 
Malawi, and Namibia, jointed the plan in the early 1990s. ZACPLAN was 
a framework program that provided for 19 so-called Zambezi Action Plan 
Projects (ZACPROs). These cover a range of activities ranging from a 
compilation of all existing and planned water projects and the creation of a 
monitoring system to the elaboration of an integrated management plan. 
                                                          
9 See Shela (2000); Chenje (2003); Nakayama (1998); Salewicz (2003); Nakayama 
(2003); Mwiinga (2000). 
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The initial plans to create an independent River Basin Coordinating Unit 
were not implemented. Some of the Zambezi riparians were unwilling to 
accept ZACPLAN because they feared it would have interfered in their 
own water resource planning. Due to the inadequacy of the organizational 
structure and a lack of funding, however, none of the projects has yet been 
realized. The only exception here is the Development of an Integrated 
Water Management Plan for the Zambezi River Basin Project 
(ZACPRO6). The first phase of ZACPRO6 (up to 1998) saw the creation 
of an information system (the Zambezi River Basin Information System 
and Database) and the preparation of seven sector studies on water use in 
the Zambezi Basin. Work is currently underway on an integrated devel-
opment plan for the basin (ZACPRO6, Phase 2). The Zambezi Water-
course Commission (ZAMCOM), set up in 2004, is responsible for coor-
dinating this project. 
Lessons learned: The Zambezi River Authority is a bilateral organization 
responsible for running the infrastructure jointly owned and operated by 
two riparian countries. In this function the Authority is entrusted with 
comprehensive planning tasks, and it operates the required hydrological 
measuring networks in its own responsibility. Thus far, efforts to come up 
with a joint water resources planning for the entire basin have failed for 
lack of political will on the part of the countries involved, some of which 
feared that an externally initiated project which is not controlled by a po-
litical process would interfere in their own national planning. The example 
of the Zambezi shows that whilst comprehensive water allocation agree-
ments will need information on the whole basin to be shared, information 
needed for the regulation of infrastructure in large transboundary basins 
can under certain conditions sufficiently be organized at the subbasin 
level.  
3.9 Cross-basin cooperation in information sharing 
The measuring networks used to collect relevant data for water resources 
management in Africa are in many cases inadequate and in poor condition 
(Rutashobya 2003). The process of decay has started at a time when de-
mand for information on water resources is on the rise. With this in mind, 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1993 initiated the Hy-
drological Cycle Observing System (HYCOS), the aim of which is to 
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strengthen the technical and institutional capacities of national hydrologi-
cal services, enabling them to collect the hydrological data and to process 
the data with a view to the needs of water resources management (van 
Biljon et al. 2001). The core element of the program is rehabilitation of 
hydrological measuring networks. HYCOS consists of regional projects 
which, while funded from different sources, are advised by the WMO. 
Another objective of the HYCOS project is to promote regional data-
sharing, and for this reason most projects cover one or more transboundary 
river basins. At present the following projects are in the process of imple-
mentation in Africa: SADC-HYCOS (including, among others, the Lim-
popo, the Zambezi, the Incomati, the Orange), Niger-HYCOS, and Volta-
HYCOS. Projects in the development stage include IGAD-HYCOS (Horn 
of Africa), Lake Victoria-HYCOS, Lake Chad-HYCOS, and Senegal-
HYCOS. 
The so-called FRIEND Program (Flow Regimes from International Ex-
perimental and Network Data) which is part of the UNESCO International 
Hydrological Programme (IHP), is designed to promote data-sharing for 
hydrological studies (Gustard / Cole 2002). The aim is to develop en-
hanced methods for hydrological analysis (e. g. of precipitation-runoff 
models) and to establish these methods in hydrological services. There are 
regional projects underway for the Nile, the SADC region, and for West 
and Central Africa. One important success of the first phase of the South 
African FRIEND project was the creation of a joint hydrological database. 
The database contains time series of the daily flow rates and water levels 
for 680 basins. FRIEND has introduced a uniform database software in the 
countries involved and conducts training for it in these countries. In addi-
tion, the project has built a comprehensive geographic information system 
(GIS) containing basin boundaries, ground-level models, water systems, 
precipitation, evaporation, soils, geological information, and land uses. 
The development of this database is an important precondition for a sys-
tematic analysis of the hydrological data, and it demonstrates the will of 
the 11 countries involved to establish free data-sharing for hydrological 
research purposes. 
In the field of transboundary groundwater resources, there are efforts un-
derway, including international initiatives on the part of UNESCO's Inter-
national Hydrological Programme (IHP), the International Association of 
Hydrogeologists (IAH), the FAO, and UNECE on Internationally Shared 
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Aquifer Resources Management (ISARM), to assemble data and informa-
tion on transboundary groundwater resources (Appelgren 2004). The focus 
of these efforts is a compilation of Transboundary Aquifer Systems (TAS). 
Based on the TAS, and in coordination with other organizations, work is 
also underway to describe 35 transboundary groundwater systems in Af-
rica. However, as far as most of these systems are concerned, few ap-
proaches to transboundary riparian cooperation have yet been developed. 
There is often also a lack of important information on the dimensions and 
the quality of these groundwater resources. In connection with regional 
cooperation (SADC) growing interest has been expressed in using expert-
technical information networks as a means to strengthen cooperation on 
transboundary groundwater resources.  
Increasingly, data gathered with the aid of remote-sensing techniques are 
being used for purposes of river-basin management. There are two areas in 
which remote sensing may play an important role: (1) more effective and 
faster mapping of hydrologically significant features over large areas (e. g. 
land cover) and (ii) direct derivation of hydrological parameters (e. g. soil 
moisture, precipitation, surface temperature) based on correlation of re-
mote and in situ observations and the use of models. An example of an 
initative with a view to optimizing these possibilities, is the so-called  
TIGER Initiative of the European Space Agency which was launched in 
1992. The aim of the initiative is to promote the use of satellite technology 
in water resources management, especially in Africa, by making earth-
observation data available as well as by providing training and technical 
support. 
Lessons learned: In recent years two changes in data collection and ac-
cess to data can be observed. First, many data needed for river-basin 
analyses have become available in the global (or regional) public domain. 
Second, more and more data are collected via remote sensing. There are a 
good number of international initiatives designed to promote the genera-
tion and exchange of information relevant to transboundary water re-
sources management - although it should be noted that these initiatives are 
not necessarily organized in the framework of river-basin cooperation 
projects. Appropriate coordination and/or cofinancing can serve to foster 
synergies from initiatives in the public domain and transboundary water 
resources management. 
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4 Summary of the case studies 
The studies on African river and lake basins show that formal information-
sharing agreements are in many cases preceded by projects designed to 
improve the information basis and by informal contacts between water 
authorities endeavoring to share information for their planning purposes. 
In the regions covered by the present study we can, in essence, distinguish 
three reasons for initiatives on transboundary information transmission: 
— Preparation of the groundwork needed for joint strategic planning 
(joint basin studies, basin management plans) as well as for agree-
ments on water allocation; 
— monitoring of the impacts of existing water infrastructure (especially 
dams) on health, the environment, and water uses with a view to ad-
justing regulation regimes; 
— real-time information-sharing for purposes of operational infrastruc-
ture management and flood warnings. 
The role played by basin organizations in this process is not a uniform one. 
On the other hand, the information-gathering and -processing capacities 
needed to address transboundary water resources management issues de-
pend in large measure on the range of tasks assigned to these organizations 
(operational management of transboundary infrastructure and/or strategic 
water resources planning) as well as on the associated organizational form 
in which transboundary cooperation is cast. 
The most important instruments used to organize information transmission 
in the river- and lake-basin cooperation ventures investigated here include: 
— documentation centers / bibliographic information systems; 
— basin information systems, including relevant guidelines and agree-
ments on data harmonization and data provision; 
— water-yield and water management models; 
— hydrological / hydrogeological databases; 
— operation of hydrological measuring networks; 
— joint water resources assessments / basin studies designed to look into 
development potentials, without losing sight of IWRM principles. 
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Table 3 summarizes the way these instruments are used by the interna-
tional commissions and/or the associated international organizations 
looked into in the present study. The work of most of these commissions is 
supported by development cooperation projects; Table 4 sums up some of 
the typical project components involved in providing support for informa-
tion transmission. 
5 Summary and recommendations for development 
cooperation  
(i) Transboundary water resources management can be seen as a cyclical 
process involving the negotiation and implementation of international 
agreements. Basically four conflict strategies are available for the riparian 
parties to attempt to resolve transboundary management issues: negotia-
tion, delegation, exit, and escalation. If cooperative transboundary water 
resources management is to be established, it is necessary that problems 
are transformed into negotiation problems. This requires that the parties 
must be in possession of the information they need to recognize potential 
Pareto improvements or so called win-win outcomes. 
(ii) On their own, data are unable to effect any difference in water re-
sources management: it is only as information that they may change be-
haviors. Since the only information relevant to a bargaining problem is 
information that has been understood, the crucial point is what information 
is both available and understood by the negotiating parties. Understanding 
should not be equated with acceptance of information. Acceptance is a 
deliberate decision by the parties. It is for this reason that two transmis-
sions are required for negotiated solutions to transboundary water re-
sources management problems: The negotiating parties must first realize 
the significance of certain data in the context of the negotiation problem, 
that is, they must transform these data into information. In order to be able 
to use this information in negotiation, this information must be transmitted 
into the parties' shared space, i. e. the parties must accept the information. 
Organizing the transmissions required is one of the core tasks of trans-
boundary water resources management.  
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Table 4: Typical components of projects designed to support 
information transmission  
 IMS RBM DATA* O&HC
1. Organizational development      
Provision of infrastructure (office, computers, 
communication) 
   X 
Funding and training of personnel for regional 
competence team (e. g. DSS or planning unit) 
   X 
Selection of national focal points and training of 
personnel involved  
   X 
2. Technical tasks - river-basin model / infor-
mation management system 
    
Analysis of information needs for strategic plan-
ning (e. g. transboundary diagnostic analysis) 
X X   
Development of water-yield and water-manage-
ment models 
X X   
Development of a river basin / aquifer informa-
tion system (e. g. database and GIS) 
X X   
Creation of a documentation center (document 
collection) 
    
3. Data-gathering and -sharing      
Analysis of data needs for decision support  X  X  
Development of standards for the collection, 
processing, analysis, and storage of data  
  X  
Supplementary support for collection and analy-
sis of data when required (e. g. measuring-net-
works, laboratory)  
  X  
Development of rules for exchange of data and 
information  
X    
4. Consolidation of application for planning 
and management problems  
    
Training and training programs at national and 
regional level  
   X 
Efforts to harness DSS applications for problems 
at national / local level  
X X   
IMS = Information Management System, RBM = River Basin Model / DSS, DATA 
= Data basis, O&HC = Organizational and Human Capacity 
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(iii) With a view to ensuring that all riparian countries have the facts they 
need to (a) negotiate an equitable and reasonable allocation of water re-
sources and (b) to avoid any significant damage beyond their borders, 
international water law requires all countries to share water-related infor-
mation. In other words, the UN convention sees the obligation to exchange 
information as directly instrumental as regards the fundamental right of the 
parties to acquire an equitable and reasonable share of the use of water-
courses and also sets out an equally fundamental obligation not to cause 
any significant damage to other riparian countries.  
(iv) Organization of the required transmissions of information is one of the 
core tasks of transboundary water resources management. Information 
needs for these various functions are many and varied. Data collected for 
one purpose, such as operational management, may be of use for other 
purposes such as planning. Often requirements differ, so that data col-
lected for one purpose are not usable in another. It is generally necessary 
to distinguish between the information needed for strategic planning and 
intergovernmental negotiations and information needs for the operational 
management of water infrastructure with transboundary impacts. The 
important instruments of information transmission include information 
systems used to store data and keep them accessible and models used to 
simulate water yields and the impacts of different management strategies 
on water balances. Depending on spectrum of tasks involved (operational 
management of transboundary infrastructure systems and/or strategic wa-
ter resources planning) and the associated form of organization selected 
for transboundary cooperation, the central information-transmission tasks 
may be divided up between national authorities and international river-
basin organizations. 
(v) In supporting transboundary water resources management, develop-
ment cooperation should not lose sight of the interactions between the 
development of national institutions and the development of appropriate 
forms of intergovernmental cooperation. If they are to successfully negoti-
ate transboundary water-management strategies, the parties must them-
selves realize the significance of certain data in the context of the negotia-
tion problem; this implies that efforts to strengthen relevant national ca-
pacities have direct impacts on the parties' ability to engage in interna-
tional cooperation. This is particularly important in constellations involv-
ing strong and weak states. Whether or not the development of joint but 
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independent analytical and planning capacities at the river-basin level will 
lead to duplications is a matter of the capacities already established in the 
riparian countries concerned. An alternative strategy is to support institu-
tional cooperation between relevant national authorities under the auspices 
of international commissions; this could be flanked by targeted support for 
countries with limited planning and analytical capacities. 
(vi) In supporting transboundary water resources management, develop-
ment cooperation should not lose sight of the principle of subsidiarity. In 
particular when large basins are concerned, the high transaction costs 
involved call for a close definition of the object of cooperation and restric-
tion to issues that are accessible to solution at the basin level. Many efforts 
concerned with transboundary water resources management in Africa are 
focused, explicitly or implicitly, on the issue of water allocation and the 
associated issue of allocation of water-use rights. What is therefore called 
for at the basin level is instruments designed to ensure that all actors are in 
possession of all of the facts they need to negotiate an equitable and rea-
sonable share of the benefits derived from the use of water resources. 
(vii) Development cooperation should not lose sight of the fact that re-
sponsibilities for data collection and analysis for transboundary water 
resources management are divided up among different levels of govern-
ment. The fact that information acquisition may be aligned to the needs of 
water resources management should not be allowed to obscure the circum-
stance that as far as many transboundary waterbodies are concerned, the 
riparians themselves may lack sufficient data, or have no data at all. In 
view of the complexity and the scope of the task involved, experience 
would seem to indicate that a division of labor between the member coun-
tries responsible for collecting and analyzing data in their own territories 
and an international river-basin commission responsible for setting stan-
dards and responsible for coordinated basin wide analysis offers best pros-
pects of success. The methods used to collect data in different countries 
are not always in line with international standards, and this often means 
that the information derived from these data cannot be directly compared 
with data from neighboring countries. River-basin organizations thus have 
an important role to play in efforts to standardize and harmonize data. 
(viii) It follows from the principles of integrated water resources manage-
ment and the requirements involved in negotiating an equitable share of 
the benefits of water use that strategies designed to acquire information 
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must have reference to both water yield (the hydrological and/or hydro-
geological dimension) and water use and  water demand (the socioeco-
nomic dimension). In many cases this calls for a shift in emphasis from an 
information-acquisition strategy geared more to hydrological-technical 
considerations to one oriented more to the information needed for analysis 
of water uses and water-demand development (correlated with a switch 
from supply to demand management). Furthermore, it is essential to ac-
cord due consideration – in the sense of integrated water resources man-
agement – to the water needs of water-dependent ecosystems, and not to 
focus only on water needs for household consumption, industry, and irri-
gated agriculture. 
(ix) In supporting transboundary water resources management, develop-
ment cooperation should not lose sight of the transaction costs involved in 
information transmission. The widespread "what we need is more data" 
paradigm must give way to efforts to specify the information required to 
make management decisions. It is essential for any transboundary water 
resources management initative to formulate a management information 
strategy and from that develop a management information system. The 
information strategy is the pattern or plan that aligns the information needs 
with the management requirements. It deals with information needs, the 
resources required for their collection and processing. The information 
system is the bundle of procedures that implement this strategy. Efforts 
should first be made to reach agreement on what types of information are 
needed and what level of detail this information must have if it is to be 
used to deal with the specific planning and management tasks concerned. 
Scoping in early phases of transboundary initiatives can help to minimize 
the costs of information acquisition. In this context it will be necessary to 
examine to what extent the set of management options to choose from may 
be expanded by improving the information base and whether or not the 
effort and expense this would involve is worthwhile.  
(x) In supporting transboundary water resources management, develop-
ment cooperation should look for synergies with other information-gener-
ating initiatives. In supporting cooperation projects, close coordination 
with other national or international initiatives is a good way to make opti-
mal use of synergies. This goes (a) for the generation of data and basic 
information and (b) for analysis and research. Close integration of ongoing 
programs like the WMO's HYCOS project on improving hydrological 
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measuring networks, ESA's TIGER Initiative on promotion of the use of 
remote-sensing data, UNESCO's FRIEND analysis and modeling program 
into information-acquisition strategies and closer links to ISARM activi-
ties in compiling information on transboundary groundwater resources 
could prove directly beneficial to the work of basin commissions. Targeted 
cofinancing of relevant programs is a good way to harness synergy poten-
tials. Efforts to strengthen the coordinating function of transboundary 
information-sharing agreements may play an important role for a good 
number of organizations that generate and collect data on integrated water 
resources planning; this would be the case e. g. in defining guidelines and 
standards for the collection and processing of data. Elaboration of and 
agreement on documentation standards and development of information 
systems would be a good way to ensure that information collected by a 
variety of individual projects remains accessible for further uses. Interna-
tional research projects also contribute to improving the information basis.  
(xi) In supporting transboundary water resources management, develop-
ment cooperation should not lose sight of the play of tensions between 
various requirements concerning the level of public accessibility of infor-
mation. Two information asymmetries are relevant in the context of trans-
boundary water resources management: on the one hand, asymmetries 
between riparian countries and on the other asymmetries between the 
negotiating parties and outsiders (e. g. the public, uninvolved government 
authorities, donor organizations, etc.). The principles of best IWRM prac-
tices are grounded on transparent mechanisms for the allocation, protec-
tion, and basic supply of scarce water resources, and these mechanisms are 
best ensured by clear-cut institutional arrangements designed to set the 
stage for planning and management at the lowest possible level and with 
the participation of all stakeholders. Participation requires public accessi-
bility of information. Publication of information may prove beneficial to 
the political and civil society discourse on possible riparian cooperation. 
On the other hand, though, transboundary water resources management is 
for the most part a governmental task with political accountability. If, 
however, riparians withhold information for strategic reasons, creation of a 
shared information base (i. e. one that is not public but accessible only to 
the parties) may constitute an important trust-building measure for initi-
ating transboundary negotiations.  
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(xii) If development cooperation should decide in favor of supporting an 
information management and decision-support component for transbound-
ary cooperation, it should bear the following points in mind: 
— An information and decision support system must be "owned" by the 
riparian countries concerned. One way to promote ownership is to in-
volve official users in the conceptual development and to adapt the 
system to user needs by giving it an open, modular design. 
— Such a system must be oriented to satisfy perceived actor information 
needs and be suited for use at both the regional and national level. It 
should be developed on the basis of an exact analysis of requirements 
at the regional, subregional, and national level. It must be ensured 
that there is cooperation at the regional level. Competence teams 
should be set up at the regional level, and - to ensure that the inter-
play between levels in fact works - teams with appropriate capacities 
should be created with the responsible national authorities. 
— It is essential to ensure that both the database and the methods used 
for calculation are transparent and inspire confidence. This requires 
that all riparians concerned are involved "at eye level" in the specifi-
cation and development of the models. There must also be consensus 
on assumptions, methods, and technical descriptions, and these must 
be accessible to all users and decision-makers.  
— It is essential to ensure that the set of instruments will be maintained 
and developed over the long term. This means that due consideration 
must be given to the institutional, financial, and technical aspects. 
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How can international donors promote transboundary water 
management? 
Erik Mostert 
1 Introduction 
Water and development 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
2002, the Millennium Development Goals were confirmed. These goals 
call for: 
— the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, 
— universal primary education, 
— gender equality and the empowerment of women, 
— the reduction in child mortality, 
— improvement in maternal health, 
— combat of HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
— environmental sustainability, 
— the development of a global partnership. 
Most Millennium Development Goals are related to water. Goals such as 
food security and environmental sustainability require that the water re-
sources are protected effectively, that overexploitation is prevented and 
that appropriate water infrastructure is constructed and managed well. To a 
large extent, this is a governance issue. Skills and information need to be 
available, an appropriate legislative framework needs to be in place, deci-
sion-making processes should be fair, transparent and effective, and all 
stakeholders affected by or influencing water management should be in-
volved. 
Transboundary water management 
The transboundary character of most water resources poses special prob-
lems. Worldwide more than 45 % of the land surface is located within 
international river basins and many groundwater aquifers are shared by 
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more than one country (Wolf 1999). Unilateral action by one country con-
cerning these resources is often ineffective (e. g. fish ladders in an up-
stream country only), inefficient (e. g. hydropower development in a flat 
downstream country) or simply impossible (many developments on 
boundary stretches). Moreover, unilateral action can significantly harm the 
other countries and may result in serious international tension. 
Many people fear that the wars of the 21st century will be over water. 
There are hardly any historical example of water wars (Wolf 1998), but 
conflicts falling short of a war have occurred frequently. For many inter-
national basins and aquifers no international agreement exists. For many 
other basins and aquifers, however, agreements do exist and effective 
institutions have been established that deliver benefits to all stakeholders. 
Africa 
In Africa the problems of development and water governance are espe-
cially acute. It is the poorest continent in the world. Many regions are 
water-stressed and many water resources are shared by more than one 
country. In the past there have been threats of water wars (the Nile), but 
there are also many examples of international cooperation. 
Against this background the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development has set up the project "Transboundary river 
basin management in Africa" (Grenzüberschreitendes Wassermanagement 
in Afrika, BMZ-Forschungsprogramm 2004-2005). Within this project 
five topics are discussed: 
1. The promotion of regional river regimes 
2. Africa's international rivers: state of affairs and experiences with trans-
boundary river basin management in Africa 
3. Cooperation on international rivers from an economic point of view: the 
concept of benefit-sharing 
4. Data bank "operational procedures of river basin organisations" 
5. Information sharing and management 
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This paper 
The present paper contains the results on topic 1. It focuses on the contri-
butions that international donors can make to the development of trans-
boundary water management. Chapter 2 introduces the issue of trans-
boundary water management and present the empirical evidence that is 
available. Chapter 3 discusses the different strategies and instruments that 
international donors can use to promote transboundary water management. 
Chapter 4 presents the conclusions of the paper in the form of six recom-
mendations for international donors. 
2 Transboundary water management 
This chapter introduces the issue of transboundary water management. It 
discusses the main driving forces, distinguishes several stages in trans-
boundary water management and identifies the different types of stake-
holders that play a role. Moreover, it discusses how in practice agreement 
is reached, the organisational frameworks that have been established and 
the experiences gained with public participation. The chapter contains two 
key messages: 
1. At any stage of transboundary water management, cooperation will 
occur if the major stakeholders perceive cooperation as a better op-
tion than non-cooperation. Understanding transboundary water man-
agement therefore requires an understanding of the perceptions and 
motivations of the different stakeholders and the factors that influence 
these. 
2. The major stakeholders are not "states", but the different national 
government bodies and sectoral bureaucracies, regional and local 
governments, international governments and donors, the media, 
civil society, individual water users and influential individuals. Un-
derstanding transboundary water management requires a "multi-scalar 
analysis" that maps the network of stakeholders and includes the re-
gional and the local level. 
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2.1 Driving forces 
Transboundary water management can be equated with the development 
and implementation of international "agreements" (treaties, gentlemen’s 
agreements, etc.). The main question is: what drives this process? In this 
context four types of benefits of transboundary water management have 
been mentioned (Sadoff / Grey 2002; see also Klaphake 2005): 
— Transboundary water management can result in more intensive use of 
the river basin itself. Shipping routes may be improved, irrigation and 
hydropower may be developed, etc. ("Benefits from the river"). 
— The river basin itself may be better protected and overexploitation 
may be prevented ("Benefits to the river"). 
— Transboundary water management may reduce or prevent the costs 
associated with international conflicts ("Benefits because of the 
river"). 
— Transboundary water management can pave the way to much greater 
cooperation between states, even to economic integration among 
states ("Benefits beyond the river"). 
The first two benefits can be summarised in the phrase "sustainable devel-
opment", and the last two as preventing or resolving international conflicts 
and promoting cooperation.1 Both types of benefits are closely related. 
Development requires cooperation and the resolution of major outstanding 
conflicts. Conversely, the resolution of outstanding conflicts creates op-
portunities for development. 
                                                          
1 By "conflict" we mean any kind of unfriendly interaction, ranging from mild expression 
of discord to diplomatic and economic sanctions or even war – but especially the more 
seriously unfriendly interactions (Wolf et al. 2003). Water may be the object of a 
conflict, for instance when there is competition over scarce water resources, but it may 
also be an instrument in a conflict. This is for instance the case when an upstream state 
threatens to divert an international river in order to harm or pressurize a downstream 
state. Water can also act as a catalyst for conflict, for example when water shortage 
within a country creates internal political instability that in turn creates international 
instability (Libiszewski 1995). 
 "Cooperation" can be defined as the opposite of conflict, therefore as "friendly 
interaction". 
How can international donors promote transboundary water management? 
German Development Institute 245 
Yet, these four benefits provide but an incomplete explanation of the de-
velopment of transboundary water management. In the end, what drives 
transboundary water management are not "objective" benefits, but the 
subjective perceptions and motivations of the major stakeholders. If in 
their eyes cooperation is a better alternative than non-cooperation, trans-
boundary water management will progress. If not, it will stall. 
2.2 Stages 
Transboundary water management can be analysed as a cyclical process 
consisting of different stages (Figure 1). It does not take place in a void, 
but in a continuously evolving hydrological, socio-economic, institutional, 
political and cultural context. This context can create a potential for devel-
opment or for conflict. For instance, a boundary river with a steep gradient 
provides a potential for joint hydropower development, whereas water 
scarcity creates a potential for conflict. 
The first and often most difficult stage in transboundary water manage-
ment is convening. It consists of bringing the major stakeholders around 
the table (Gray 1989). The stakeholders need to find sufficient overlap in 
how they perceive the major issues. There should be a minimum level of 
mutual interdependence. The stakeholders need to be convinced that: 
(1) the present situation does not serve their interests optimally; 
Figure 1: Stages in transboundary water management (simplified) 
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(2) negotiations could result in a fair agreement that could serve their 
interests better (Fisher / Ury 1981); 
(3) the agreement will actually be complied with, also by the other parties 
to the agreement. 
Especially when relations are good, one of the stakeholders involved could 
take on the role of convenor. Often, however, a third-party convenor will 
be useful. The convenor could help the stakeholders in analysing their own 
interests, in identifying overlaps and interdependencies, and in overcoming 
barriers to negotiation, such as stereotyping the other parties, which hin-
ders communication. Powerful convenors, whether third-party or stake-
holder, can also use other means to persuade the (other) stakeholders to 
start negotiations. They could for instance promise or threaten to withhold, 
openly or more covertly, economic or political support. 
The second stage in transboundary water management is the negotiations 
themselves (Gray 1989). If this has not yet been done at the convening 
stage, the agenda for the negotiations has to be decided upon and some 
ground rules need to be agreed upon, for instance on confidentiality of the 
negotiations and on possibilities to exit. Moreover, the relevant "facts" have 
to be established, such as the natural river discharge, present use and pro-
jected demand, and several options need to be developed and assessed (see 
section 2.5). 
The third stage is the conclusion of an agreement. The chances for a mutu-
ally satisfactory agreement are best if the negotiations are "integrative" 
instead of "positional". Positional negotiations or "bargaining" occur when 
the stakeholders take fixed positions and then start defending these. This is 
likely to result in stalemates or in suboptimal compromises. Integrative 
negotiations, on the other hand, occur when the stakeholders think in terms 
of their underlying interests and are flexible with regard to the means for 
satisfying these. This offers far better possibilities for reaching a mutually 
satisfactory agreement (cf. the notion of "double-loop learning"; Argyris / 
Schön 1996). Integrative negotiations are promoted if during the negotia-
tions more than two options are explored (Fisher / Ury 1981). 
With respect to international rivers, upstream-downstream relations pose 
special problems. From a purely hydrological point of view, upstream  
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Box 1: Eight mechanisms for overcoming upstream-downstream 
problems (Golub 1996) 
1: Issue linkage 
Issue linkage occurs when an upstream-downstream issue is linked to another 
issue where the downstream state is in control and the upstream state is the 
asking party (LeMarquand 1977; Marty 2001; Meijerink 1999). This issue might 
be a water management issue (e. g. improving maritime access to the upstream 
state) or it might be an issue from a totally different policy sector. The former is 
more common since issue linkage is only possible if the countries involved can 
expect that the others will keep their part of a deal. This is more likely if the 
stakeholders for the different issues are the same (Golub 1996). 
2: Diffuse reciprocity / good relations 
Diffuse reciprocity refers to countries that accept less favourable agreements in 
order to keep good relations and to create a "reservoir of goodwill" 
(LeMarquand 1977) from which they can draw in the future. Diffuse reciprocity 
is a kind of issue linkage of unspecified issues over time. 
3: Large geographical scope 
Upstream-downstream problems can also be overcome by extending the scope of 
agreements to include rivers where the downstream country is upstream and the 
upstream country downstream. This is in fact a kind of "geographical issue link-
age." 
4: Side payments 
Side payments or "financial compensation" are payments – directly or through 
increased subsidies or reduced contributions – in return for a concession (Golub 
1996). Side payments will be most effective for compensating economic or 
financial losses. They will be less effective when deeply held values or basic 
human needs are involved and could be experienced as bribery (Hisschemöller et 
al. 1989; Zeiss 1991). 
5: Slack cutting 
Slack cutting occurs when sectoral government bodies use their privileged access 
to international fora for introducing a more ambitious national policy than would 
be possibly through the national channels (Golub 1996; Bernauer / Moser 1996). 
An upstream country may for instance agree to very strict emission reductions 
because in effect the environmental ministry representing this country wanted to 
introduce strict regulation nationally. 
6: Intended non-compliance 
Intended non-compliance refers to the fact that countries may be willing to 
accept ambitious international agreements if they expect that the agreements will 
not be enforced. 
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countries are less dependent on downstream countries than vice versa and 
may therefore be less interested in transboundary water management. 
However, a number of mechanisms can be used for reaching agreement 
(Box 1). 
As a rule, agreements need to be ratified or approved by a higher author-
ity: a minister, the cabinet or parliament. This might prove difficult if the 
negotiators have not interacted effectively with these higher authorities. 
Problems may also occur after ratification or approval, when the agree-
ment has to be implemented or complied with. Implementation or compli-
ance is usually the responsibility of lower level governments and water 
users who have not been involved in international negotiations. To im-
prove implementation, one could consider involving them, but there are 
limits to the number of participants in negotiations. Moreover, national 
governments are often against this kind of involvement. A very different 
option for improving implementation is to develop monitoring or reporting 
mechanisms. This is often coordinated by a river basin organisation (RBO) 
set up by the pertinent agreement. 
When implemented, agreements result in certain environmental, social, 
economic, political and even cultural changes. These may be foreseen or 
not, but in any case they change the context of water management and may 
result in a new potential for development or conflict, in new negotiations 
and in new agreements. 
Development or conflict potentials do not always result in negotiations, 
negotiations do not always result in an agreement, and agreements are not 
continued Box 1: 
7: Unforeseen consequences 
At times upstream-downstream conflicts can be overcome simply because the 
upstream state did not see the consequences of the agreement. This can happen 
when negotiators are inexperienced or lack back-up, when last-minute 
changesare discussed under high pressure of reaching agreement, and when 
international courts give unexpectedly strict interpretations to agreements. 
8: Exercise of power 
While less powerful from a purely hydrological point of view, downstream coun-
tries may possess other sources of power – economic, political, military – that 
may compensate for this lack. 
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always implemented. This can create serious conflicts. On the other hand, 
negotiations may also start after a conflict has developed (as witnessed by 
for instance peace negotiations). 
In practice transboundary water management develops in several rounds. It 
often starts with technical cooperation on monitoring or research. This is 
less risky for the basin states concerned but still allows the development of 
a common factual basis and of trust (section 2.5). Often, a broad frame-
work agreement is negotiated next. This agreement is then followed by a 
number of substantive agreements on, for instance, water allocation or 
distribution of costs. Figure 1 describes just one round. 
2.3 The "agreement" 
The "agreement" that figures so prominently in the previous section can 
take a number of forms: a treaty, a private law contract, a gentlemen's 
agreement, a tacit understanding, a shared cultural practice, etc. All these 
agreements can be analysed in terms of the "institutions" or "rules of the 
game" that they establish (Ostrom 1990; Young 1995): 
a) operational rules, which determine who can use the resource (use rules, 
e. g. concerning water abstraction) and who should provide or maintain 
the resource (provision rules, e. g. concerning financing of infra-
structure); 
b) decision-making rules, which determine how the operational rules are 
to be decided upon (e. g. consultation and public participation require-
ments); 
c) constitutional rules, which determine who is entitled to take decisions 
(e. g. concerning the tasks and responsibilities of a river basin organi-
sation).2 
                                                          
2 Although Ostrom’s typology of management institutions can be applied to international 
river basins, the same does not necessarily hold true for the other elements of her 
theory. Ostrom’s theory focuses on the management of relatively small common pool 
resources, such as irrigation systems, groundwater bodies and coastal fisheries. In 
international river basins, however, the number of stakeholders is far bigger. 
Complexity is often much bigger as well and relations can be more asymmetrical. 
Moreover, the role that government and courts can play is very different. There is no 
higher authority that can enforce agreements (except in the EU and when countries have 
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The institutions that are established depend on many factors, not in the 
least on the main management issues in the basin. In the case of water 
allocation, all eventualities should be considered, such as long drought 
periods. International water law and especially the principles of "reason-
able and equitable utilisation" and of not causing "significant harm" to the 
other basin states may offer some guidance on the share of each basin state 
(UN 1997, Art. 5–7; Vinogradov et al. 2003). Apart from that, it is a 
matter of negotiation. 
Integrated versus functional approach 
A more general issue is the choice between an "integrated" or a "functional 
approach" to transboundary water management. An integrated approach 
aims at the integrated management of the whole basin and is transsectoral 
in character. It often involves the conclusion of a broad framework 
agreement that contains general principles and establishes a river basin 
organisation but requires further implementation agreements. In a 
functional approach, issues are addressed one-by-one as they emerge. 
Agreements often have a mono-sectoral character (for instance only hy-
dropower or only water allocation) and often apply only to part of the 
basin, but they are very specific. 
Several arguments have been raised in favour of a functional approach. A 
functional approach would be more politically feasible, specific agree-
ments would be better implemented than broad framework agreements, 
and scientific-technical complexity and the number of stakeholders in-
volved would be reduced, thus making it easier to reach agreement (Marty 
2001; see also Alam 1998). On the other hand, several RBOs established 
by broad framework agreements have proven to promote further coopera-
tion (e. g. the Meuse, Scheldt and Rhine Commissions and US-Mexican 
International Boundary and Waters Commission). Moreover, narrow 
"functional" agreements can create significant negative side effects. For 
instance, treaties promoting irrigation only may harm flood recession agri-
culture, fisheries and nature (see also the Rio Grande rectification project, 
discussed by Marty 2001). 
                                                                                                                         
accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or established comparable 
procedures). 
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It is impossible and perhaps even dangerous to choose in general between 
an integrated and a functional approach. Both approaches have potential 
advantages as well as disadvantages. In each individual case, the applica-
bility and importance of the different advantages and disadvantages need 
to be assessed and only then a well-informed choice can be made. 
Legally binding agreements or not? 
Another issue concerning agreements is whether they should be legally 
binding or not. Non-legally binding agreements can by definition not be 
enforced using legal means and may not be taken very seriously by the 
contracting parties. But on the other hand, legal enforcement is often 
problematic. Moreover, non-legally binding agreements may still be po-
litically binding and may still be implemented. 
A case in point is the Rhine Action Plan of 1987, developed in response to 
the 1986 Sandoz disaster. As this plan was not legally binding, it could be 
developed quickly, when public attention for environmental matters was 
high. Moreover, countries were willing to subscribe to ambitious goals 
because they were not legally binding. Still, the Rhine Action Plan was 
politically binding and most of its goals have been reached (Dieperink 
1999; Victor et al. 1998; Bernauer / Moser 1996; Dieperink 1997). How-
ever, these experiences cannot be generalised, and in other basins the ad-
vantages of legally binding agreements may be more important. 
2.4 Stakeholders 
Traditionally, transboundary water management is seen as an issue be-
tween sovereign states. "States" are, however, abstractions. They are legal 
concepts and important symbols and provide a source of identity for many 
people, but in practice the main parties in transboundary water manage-
ment are specific groups and individuals. These include groups and indi-
viduals that possess formal authority and other important resources for 
developing or implementing international agreements, such as money, 
political influence, information and expertise. They also include groups 
and individuals that may be affected by water management but are unable 
to exert any significant influence (Trottier 2003). Together, these two 
groups are the "stakeholders" in transboundary water management. 
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National, sub-, inter- and supranational government 
International agreements are usually negotiated by national government 
bodies, but regional and local governments can play a key role in the 
background. Water-related problems are often experienced first at the 
local, grass-root level and may also be caused at this level. Especially in 
federal states it may be impossible to reach, ratify and implement interna-
tional agreements without involving subnational governments in their 
preparation. In some countries, such as Belgium, subnational governments 
are entitled to conclude international agreements (Meijerink 1999). 
Inter- and supranational organisations can play an important role as well. 
Prime examples are the many intergovernmental river and lake basin or-
ganisations. In addition there are boundary commissions, commissions for 
regional seas, and regional organisations, such as the EU and SADC. With 
few exceptions, these organisations lack decision-making powers, but they 
can create a platform for communication and negotiation. 
Sectoral government 
It is usually not correct to treat government at any level as a unified, sin-
gle-minded entity. At the national level governments usually consist of 
different sectoral ministers, bureaucracies and specialists in parliament. 
They may adopt very different positions on international freshwater issues. 
For instance, the Ministry for Water management may favour the con-
struction of a hydropower dam on a boundary river, but the Ministry of 
Environment may be against (Vàrkonyi 1990). 
Water users 
Furthermore, water users can play an important role. Especially in democ-
racies, public opinion may influence the national position on international 
issues. Moreover, governments are usually not powerful enough to imple-
ment nationally any policy they want. They have to rely on a basic level of 
cooperation by the water users. Sometimes water users in one country can 
sue water users or governments in other countries, without involving their 
own government (Dieperink 1997; Bernauer / Moser 1996; Dieperink 
1999). To increase their influence, interest groups may organise them-
selves at the international level. 
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International donors, international NGOs and developing countries 
In so-called developing countries international donors and international 
NGOs often play an important role. A useful classification of stakeholders 
for many developing countries is the following (on the Senegal River: 
Adams 2000): 
— the local population, 
— national government bodies, such as irrigation services, 
— international donors, 
— international NGOs. 
The prime concern of the local population is usually to safeguard their 
livelihood. National government bodies may focus on the interests of the 
country as a whole, the interests of the capital, the interests of the ruling 
elite or the specific sectoral interests that they represent, such as commer-
cial farming or hydropower production. International RBOs are usually 
intergovernmental and often sectoral. Consequently, they focus on the 
same broad types of interests. When the interests of the local population 
and national government bodies differ, international donors may favour 
either. International NGOs usually support the local population or the local 
environment, which is not always the same. 
The need for "multi-scalar analysis" 
Concepts such as "local population", "water user" or "local government" 
can be as abstract as the concept "state." They may hide important 
distinctions, such as gender, ethnicity and profession (Trottier 2003). 
Which distinctions are important cannot be decided in advance. "Multi-
scalar analysis" is needed that looks beyond the "states" and includes the 
regional and local levels in the analysis. Non-water issues may need to be 
considered as well, since water is just one aspect of the relations between 
groups and individuals involved. (This also applies to the relationships 
between the nation states.) 
There is a moral side to multi-scalar analysis as well (e. g. Nicol 2003). 
Focusing exclusively on the interests and goals of the "states" means in 
practice focusing on the interests and goals of national governments. This 
may result in too little attention for the interests and needs of underprivi-
leged stakeholders. For example, according to the policy of the govern-
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ment of Senegal, the international cooperation on the Senegal River is a 
success. Large dams have been built and irrigated agricultural land has 
increased. However, reportedly (Adams 2000) this proved to be at the 
expense of flood-recession farming, fisheries, the environment and the 
health of the local population. The dams on the Salween River in Myan-
mar provide another example. These could be seen as an example of ef-
fective international cooperation if one ignores the fact that Myanmar is 
using forced labour to construct them (Moe 2000; US Department of La-
bor 2000). 
Figure 2:  Relations in transboundary water management 
(simplified) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public participation 
Apart from multi-scalar analysis, public participation may be called for. 
Public participation is generally believed to improve transparency and 
democracy, increase the quality of decisions and promote public accep-
tance. More information becomes available for decision-making, expertise 
and creativity among the water users can be used, and the chances of ef-
fective implementation are maximised. The chances of agreements that 
serve only some interests are minimised (Mostert 2003c; Budge 1996; 
Drafting Group 2002; Mostert 2003a; Webler / Renn 1995). 
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It can be difficult to organise public participation in large international and 
often multilingual river basins. There are practical issues to be addressed, 
and in addition there is often ideological or political resistance against 
public participation. Moreover, too much transparency may limit the pos-
sibilities for negotiators to freely explore possible solutions. In some cases 
the participating members of the public can be asked to respect the confi-
dentiality of the negotiations or parts thereof. The international NGOs 
participating in the International Rhine Commission have done this (see 
also the section 2.6). 
2.5 The role of information 
Transboundary water management is the result of interactions between 
different stakeholders. At the same time it is a function of the perceptions 
of the stakeholders concerning the issues at stake (Craps 2003). Trans-
boundary water management is often very political, but there is always a 
role for information exchange and joint research ("joint information 
search"; Gray 1989). 
Information exchange and joint research serves several purposes: 
— It helps to identify joint development potentials and can result in a 
common factual basis for reaching agreement. 
— Early notification of unilateral initiatives can prevent the develop-
ment of conflicts. 
— Information exchange and joint research is also a good first step in 
developing cooperation: it can help to develop trust (Dieperink 1997; 
Savenije / van der Zaag 1998b; Nicol 2003). 
— Good information increases the likelihood of agreements that are 
technically and economically feasible, deliver the promised benefits 
and produce no significant negative side-effects. 
Joint research involving several stakeholders is likely to result in fewer 
technical controversies than research by one of the stakeholders only. 
Research is never completely value-free. It involves selection (which ef-
fects to predict? which alternatives to develop and assess? what to report 
and how?), interpretation and uncertainty. If research is not transparent or 
does not reflect the concerns of all major stakeholders, it is unlikely to 
serve as a basis for agreement and is very likely to become contested. 
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The information to be exchanged and the research to be conducted concern 
the state of the water resource as well as factors that could affect the re-
source (Grossmann 2005). Moreover, information about the concerns of 
the different stakeholders should be exchanged. If all stakeholders recog-
nise each other's concerns, this will help in developing an agreement that 
is acceptable to all concerned. 
2.6 Experiences 
The previous sections of this chapter are partly based on literature on col-
laboration and negotiations (especially Gray 1989) and partly on case 
studies from Africa and other parts of the world (Mostert 2003b; Burchi / 
Spreij 2003; Wirkus / Böge 2005). Altogether, the experiences in more 
than 40 basins were taken into account. The most common transboundary 
issues in these basins were water scarcity and water allocation, followed 
by water pollution, shipping, hydropower development, flooding, fisheries 
and boundary issues. Nature protection and development was mentioned a 
few times as a topic for cooperation, but was an important issue in at least 
nine other cases. 
Reaching agreement 
In the 40 plus cases agreements were reached under different circum-
stances. In some cases an urgent problem had to be solved, such as water 
allocation in the Indus basin after the partition of India and Pakistan. In 
other cases the basin states wanted to develop the potential of their basin 
(Senegal and the Orange River). In some cases changing political circum-
stances offered new opportunities, such as the end of the Apartheid Re-
gime in South Africa and in Central Europe the end of the Cold War. 
Reaching agreement usually took between one and 100 years (the Alpine 
Rhine case: Marty 2001). The shortest periods usually relate to framework 
agreements that require further elaboration (Amazon) or to the modifica-
tion of an existing ineffective regime (Senegal River). Such cases apart, 
the evidence suggests that the development of effective international co-
operation takes at least ten years. 
In several cases international relations were strained and parties are not 
willing to negotiate (for instance the Ganges–Brahmaputra, although bilat-
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eral agreements exist). In some cases agreement was reached despite 
strained relations. Examples include the Indus River, the Senegal River 
and Lake Peipsi. In other cases international water issues were solved after 
relations had improved or as part of an effort to improve relations (the Rio 
Grande). 
Reaching agreement may be difficult even when the issue is joined devel-
opment of the resource with benefits for all countries involved. Reasons 
for this include complexities of project planning (Klaphake 2005), ine-
qualities in expertise, internal conflicts of interests, strained international 
relations, lack of trust that the other parties will honour their side of an 
agreement and limited capacity to enforce compliance. 
In many cases there was a conflict of interests between the upstream and 
the downstream states. In a few cases this conflict could be overcome 
through issue linkage (the Meuse and Scheldt, to some extent the Euphra-
tes and the Colorado River). In at least one case side payments were of-
fered to the polluting country (the Rhine). In some cases external donor 
funding may have played a role (the Niger River). In at least one case 
military strength may have contributed to the conclusion of an agreement 
(the Mahakali River between Nepal and India), but implementation of this 
agreement proved to be very difficult. No examples of the "slag cutting" or 
"unforeseen consequences" (Box 1) were found. 
The most common and powerful factor influencing the conclusion of 
agreements was the wish to develop or maintain good international rela-
tions. When relations are good, countries are willing to compromise on 
some points that are more important for the other countries than for them-
selves, trusting that this will be reciprocated. Investing in good relations 
usually has long-term benefits for all countries concerned that outweigh 
the short-term benefits of less cooperative behaviour. Factual controver-
sies are less likely, more learning can take place, negotiations may be 
shorter, there is less need for strict compliance procedures, and manage-
ment can be more flexible. 
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Organisational frameworks 
The agreements that were reached obviously depended on the issues that 
were addressed. However, they all involved the establishment of a RBO or 
were negotiated in the framework of such an organisation.3 
The simplest organisational framework found is the Permanent Indus 
Commission. It consists of two commissioners only, one for Pakistan and 
one for India. The most complex framework is that of the OMVS (Senegal 
River), with a Conference of the Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, 
the Office of the High Commissioner (with several departments), three 
advisory bodies, National Offices and two separate companies for manag-
ing the dams in the river (SOGED and SOGEM). A relatively common 
framework in Europe consists of a general assembly with high-level civil 
servants, working groups on specific topics with governmental and non-
governmental experts, irregular ministerial conferences, and an independ-
ent but relatively small secretariat. Examples include the Rhine, Danube, 
Meuse and Scheldt commissions. 
The tasks and powers of the different organisations differ significantly, but 
three main types exist: 
— Some RBOs deal with the integrated development of a river basin. 
These are to be found mostly in the so-called developing world. They 
often coordinate donor financing and are typically large. A prime ex-
ample is the Mekong Commission. 
— Other organisations deal with the integrated protection of river basins 
or other freshwater resources. They are to be found mostly in the de-
veloped world ("developed" referring both to the economy and to the 
water resources). Examples include the European commissions re-
ferred to above. They coordinate research and monitoring (but do not 
do this themselves) and organise intergovernmental discussions on 
the river concerned. 
— The third type of organisation has very specific tasks, such as ship-
ping, water allocation or the management of a particular hydropower 
dam. One example is the Zambezi River Authority (Zambia – Zim-
                                                          
3 In this report the term "river basin organisation" refers to all types of river basin entities. 
Others authors reserve the term for river basin entities with more-or-less independent 
competencies and an own apparatus. 
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babwe), whose main task is the joint management of the Kariba Dam. 
These organisations may be quite small. Unlike the other two types, 
they may have significant regulatory powers and are then true "river 
basin authorities". 
Financing 
The costs of the RBO are usually borne by the member states on an equal 
basis or on the basis of surface area in the basin or another political 
agreement (Burchi / Spreij 2003). Tasks coordinated but not executed by 
the commission are usually financed by the country concerned. The costs 
of joint infrastructure projects are usually borne by the member states in 
proportion to the benefits they derive from these projects. In some basins a 
jointly operated fund exists to finance works (for instance the Rio de la 
Plata).  
Both the member states and the commission itself can and sometimes do 
get financial support from international donors. In some river basins this is 
even the most important source of finances. It has been argued that donor 
financing is not the most sustainable financial solution for the long or even 
the medium term. Much more certain would be high political commitment, 
trust among parties, and stakeholder and civil society support (Develop-
ment Policy Forum 1998). 
River basin organisations could also raise their own funds through the sale 
of electricity, water or consultancy services and through other economic 
activities. This is in fact quite rare. It could lead to a conflict of interests if 
the RBO is also the regulator of these activities. Enforcement may then 
become problematic (the "poacher and gamekeeper problem") and the 
regulations themselves may become biased. Similar but smaller problems 
can occur if a RBO combines commercial functions with policy making 
and planning. 
No conflict of interests needs to occur if RBOs only manage infrastructure 
or implement policies and regulations. An example is the Zambezi River 
Authority (although its official functions include policy as well). The ZRA 
charges for the water that it delivers to the two electricity companies of 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, it is important that a good policy and 
good regulations are in place to ensure that the operations of such organi-
sations do not cause negative side-effects for the environment or for ri-
parians. 
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Public participation 
The tasks of many RBOs include information exchange, and many have 
public relations and communication departments. Many also publish re-
ports and maintain websites. In most cases, however, citizens and NGOs 
do not have a right of access to information. Information exchange is often 
limited to exchange between the states party to the agreement. Participa-
tion in decision-making is even more limited. Many RBOs may invite 
observers to their meetings, but these are usually international organisa-
tions, international donors, and other government bodies. 
The exceptions to the rule are the North American bodies and the Rhine 
and Danube commissions. They have very informative websites, publish 
many reports, mostly free of charge, and often organise consultations (As-
setto / Mumme 2000; Milich / Varady 1999; Mostert 2000a; Chenoweth / 
Bird 2000). International NGOs often participate actively in the discus-
sions in the plenary commission and the various subsidiary organs. Na-
tional NGOs are frequently involved in the national preparations for the 
meetings of the commission and in the national implementation of its 
decisions. 
In Africa public participation has been organised in the framework of the 
Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project, organised at national 
and regional levels and financed largely by Sida. Moreover, water users 
associations have been established in different places, among others in the 
Lake Chad Basin (Kano River Irrigation Project and the Hadejia River 
Barrage Project) and the Senegal basin (Meinzen-Dick 1997; Wirkus / 
Böge 2005) 
Effectiveness 
Information about the effectiveness of international agreements is limited 
and, as far as can be seen, the experiences are mixed. Most of the organ-
isational structures that have been agreed upon have been established, 
sometimes with some delay. Many substantive provisions have been im-
plemented: river bends have been cut off, dams have been built, water 
allocation rules are being observed, etc. There are, however, exceptions 
(e. g. Adams 2000; Hey 2000). Some agreements are violated and others 
are simply not implemented. This is especially true for broad framework 
agreements. 
How can international donors promote transboundary water management? 
German Development Institute 261 
The ultimate test of transboundary water management is whether it deliv-
ers the benefits foreseen and whether any significant negative side effects 
occur. Evidence is scarce and had already been discussed (Rhine, Senegal 
River). A key question is: benefits for whom? 
3 The roles of development cooperation 
As argued in the previous chapter, transboundary water management is 
driven by the perceptions and motivations of the major stakeholders. In 
addition, however, international donors can play a positive role (Savenije / 
van der Zaag 1998a). This chapter tries to promote reflection on their role. 
It discusses in which basins and in which phases of transboundary water 
management donor involvement could be useful and which strategies can 
be used. Moreover, it discusses the instruments that can be used in the 
different strategies. Special attention is paid to the issue of donor coordi-
nation. But first, the available information sources are discussed. 
3.1 Information sources 
Basic information 
Information on donor involvement is scarce. The most complete database 
on official development assistance and official aid is CRS / Aid of the 
OECD (www.oecd.org). CRS / Aid incorporates data from OECD’s DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) members and gives financial data 
up to the level of individual projects. It contains no information on the 
activities undertaken or on the national or transboundary character of the 
projects. 
Much more detailed is the overview of the projects within Global Envi-
ronment Facility’s (GEF) International Waters Focal Area (www.iwlearn. 
net/projects). To date, 691.59 million US$ have been spent in the Focal 
Area (GEF 2004). The overview contains links to websites, gives e-mail 
addresses of contact persons, and can be searched in different ways. 
The European Union has funded the preparation of an EU Donor Atlas 
with details per (EU) donor, sector and recipient (Development Strategies 
2004). The Donor Atlas is based largely on CRS/Aid. It shows that in the 
water and sanitation sector Germany is the biggest EU donor, followed by 
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the European Community, France and The Netherlands (301, 150, 141 and 
120 million € / year respectively). But like CRS, it gives little information 
about the types of activities that are supported. 
In addition, many donors and implementing organisations have their own 
homepage, such as GTZ (www2.gtz.de/transwater/english/program.html), 
the European Union’s Water Initiative (www.euwi.net), Sida (www. 
sida.se), USAID (www.usaid.gov) and Dutch Development Cooperation 
(www.minbuza.nl). With some effort, it is possible to find out in which 
basins these donors are active, but generally there is little or no informa-
tion about individual projects. 
Information specifically on the Limpopo, Orange River, Zambezi, Lake 
Victoria and Lake Chad can be found in Wirkus / Böge (2005). 
Overseeing the different projects, it is clear that involvement in trans-
boundary water management does not necessarily imply involvement at 
the international level. Many donor-sponsored activities take place at the 
national or even local level. This may reflect the role of national factors in 
transboundary water management (section 2.4), as well as the difficulties 
of addressing the international level directly. Sometimes no international 
organisations exist that could act as a counterpart or "beneficiary" (e. g. in 
the Nile basin: Jaspers, personal communication). Moreover, donor in-
volvement at the international level may not be welcomed by all basin 
states. 
Evaluations 
Evaluations of donor involvement are very scarce. Often, individual proj-
ects are evaluated, but these evaluations are usually not publicly available. 
Systematic evaluations of programmes are even scarcer. Often evaluation 
is limited to the implementation aspects and the delivery of project out-
puts. The actual contribution to the development of transboundary water 
management is usually not assessed (Abrams et al. 2000). 
The most informative evaluation is GEF’s November 2004 evaluation of 
its International Waters Focal Area (GEF 2004). According to this study, 
the Focal Area has resulted in new legal regimes for a number of interna-
tional resources. Most of the work, however, is not so spectacular and 
consists of "assisting countries to jointly undertake a series of processes 
with progressive commitments to action and instilling a philosophy of 
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adaptive management. Further, it seeks to simplify complex situations into 
manageable components for action" (GEF 2004, 2). The study furthermore 
draws conclusions specifically on the Focal Area, which, however, may 
also be relevant for other programmes, such as the need for clear pro-
gramme documentation and for sufficient funding for site visits by super-
visory staff. 
Moreover, important information can be gained from the report of a spe-
cial session "Facilitating transboundary water management" at the 3rd 
World Water Forum in March 2003 (GTZ 2003, Box 2). This information 
is quite normative and consists of a mix of concepts, issues to be addressed 
and principles to be applied. The "how-question" is not really addressed. 
For instance, one of the conclusions of the special session was "acceptance 
of international protocol and other policy frameworks by all riparian 
countries." But how can international donors promote this? 
This paper specifically addresses the how-question and discusses issues 
such as: where and when to intervene? And which strategies and instru-
ments to use? On top of the information sources mentioned above, it uses 
the following information: 
— the theory of transboundary water management presented in the 
previous chapter, 
— insights and experiences gained in preventing violent conflict (DAC 
1997; 2001; Bigdon / Korf 2001; Paffenholz 2001), 
— three interviews were held with experts involved in development 
cooperation (see list of interviewed persons), 
— anecdotal evidence (as indicated below). 
3.2 Where to intervene? 
In section 2.1 the main driving forces of transboundary water management 
were discussed: sustainable development potential, conflict potential and 
the perceptions and motivations of the main stakeholders. These driving 
forces also constitute major reasons for donor involvement. The bigger the 
development or conflict potential, the sooner involvement is justified. This 
potential partly depends on objective factors, such as the presence of good  
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Box 2: Conclusions of the session "Facilitating transboundary 
water management" at the 3rd World Water Forum 
(Kyoto, 20 March 2003: GTZ 2003) 
Vision and ownership 
− Ownership to ensure sustainability 
to the process 
− Ownership is reinforced by posi-
tive results and clear benefits from 
cooperation 
− Consensus model for decision 
making 
− Demand driven actions – riparian 
countries in the driver seat 
− Joined vision as basis for coopera-
tion 
− Co-ownership with cooperating 
partners and stakeholders 
− There are divers levels of visions 
Institutional set up 
− Legal framework: Water Act – 
national water resources manage-
ment plans 
− Harmonisation of policies – make 
legislation compatible between ri-
parian states 
− Accept and build on existing re-
gional and international agree-
ments 
− Political process as an umbrella 
− Technical process as the proof of 
success on the ground 
− Role clarification 
Capacity Building 
− Build equal capacity within the 
countries 
− Support for appropriate capacity 
building, skill and knowledge 
transfer 
− Focus capacity building to areas 
where it is most needed 
Cultural understanding 
− Cooperating partners respect and 
understand the various cultural differ-
ences 
− Understanding for cultural differences 
in respect of requirements by the coop-
erating partners 
Finance 
− Coordination of funds 
− Coordination of financial support by 
donors – bi- and multilateral 
− Direct benefits on the ground from 
financial inputs 
− Basket funding as instrument 
Time 
− Realistic time-frame for cooperation 
− Long term commitment 
Framework 
− Acceptance of international protocol 
and other policy frameworks by all ri-
parian countries 
− Building a legal framework 
− A comprehensive frameworks must 
include all stakeholders 
− Framework providing for sustainability 
in engagements 
Partnerships 
− Partnerships at all levels  
− Active integration of people on the 
ground into the process of river basin 
development 
− Active partnerships with all relevant 
stakeholders 
Flexibility 
− Flexibility in integrating partners on 
different levels 
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continued Box 2: 
− Basin study as a "starter" - informa-
tion of good quality exchanged 
between riparian states 
− Basins study developed in a gradual 
and progressive manner 
− Involvement of commission in the 
basin study 
− Flexibility to allow a bottom up 
approach 
− Flexibility in planning 
− Political will to enter the process 
and get involved 
 
sites for dams or water stress. In the end, however, it depends on the per-
ceptions of these objective factors by the main stakeholders and their mo-
tivations. 
Additional reasons for donor involvement are the need for development, 
even when the potential is limited, and the capacity of the main stake-
holders to forge and implement agreements. If this capacity is large, there 
is little need for donor involvement. Involvement is justified if this capac-
ity is small and the pertinent donor can help to increase this capacity. 
In a recent article, Wolf et al. (2003) have tried to identify basins with a 
high conflict potential. Using different data bases, they identified 1831 
cooperative or conflictive international interactions related to water. They 
then tried to correlate these interactions with a number of other factors, 
such as per capita water availability, per capita GDP, climate and type of 
government (democratic or autocratic). None of these factors were corre-
lated with conflicts. However, they did find some relation between the rate 
of change in river basins and conflicts. Conflicts were more common and 
more serious in basins that had recently been "internationalised" due to the 
brake up of old countries, and in basins where unilateral development took 
place (construction of dams) in the absence of a river basin organization or 
technical working group. Using rate of change as a criterion, they identi-
fied several basins at risk, including in Africa the Senegal, Lake Chad, 
Zambezi, Limpopo, Incomati, Orange, Okavango and Kuene basins. 
3.3 When and how to intervene? 
Donors could intervene in all stages of transboundary water management, 
but different strategies may be called for. Four different strategies can be 
distinguished (Bigdon / Korf 2001): 
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1. Cooperation or "track I diplomacy" 
The cooperation strategy aims to support the conclusion of an international 
treaty or another formal agreement between the basin states. Typical in-
struments are mediation and facilitation. 
2. Collaboration or "track II diplomacy" 
The main concern in the collaboration strategy is not the conclusion of an 
international agreement per se, since many formal agreements are not 
implemented or do not deliver the expected benefits. Instead, the main 
concern is to resolve the underlying issues and achieve action on the 
ground. The collaboration strategy looks beyond the positions taken by the 
basin states to the underlying interests. It aims to support the basin states 
in developing a solution that satisfies the different interests involved and 
stands a good chance of actually being implemented. Instruments include 
the organisation of informal international dialogues, applied research and 
studies, and diverse forms of capacity building at the national level. 
3. Transformation or "track III diplomacy" 
Whereas the collaboration strategy tries to develop a solution within the 
existing social, political and economic structure, the transformation strat-
egy targets this very structure, since it is often here where the root causes 
of international problems lie. For example, water scarcity may be a prob-
lem because the economy of the basin countries depends on very water-
intensive crops. Donor involvement could then consist of promoting the 
introduction of less water-intensive crops. All attention in a transformation 
strategy goes to the national, regional and local level. Instruments include 
diverse forms of capacity building, financial assistance for e. g. technology 
and for developing reform strategies. 
4. Continuing support 
Even after basin states have agreed to cooperate, donor support may be 
necessary. This may include financing the operation of a river basin or-
ganization and support for development projects that have been agreed 
upon. 
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The different strategies are not mutually exclusive and may succeed each 
other. When international relations are polarised and basin states are 
unwilling to enter into discussions, the only option for most donors is to 
support transformation in one or more of the basin states. Some donors –
those with significant political or financial resources – may also try to 
convene the parties and start informal discussions. Donors may also try to 
support informal technical cooperation, but if relations are much polarised, 
even cooperation at the technical level is problematic. 
Once basin states are willing to have informal discussions, track II diplo-
macy becomes an option. Training courses may be held, informal meetings 
can be organised, etc. Influential donors may use their influence to pro-
Table 1: When to intervene and which strategy to use? 
Donor characteristics 
Basin states 
characteristics 
Donors without signifi-
cant political and finan-
cial resources 
Donors with significant 
political and financial 
resources 
Unwillingness of one or 
more basin states to enter 
into discussions 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Cooperation strategy 
(convening for infor-
mal discussions) 
Willingness to enter into 
informal discussions 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
− Cooperation strategy 
(convening for formal 
negotiations) 
Willingness to enter into 
formal negotiations 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
− Cooperation strategy 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
− Cooperation strategy 
(including "power 
mediation") 
After conclusion of an 
agreement 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
− Continuing support 
− Transformation 
strategy 
− Collaboration strategy 
− Continuing support 
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mote the start of formal negotiations (track I diplomacy). Yet, track III 
diplomacy may continue as well. 
Once formal negotiations have started, all donors may intervene directly in 
the negotiations as mediator or facilitator if requested by the basin states. 
Influential donors may use their influence to stimulate the conclusion of an 
agreement. Throughout the formal negotiations track II and track III di-
plomacy may continue. 
After the conclusion of an agreement, donors may provide continuing 
support in the form of financial support for a RBO or loans for develop-
ment projects. Moreover, track II and III diplomacy may continue (see 
Table 1). 
Within each strategy different instruments can be used. Box 3 gives an 
overview. They are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
3.4 Exchange of expertise and capacity building 
In all phases of transboundary water management expertise plays a role. 
Different types of expertise may be provided or exchanged, concerning the 
substantive issues at stake – hydrological, technical, economic, agronomi-
cal expertise, etc. – and concerning governance issues – conflict resolu-
tion, collaboration, legal and institutional design, etc. The expertise may 
be presented in an authoritative way – as a way of informing the stake-
Box 3: Overview of instruments for development cooperation 
Exchange of expertise and capacity 
building 
− (Feasibility) studies and research 
− Data exchange 
− Long-term / short-term experts 
− Education and training 
− Twinning 
Direct intervention 
− Conciliation 
− Consultation 
− Pure mediation 
− Power mediation 
− Arbitration 
− Peacekeeping 
Capital 
− Grants or loans for infrastructure 
projects 
− Debt relief (debt rescheduling, 
debt refinancing, debt reduction 
and / or debt service reduction) 
Financial support for… 
− developing cooperative institutions
− operations of a RBO 
− data sharing and information man-
agement 
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holders what to do –, or in a facilitative way – as a way of enhancing 
learning by the stakeholders (Huxham 1996). 
Instruments to improve expertise and management capacity include: 
— (feasibility) studies and research, 
— data exchange (Grossmann 2005), 
— long-term / short-term experts, 
— education and training, 
— twinning (Box 4). 
To be effective, exchange of expertise and capacity building ought to be 
part of a bigger strategy for water management, to prevent that "the con-
sultants came in, did their job and left, leaving little other than reports 
behind" (Lamoree / Nilsson 2001 on the Zambezi Action Plan, quoted in 
Wirkus / Böge 2005). Another pitfall to prevent is to train individuals 
when the major challenge is organisational development. 
3.5 Direct intervention 
Track I entails and Track II diplomacy may entail direct intervention by 
international donors in transboundary water management. Donors may 
provide a communicative link between antagonistic parties, help in clari-
fying issues and developing solutions, facilitate the negotiation of agree-
ments, use leverage or coercion; arbitrate at the request of parties in the 
conflict, or even send "peacekeeping forces" (Box 5). 
Whether direct intervention has any chance of success and which form to 
choose depends on a number of factors: 
— whether there is a development potential, a conflict potential or an 
actual conflict; 
— whether the principal stakeholders have agreed to start (informal) 
talks or not; 
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Box 4: Twinning of river basin organisations 
A form of capacity building that recently got a lot of attention is twinning. Twin-
ning in a strict sense implies entering into and maintaining a structural relation 
between two organisations. These could be two international RBOs, but also two 
national water management agencies or two water ministries. Twinning in a 
broader sense includes networking activities involving more than two parties and 
occasional visits and other exchanges of experiences. 
Twinning of RBOs received a lot of attention in the preparations for the 2nd World 
Water Forum in The Hague in 2000. At the Forum, eight organisations signed a 
Declaration of Intent, including four international organisations (Lake Chad Basin 
Commission, the Zambezi Valley Development Authority, the International Com-
mission for the Protection of the Danube River and the International Commission 
for the Protection of the Rhine). Until now there is only one example of twinning in 
a strict sense involving two international RBOs: the International Commission for 
the Protection of the Rhine and the Rio de la Plata Commission. In addition, the 
OMVS (Senegal River) has a twinning agreement with the Agence de l’Eau Seine 
Normandie. 
The first contact between the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine (ICPR) and the Rio de la Plata Commission was made by the latter commis-
sion in 2001. On 17 March 2003, at the 3rd World Water Forum in Kyoto, a declara-
tion of intent was signed. A draft Twinning agreement and work programme were 
ready in summer 2003, but could not yet be signed. The activities up to then had 
been financed through the Dutch programme "Partners for Water", but this pro-
gramme was to end by 2004. The secretariat of the ICPR needed its resources to 
execute its tasks under the new European Water Framework Directive. Moreover, 
one member state feared that twinning would amount to nothing more than a "tea 
party". 
In July 2003 these issues were solved. Switzerland had become interested in fi-
nancing twinning activities and Germany expressed its willingness to finance 
concrete activities. The twinning agreement itself was signed in June 2004. The 
activities foreseen focus on flood and drought management, monitoring of water 
quality, harmonisation of transboundary water quality standards, institutional 
capacity building and public participation. On these issues documents will be 
exchanged, a number of workshops will be organised and a few secondments will 
be organised. A detailed work programme for the next 5 to 10 years is planned to 
be finalised in February 2005 in Buenos Aires. 
Apart from this, in January 2004 the TWIN-basin project started, an associated pro-
gramme of the Global Water Partnership, sponsored by the European Commission 
(6th Framework Programme) and coordinated by the International Water Office in 
Paris. Rather than a traditional twinning project, it is a network of, eventually, 150 
RBOs, universities and other partners. Hundred and twenty scholarships of 
between 0.5 and 2 months will be disbursed to facilitate the mobility of executives 
between basins. The project will pay specific attention to transboundary basins. 
Partners include at this moment two international RBOs: the Interstate 
Coordination Water Commission (Aral Sea) and the OMVS (Senegal River). 
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— who initiated the intervention: all stakeholders, a few or only one 
stakeholder, or the intervening party?  
— whether the intervening party only has informal influence or also 
financial resources and political influence. 
Arbitration and peace-keeping are only an option under very specific cir-
cumstances, when serious conflicts have already developed. With respect 
to the other forms of direct intervention, the intervener may offer several 
services to the parties: 
— Helping the parties to analyse their positions and assess their interests 
The aim could be to prevent polarisation of positions in the negotia-
tions ("positional bargaining") and promote the exploration of possi-
ble integrative solutions on the basis of the interests that underlie the 
different positions ("integrative bargaining"; Fisher / Ury 1981). 
Box 5:  A taxonomy of third-party intervention  
1. Conciliation, in which a trusted third-party provides an informal communica-
tive link between the antagonists for the purposes of identifying the issues, 
lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually in the form of 
negotiation. 
2. Consultation, in which the third-party works to facilitate creative problem-
solving through communication and analysis, making use of human relations 
skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict aetiology and dynamics. 
3. Pure Mediation, in which the third-party works to facilitate a negotiated 
settlement on substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, 
effective control of information, and the suggestion of alternatives. 
4. Power Mediation, which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond 
it to include the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the 
form of promised rewards or threatened punishments, and may also involve 
the third-party as monitor and guarantor of the agreement. 
5. Arbitration, wherein the third-party renders a binding judgment arrived at 
through consideration of the individual merits of the opposing positions and 
then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just. 
6. Peacekeeping, in which the third-party provides military personnel in order to 
monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between antagonists, and may also 
engage in humanitarian activities designed to restore normalcy in concert with 
civilian personnel, who may also assist in the management of political 
decision-making processes such as elections. 
Source: Fisher 2001, 11 
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— Organising and chairing meetings and arranging other practical 
matters in an expert and impartial way 
The facilitator (conciliator etc.) may offer physical space where the 
parties can meet in private and freely explore possible integrative so-
lutions (Alam 1998). Moreover, in the case of large cultural differ-
ences he or she may act as a "cultural interpreter" and thus prevent 
communication problems (Cohen 1993). 
— Presenting ideas and proposal on behalf of one of the disputants to 
the other disputants 
Indirect communication may be called for when for reasons of na-
tional politics international talks are not possible, when the key play-
ers have bad interpersonal relations and when making concessions di-
rectly to the other parties would be seen as "loosing face" (Alam 
1998; Cohen 1993). 
— Legitimizing procedures and outcomes 
Sometimes a facilitator may be better positioned to explain an agree-
ment to domestic audiences than one of the parties to the agreement, 
especially when the agreement differs from positions taken previ-
ously in public. 
— Suggest, propose or develop solutions 
This only applies to mediation. Responsibility remains with the dis-
putants themselves. 
The best-known example of mediation (or "power mediation"; Fisher 
2001) is the involvement of the World Bank in the Indus conflict between 
Pakistan and India (Alam 1998; Baxter 1967, see Box 6). Smaller donors, 
however, do not have the same leverage. If they are to succeed as facilita-
tor, or even to be asked as facilitator, they have to rely completely on a 
reputation of impartiality and expertise. 
3.6 Capital 
The Indus example shows that "power mediation" is often accompanied by 
the transfer of capital or promises of transfer. Transfer of capital may take 
several forms: 
— grants or loans for infrastructure projects, 
— debt rescheduling, 
— debt refinancing, 
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— debt reduction and / or debt service reduction. 
The three latter forms are also called debt relief. 
Box 6:  World Bank involvement in the Indus conflict between  
India and Pakistan 
In April 1948, after the partition of India and Pakistan, an international dispute 
arose as India, the upstream state, stopped water supply to Pakistani irrigation 
canals. This occurred in a general atmosphere of hostility, revolving around the 
disputed area of Kashmir. Yet, water was important too. India wanted to develop 
more irrigation areas and Pakistan wanted to do the same and in addition 
safeguard its present water uses. 
The World Bank became involved in the conflict in 1949 when India applied for 
loans for irrigation development. Later, Pakistan applied for loans as well. The 
World Bank could not grant these loans because the use of disputed water was at 
stake. In 1951, the World Bank was officially asked by India and Pakistan to 
offer its "good offices." 
The ensuing negotiations resulted in the Indus River Basin Treaty of 1960. Under 
this treaty, the water of the three Eastern Rivers (tributaries) was allocated to 
India and the water of the three Western Rivers to Pakistan. Since Pakistan used 
water from the Eastern Rivers for irrigation, extensive water transfer works were 
necessary on Pakistani territory from the Western to the Eastern Rivers. While 
perhaps not economically optimal, these works did allow Pakistan to develop 
additional irrigation and generate 3,000 MW of hydropower. The works were to 
be financed from two loans to Pakistan, from a financial contribution by India 
and from the Indus Basin Development Fund, to which Germany and other 
international donors made substantial contributions. Moreover, the Permanent 
Indus Commission was established, which was modelled after the International 
Joint Commission (United States – Canada). 
It might be difficult to replicate the experiences in the Indus basin. The World 
Bank had special leverage because of its financing power. Moreover, the World 
Bank was still a relatively young institution and was interested to develop its 
reputation. In later years, the World Bank was prepared to offer its good offices 
in the Jordan Valley and the Ganges Basin, but it was not asked to. At the 
moment the World Bank, together with other donors, is trying to develop 
cooperation in the Nile basin, the main carrot being huge development projects 
when the basin states can agree on a shared vision (Jaspers, personal 
communication; World Bank 2004; Nicol 2003; Alaerts 2000). 
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By making grants, loans and debt relief conditional, the donors can to 
some extent influence the policy and management of the recipients. The 
World Bank, for instance, requires for projects on international waterways 
that all riparian states are notified and have voiced no objection. If there 
are objections, the World Bank staff assesses whether the project will 
cause "appreciable harm" to the interests of the other riparians. In appro-
priate cases, the World Bank may appoint one or more independent ex-
perts to examine the project (World Bank 2001a; 2004, 78; 2001b) 
Grants and loans for infrastructure projects can promote international 
cooperation, but infrastructure projects can also cause international con-
flicts. Prior notification as required by international law (Vinogradov et al. 
2003) and the World Bank may help to prevent conflicts. In addition, envi-
ronmental and social impact assessment can be useful. The World Bank 
has a special policy on this (World Bank 1999a; b), but other donors often 
require these kinds of impact assessments as well, or conduct them them-
selves (e. g. International Dialogue Forum 1998). 
3.7 Financial support 
In addition to capital, international donors may also provide financial 
support for specific activities. These activities can include: 
— developing cooperative institutions, 
— operations of a river basin organization, 
— data sharing and information management (Grossmann 2005), 
— Water Cooperation Facility (Box 7). 
The costs of developing cooperative institutions and the operational costs 
of a RBO are significant. Many international as well as national meetings 
are necessary, involving high travel and subsistence costs. Moreover, staff, 
office space and office equipment may be needed for the secretariat. Re-
ports may have to be published, translation may have to be funded, an 
Internet site may have to be set up and maintained, and so on. (The fi-
nancing of RBOs in general has been discussed in section 2.6.) 
International donors have financed parts of the development and opera-
tional costs of many RBOs. This includes (Wirkus / Böge 2005): 
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— the development of the Limpopo Watercourse Commission (GTZ), 
— Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (World Bank / GEF through the 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project and FAO), 
— Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (International Development 
Association and GEF, later Norway and Sweden), 
— the development of the Protocol for the Sustainable Development of 
Lake Victoria (Sida). 
Box 7:  The Water Cooperation Facility 
A relatively recent development in the field of transboundary water management 
is the development of a Water Cooperation Facility. The idea for an international 
facility was first launched at the Second World Water Forum in The Hague in 
2000 by the president of the World Water Council. The role of the Facility would 
be to assist nations with current and potential transboundary water issues, to help 
bridge gaps between the concerned parties, and to develop and promote common 
interest for win-win solutions. 
Early 2003 the idea was taken up again, and at the Third World Water Forum in 
Kyoto in March 2003, the Director General of UNESCO announced the creation 
of the Water Cooperation Facility. Following, ideas were developed on how it 
should be organised and funded, and most importantly, what it should do. A 
survey was held among RBOs, NGOs, national and international government 
bodies and academics on all continents about the desired services of such a 
Facility (Robertson 2004). The top seven of desired services (out of 24 in total) 
was as follows: 
1. Designing, implementing and adapting institutional and legal frameworks 
2. Capacity building 
3. Basin-wide access to knowledge and tools 
4. Convening parties 
5. Performing joint research projects (modelling, data collection) 
6. Creating joint development ventures 
7. Research for the anticipation / prevention / resolution of water conflicts 
Arbitration was the least popular service and mediation / facilitating the fourth 
least popular service. Traditional Track I diplomacy therefore does not seem to 
be in very high demand. This conclusion was confirmed at the Water 
Cooperation Facility Meeting in Delft on 25 and 26 November 2004. 
The initiative has until now brought together a number of renowned experts. 
Presently, further steps are taken to develop the Facility, coordinated by 
UNESCO. The future will tell how it will develop and whether sufficient funds 
can be attracted. 
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Financial support for the development and operation of a RBO can benefit 
the persons involved in the form of employment, international travel and 
per diems that exceed the subsistence costs and complement meagre regu-
lar salaries. This can provide extra stimuli for transboundary cooperation. 
Yet, if they are the only reason for cooperation, the financial support will 
not be very effective. 
3.8 Donor coordination 
Whenever more than one donor is active in a specific basin, donor coordi-
nation becomes an issue. Donor coordination can significantly improve 
donor effectiveness: 
— It results in an overview of ongoing initiatives. 
— It allows donors to tackle bigger problems by pooling resources. 
— It can prevent duplication of efforts and competition between donor 
projects. 
— It can help to identify and fill in gaps. 
— It can reduce the management burden for beneficiaries. 
Despite these functions, donor coordination is often problematic (e. g. the 
Zambezi Action Plan / Zambezi Commission Lake Victoria Environmental 
Management Project; Wirkus / Böge 2005). Possible causes include the 
following: 
— Everybody likes to coordinate and play a leading role, but nobody 
likes to be coordinated. 
— Considerations other than donor effectiveness may prevail, such as 
international reputation or promoting export. 
— Policies and priorities of the different donors may differ. 
— Internal accounting procedures of donors may result in inflexibility. 
— Donors may not be able to make long-term commitments. 
— Information exchange procedures and platforms to discuss coordina-
tion issues may be lacking. 
— Donors have limited human resources and may have other priorities 
than coordination. 
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These causes may not be relevant in all basins and for all donors. Some-
times, donors do coordinate their activities. A recent development in this 
respect is to give a larger role to the beneficiaries and base donor involve-
ment on the needs expressed by them (e. g. European Commission 2005; 
European Council / European Commission 2000). One example is the EU 
Water Initiative. As part of this initiative, an African – EU strategic part-
nership on water affairs and sanitation has been established, involving on 
the African side the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW). The 
strategy for the 2004–2005 work programme was agreed upon by 
AMCOW and EU-representatives on 13 December 2003 in Addis Abeba. 
Involving the beneficiaries in project development can not only help to 
coordinate donor activities, but it can also improve ownership by the bene-
ficiaries. Yet, it is no panacea. Beneficiaries do not necessarily cooperate 
better among themselves than donors do (see for example GEF 2004, foot-
note 28). If more than one beneficiary is involved, one option is to con-
clude an agreement between the different donors and the different benefi-
ciaries. An example is the Partnership Agreement concerning Lake Victo-
ria, concluded between the East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda) and the donors Sweden, France, Norway and the World Bank 
(Wirkus / Böge 2005) 
An essential first step towards better donor coordination is to improve 
information supply on the individual donor initiatives. Internet nowadays 
offers ample possibilities for this, but these are not yet fully used (see 
section 3.1). 
4 Recommendations for development cooperation 
This chapter contains the conclusions of the paper in the form of recom-
mendations for development cooperation. Recommendations are always 
given from a specific perspective. The perspective used in this paper can 
be summarised in two points: 
— Normatively: The main purpose of donor involvement in transbound-
ary water management is to promote the development of effective, 
just and sustainable management institutions for transboundary basins 
and aquifers. 
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— Descriptively: The development of effective institutions is driven 
primarily by the perceptions and motivations of the major stake-
holders in the basin (see chapter 2). 
The recommendations given in this chapter do not tell international donors 
what to do. Instead, the recommendations suggest issues that need to be 
addressed and propose specific actions that can be taken. They are meant 
to promote reflection by the donors, who should decide for themselves, 
since they are responsible and also possess information that outsiders lack. 
1. Nosce te ipsum 
Nosce te ipsum, "know thyself", is the first step towards effective donor 
involvement. Donors may have motivations other than the promotion of 
effective transboundary water management. These should be recognised 
explicitly. Only then is it possible to see whether and how they can be 
accommodated without jeopardising the promotion of effective trans-
boundary water management, or whether they should be given a lower 
priority. 
Donors should also recognise their own possibilities and limitations, such 
as their financial resources, political influence, expertise and experiences. 
These factors influence in which basins and in which stages of trans-
boundary water management they can make a contribution, and which 
strategies and instruments they can use (section 3.3). 
"Know thyself" is important for all stages of transboundary water man-
agement, for all donors and for all forms of donor involvement. However, 
it deserves special attention when evaluating past donor involvement (rec-
ommendation 4) and deciding on new programmes (recommendation 5). 
2. Donors should build on developments within the basin and promote 
ownership 
Secondly, donors should always realise that they cannot organise trans-
boundary water management from the outside. They can influence trans-
boundary water management in several ways, but if their activities are to 
be effective, they should build on what is already available in the basin. To 
be effective, projects supported by donors should not be donor-driven, but 
should be owned by the countries themselves. 
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3. All stakeholders should be involved, not just "states" 
"States" are legal constructs with a symbolic value. In practice, specific 
groups and individuals are involved in transboundary water management: 
individual politicians, sectoral government bureaucracies, regional and 
local governments, farmers, electricity companies, etc. Some may be in-
volved in international negotiations, others may be needed to get interna-
tional agreements ratified or implemented and still others may be affected 
by transboundary water management but lack the means to exert any in-
fluence. To improve the chances of effective and just agreements, all these 
stakeholders should be involved. 
This being said, it is no easy task to involve all stakeholders in trans-
boundary water management. International basins are huge, the costs of 
organising stakeholder participation are high, not all stakeholders are in a 
position to make optimal use of the opportunities that are offered, and 
social and political circumstances may not favour stakeholder involve-
ment. But before any development project is approved, proper stakeholder 
analysis is needed to prevent that the project is "captured" by one national 
group (GEF 2004, 31). Moreover, in the framework of environmental and 
social impact assessment procedures the main categories of stakeholders 
should be consulted. Furthermore, large national and international NGOs 
could become involved more actively. Finally, stakeholder involvement 
can be facilitated by decentralising decision-making as much as possible 
(see section 2.6 and e. g. Assetto / Mumme 2000; Creighton 2000; Draft-
ing Group 2002; IAP2 2004; Meinzen-Dick 1997; Mostert 2003a). 
International donors can require different forms of public participation and 
involve different stakeholders in their own activities, provided there is 
sufficient willingness among the authorities in the basin. If this willingness 
is completely lacking, public participation cannot simply be imposed and 
donors may want to consider other basins to become involved in. 
4. Evaluate! 
Improving the effectiveness of donor involvement requires that past ex-
periences are collected and evaluated. Evaluation should not be limited to 
the implementation of projects and the production of project outputs. In 
addition, the project outcomes in terms of promoting transboundary water 
management should be assessed. This is methodologically very difficult 
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but too important for not trying. A first step would be to collect and ana-
lyse the individual project evaluations. This can be complemented with 
questionnaires, interviews with the donor staff and beneficiaries and site 
visits. The costs would be significant but can be offset by increasing cost-
effectiveness of donor involvement. 
5. Review! 
Ideally, donors should only be involved in those basins where the devel-
opment needs and conflict potential are biggest and where the pertinent 
donor has the best possibilities to contribute to the development of effec-
tive institutions. In practice, donors are already involved in a number of 
basins and often have made long or medium-term commitments. It is, 
however, important to review regularly whether their activities are still the 
most appropriate. Different basins may benefit more from donor involve-
ment or different strategies and instruments may need to be used. 
6. Publicise on the Internet and coordinate! 
Evaluations and reviews and details about ongoing and planned develop-
ment projects should be published on the Internet. This will facilitate 
learning from other donors and coordination of donor activities. Moreover, 
detailed information on individual projects, ongoing and planned, should 
be published too. This would facilitate better donor coordination. A useful 
format for project information can be found on the IWLearn site 
(www.iwlearn.net/projects). 
This IWLearn site now contains primarily information about GEF-proj-
ects. If agreed with IWLearn and GEF, other projects could be added. 
Alternatively, a new and bigger site could be developed in cooperation 
with IWLearn and GEF. Germany could propose in the framework of the 
EU Water Initiative or the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
OECD that all donors publish their project details on this site. 
An internet site may not be enough for improving donor coordination. It 
should also receive ample attention in the regular evaluations and reviews 
and be discussed amply among donors. However, an Internet site is an 
important first step. Individual donors would have no reason anymore for 
not contacting other donors. 
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Recommendations on development cooperation in 
transboundary water management  
Waltina Scheumann / Susanne Neubert 
1 Present state of transboundary water management in 
Africa 
While cooperation in transboundary river and lake basins is a necessity, it 
is not at all a matter of course. The reason: If it is not possible to satisfy 
the accumulated demand of all riparian countries sharing a river or lake 
system, the result may be water-use conflicts of many different kinds. 
These conflicts are concerned quite generally with water-quantity and 
water-quality issues.1 Unlike domestic conflicts over water quantity and 
quality, which are generally accessible to resolution by a higher-level state 
authority or by informal means, i. e. by the users themselves, one particu-
lar feature of transboundary water-use conflicts is that they can be re-
solved only though negotiations between sovereign states. Developments 
in southern Africa show clearly the ways in which access to transboundary 
water resources depend on political and economic power. The unequal 
economic power of riparian countries and their unequally developed ad-
ministrative capacities furthermore have an important influence on the 
ability of riparians to engage in cooperation. 
Africa is a continent exceptionally well endowed with river basins and 
large inland lakes2 that extend over the territories of several countries. We 
here find both crisis-prone hotspots and a good number of promising ap-
proaches to transboundary water management. Today there are interna-
tional agreements in effect for 20 of Africa's 63 river basins, and in 16 
river basins there are institutionalized forums that have the task of coordi-
nating individual national initiatives. 
                                                          
1  The term "conflict" refers to disputes and differences of interests between riparians that 
may occur when accumulated demand cannot be satisfied. The task of conflict resolu-
tion may be approach by cooperative or by confrontational means; under certain - re-
strictive - conditions, though, the riparians concerned may opt to settle a conflict over 
water use by violent means. 
2  In the present context the term "lake" will be used for all inland lakes. 
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Despite this limited number of formal coordination forums, transboundary 
water management has made considerable progress, especially in southern 
Africa: New organizations have been founded, older organizations re-
structured and leaned own, and some such organizations have enlarged 
their regulatory scopes and fields of responsibility and redefined their 
functions. The reasons for this must be sought in the overall political con-
stellation given at present, with the Republic of South Africa, the domi-
nant regional power, pursuing a cooperative and pro-integration course. 
Furthermore, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
provides an overarching political framework conducive to such efforts 
aimed at transboundary cooperation. Another important success factor 
must be seen in the incrementalist, pragmatic approach that has been pur-
sued in the development of transboundary water organizations; two fea-
tures typical of the approach are confidence-building measures and the 
procedures governing of intergovernmental cooperation that have now 
been established.  
Many promising developments may also be noted for older river-basin 
organizations like the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sé-
négal (OMVS), the Niger Basin Authority (NBA), and the Lake Chad 
Basin Commission (LCBC), and an new field of activity for development 
cooperation (DC) presently appears to be opening up on Lake Victoria. In 
addition, the founding of the African Ministers’ Council on Water 
(AMCOW) has established a continent-wide cooperation context that has 
placed transboundary water cooperation on its agenda, and is receiving DC 
support for the purpose. 
By comparison, cooperation along the region's roughly 38 transboundary 
aquifers is weakly developed, and examples of cooperation may be found 
only in North Africa, on the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System and the 
North West Sahara Aquifer System. Even though many African countries 
have increasingly been tapping groundwater resources for agriculture and to 
supply household needs, very few forms of institutionalized cooperation 
have been established thus far. 
The international donor community has played an important role in the 
foundation of nearly all river- and lake-basin organizations. It has contrib-
uted important financial and technical support for the building and devel-
opment of such organizations, in taking stock of the current situation, in 
exchanging data, in developing options for and programs of action, in 
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supporting international and local NGOs and groups, and it is involved in 
the funding of infrastructure projects. Apart from international donor or-
ganizations, regional actors like the SADC Water Division, the Water 
Division of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
AMCOW, and the African Union (AU), via the New Partnership for Af-
rica’s Development (NEPAD), also play a role here, and they themselves 
have been receiving financial and technical support for the purpose. 
Germany is engaged at several levels of transboundary water management 
in Africa: at the international level though the G8 and the EU Water Ini-
tiative; at the continental level (AMCOW, NEPAD); at the regional level 
(SADC), in river- and lake-basin organizations and, indirectly, at the bilat-
eral level, making use of the instruments of financial cooperation (FC) and 
technical cooperation (TC) in the water sector (water supply and waste-
water disposal, water-sector reforms, harmonization of water policies); in 
the agricultural sector (irrigation and drainage); and in the energy sector 
(hydropower plants). 
In the framework of the BMZ research project, the present study took an 
in-depth look at five river and lake basins and the institutional forms used 
there for transboundary water management. An overview was prepared for 
each of 13 other such basins. However, it became clear during the term of 
the project that too little attention was being accorded to transboundary 
groundwater resources, which are equally important for the African conti-
nent. The findings and recommendations presented here therefore apply 
only for cooperation along surface waters. 
2 Fields of action in transboundary water management 
The five reports presented here have identified a number of general fields 
of action for transboundary water management. German development 
cooperation is already engaged in several of these fields, and it would 
make sense to deepen or to expand this engagement. The actual decision 
on whether or not to follow up on these issue-specific findings will of 
course depend on a number of other factors, including e. g. the means 
available, the comparative advantages that German DC has in certain 
fields, the activities of other donors, and political-strategic considerations 
bearing on existing DC priorities, etc. The present final report does not go 
into these internal DC criteria. The sole aim of the reports, including this 
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final report, is to identify, from an issue-related perspective, what support 
partner countries may need. 
The fields of action are presented in a table below; some aspects are ad-
dressed again in more depth in the recommendations at the end of this 
report. 
First field of action: Improved transboundary coordination of unilaterally 
planned projects designed to expand water supply 
Looking at the river and lake basins that are the subject of the present 
reports (Orange-Senqu, Limpopo, Zambezi, Lake Victoria, and Lake 
Chad) as well as the 13 other reference waterbodies, we find that the ri-
parian countries in river basins with a very high level of water-resource 
development plan to carry out further unilateral projects designed to in-
crease national water supply. Neighboring countries are often not included 
in these plans. However, the projects need to be coordinated across bor-
ders with a view to avoiding negative impacts on both other countries and 
the waterbodies concerned. Most of these projects are concerned with dam 
construction and interbasin transfers (IBTs) conceived to cover the water 
needs of urban centers and irrigated agriculture and to generate electricity 
(hydropower plants). Table 1 provides an overview of the status quo and 
the projects planned. 
Cooperative basin-level management approaches and strategies can serve 
to strike a balance between conflicting uses and in given cases to mitigate 
negative impacts on other riparians. It is often either impossible or too 
expensive (production costs) to satisfy the rising demand for water or 
water-related products (energy) within the borders of a single country. 
Joint transboundary planning is one possible way to minimize the produc-
tion costs for infrastructure projects. Depending on the initial scenario and 
the given state of cooperation, joint planning approaches may be integra-
tive and/or cross-sectoral in nature. In the earlier stages it is prudent to 
limit cooperation to certain aspects of water use that appear particularly 
relevant for the riparians concerned. 
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Second field of action: Greater consideration of water-quality and  
environmental issues 
Even today, national planning as a rule accords too little attention to wa-
ter-quality issues and other environmental problems associated with water 
use, with quantitative aspects continuing to dominate the picture. Another 
noteworthy aspect is that the focus tends to be on the development and 
management of surface waters, while hardly any consideration is given to 
the sizable potential offered by transboundary groundwater resources. 
Governance and management issues often tend to be sidelined for lack of 
Table 1: Present state and intended uses in the river and lake 
basins considered in this report 
River / 
lake 
basin  
State of development In planning stage – for the most part 
unilateral 
Orange-
Senqu 
37 large damsa and a good 
number of IBTs, mainly 
South Africa 
Dam for irrigation on the Lower Orange 
(Namibia, South Africa); 
water supply for capital city (Botswana)
Zambezi 12 large dams  Use by Angola; 
irrigation and water supply (Botswana);
water supply (Zimbabwe); 
irrigation (Malawi); 
IBTs (South Africa) 
Limpopo 44 large dams + IBTs, 
mainly for South Africa  
Plans by upstream riparians (dams, 
IBTs); 
reduced quantity /quality 
(Mozambique) 
Lake 
Victoria 
Intensive utilization 
(fishing-related conflicts, 
environmental problems) 
Pipeline (water for Tanzania + Kenya) 
Lake 
Chad  
Intensive utilization  
(shrinkage of the lake and 
declining groundwater 
levels, species depletion, 
pollution, overfishing) 
Irrigation and energy (Central African 
Republic); 
irrigation (Niger, Chad, Cameroon); 
IBT from Congo to Lake Chad (navi-
gable canal) 
a Dams with a storage capacity of over 12 million m3 are classified as "large." 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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adequate awareness of the problems involved and sufficient information 
on the availability – in both quantitative and qualitative terms – of 
groundwater resources. 
Third field of action: Support for efforts to develop disaster-prevention 
plans 
Even today, there is a lack of comprehensive disaster-prevention plans for 
overall basin areas. Such plans need to be developed if both countries and 
individual river- and lake-basin organizations are to be able to respond 
more rapidly and effectively to unpredictable events and natural disasters 
(e. g. drought and flood events). 
Fourth field of action: Improvement of information exchange and 
management 
The hydrological, agronomic, social, economic, and economic information 
and data on international waterbodies that are essential for both the opera-
tional management of infrastructure and strategic water resource planning 
are often lacking, inaccessible, or not standardized. Yet information man-
agement has a crucial role to play for transboundary water management, 
for knowledge-sharing on resource availability is key to efforts to defuse 
use-related conflicts and to develop equitable and reasonable alternative 
uses. 
Fifth field of action: Capacity-building for monitoring and public 
participation 
The existing river- and lake-basin organizations are often unable to effec-
tively carry out their mandates and tasks. To improve their effectiveness, 
they are in need of appropriate manpower capacities, effective feedback 
mechanisms to and from riparians, and agreements on procedural rules and 
other procedures suited to fostering transparency and public participation. 
There is also a need for capacity-building at the national level to boost the 
effectiveness of national administrations. This is especially important 
when there are in this regard major development disparities between the 
riparians concerned. Reporting on and monitoring of the implementation 
of intergovernmental agreements tend as a rule to be weakly developed. 
Another need often encountered is adequate formats for the reports and 
protocols that the relevant government units in riparian countries require to 
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acquire information on the activities of river- and lake-basin organizations 
and to monitor progress in implementation. 
Sixth field of action: Financial support for river- and lake-basin 
organizations 
The river- and lake-basin organization that already exist in Africa are often 
underfunded and heavily dependent on external financial support. Over the 
long term the riparian countries concerned should themselves fund the 
work of these organizations, and financial support through DC should be 
no more than transitional in nature. DC itself should therefore seek to 
promote the development of sustainable financial and manpower plans and 
insist that the countries involved meet their obligations. 
3 Seven recommendations on the strategic orientation of 
development cooperation 
3.1 An outline of the recommendations 
Table 2 (below) presents, in outline form, the recommendations as well as 
some central propositions on the strategic orientation of DC in the field of 
transboundary water management. The backgrounds as well as more con-
crete information can be found in the explanatory section (3.2) that follows 
the table. 
3.2 Explanatory remarks 
3.2.1 Recommendation one: Create incentives for 
cooperation and support benefit-sharing agreements 
In view of the fact that there is no automatism involved in the develop-
ment of cooperation on transboundary lakes and rivers, economic – among 
other – incentives may play an important role in stimulating such coopera-
tion. This is the idea on which the benefit-sharing concept favored by the 
World Bank is based. Following the line of argument pursued in 
Klaphake's report (2005), benefit-sharing may in general be said to be an 
approach well suited to promoting international water cooperation. The 
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Table 2: Recommendations on the strategic orientation of DC in 
the field of transboundary water management  
Recommendation one:
Create incentives for 
cooperation, e. g. 
through benefit-sharing 
agreements  
When new projects are planned to expand water sup-
ply, specifically, to build dams and water pipelines – 
the classic fields of application for benefit-sharing – 
DC should continue to insist on adherence to the 
guidelines of the World Commission on Dams as well 
as on a comprehensive preliminary examination of the 
anticipated economic, social, and ecological impacts, 
or provide support for such efforts. 
In the preparatory phase of projects with possible 
transboundary impacts, DC should furthermore always 
conduct or provide support for a comprehensive as-
sessment of the economic benefits of water coop-
eration. 
DC should participate in efforts to highlight the po-
tential economic benefits involved in the joint pursuit 
of environmental goals. One factor of great importance 
here – and one that should be supported on a case-by-
case basis – is participation of local groups, interest 
groups, and the public at large in transboundary water 
cooperation. 
 DC should give special consideration to a multilevel 
approach: In some lake or river basins the focus could 
be more on building an institutional framework (e. g. 
in the SADC region); in others, though, it may prove 
necessary to start out by outlining the possible eco-
nomic benefits of cooperation in order boost to the 
propensity of the governments concerned to cooperate 
(as e. g. in the case of cooperation among the Nile 
riparians). 
Recommendation two:
Strengthen information 
exchange and manage-
ment 
One of the first steps should be to use different ana-
lytical instruments to determine what kinds of infor-
mation are needed for given management tasks and 
what level of differentiation this information should 
have. In collecting and recording data attention should 
be paid to possible synergies with other initiatives; this 
would e. g. serve to avoid duplications in data acqui-
sition. 
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Table 2 continued 
 In view of the complexity and volume of the data 
that need to be collected and processed, this should 
involved division of labor, with the individual 
member countries responsible for collection data in 
their own area of responsibility and river-basin 
organizations responsible assembling the data and 
subjecting it to strategic analysis at the river-basin 
level. 
If DC provides contributions for a decision-support 
component, it should bear in mind that the instru-
ment should be geared to the information needs of 
the actors involved and may prove useful at both the 
regional and the national level. 
Introduction of mechanisms that are transparent for 
both the actors involved and the general public 
should be given support in particular when the 
concern is the allocation, protection, and basic 
supply of – the scarce resource – water. In certain 
consultation phases, however, withholding infor-
mation from the public may prove conducive to 
building confidence. DC should bear this fact in 
mind and subject it to a differentiated analysis. 
Recommendation three: 
Support the establishment 
and the work of river- and 
lake-basin organizations  
The establishment of river-lake-basin organizations 
is an important – though not the only – condition 
required for successful transboundary water man-
agement. DC can use a number of different instru-
ments to promote the process involved in setting up 
cooperation forums. In view of the fact that trans-
boundary water cooperation is a highly political 
enterprise, DC will be unable to do much to acceler-
ate the process; what is called for is staying power. 
Regional and continental organizations like the 
SADC Water Division and AMCOW should con-
tinue to receive support, since they are in a position 
to provide important impulses for the creation and 
optimization of river- and lake-basin organizations. 
Further support could also be provided for the ex-
change of South-South information and experience 
by promoting the establishment of centers of com-
petence. 
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Table 2 continued 
 In the bilateral funding of infrastructure projects, 
care should be taken in advance to determine 
whether and what cross-border impacts must be 
anticipated. If there is reason to fear substantial 
negative impacts, a risk analysis should be con-
ducted. DC can also advise the organizations con-
cerned on the use of procedural rules (prior notifica-
tion, no objection). 
Recommendation four: 
Promote the sustainable 
funding of river- and 
lake-basin organizations  
Most organizations and their member countries are 
still far from the goal of being able to fund river- and 
lake-basin-organizations on their own. 
In principle it would be possible to use fees to cover 
administrative and personnel costs, assuming that a 
given organization is both the owner and operator of 
hydropower plants. DC should seek to ensure that 
this principle is applied in relevant cases. As regards 
irrigation projects, implementation of this principle 
would call for full cost coverage at the national level. 
Here we find clear-cut links to water- and agricul-
tural-sector reforms at the national level. 
External funding in support of river- and lake-basin 
organizations may be justified for a given period of 
time, especially for weaker countries, assuming it is 
provided as start-up funding and is earmarked for 
specific tasks. But DC should make use of different 
instruments to ensure that member countries assume 
all costs for organizational work as soon as a certain 
level of institutionalization has been reached. 
Recommendation five: 
Strengthen public partici-
pation in transboundary 
water management  
There are a number of positive examples for par-
ticipation of interest groups, stakeholders, associa-
tions, and NGOs in African river-basin organiza-
tions, and it would be important to learn from these 
examples. It is essential for DC to actively promote 
participation, since participation presupposes supra-
regional coordination of and cooperation between 
groups and associations. DC can play an active role 
in developing participation strategies, including the 
organizational, legal, and financial aspects involved. 
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concept's basic assumption is that the importance of such benefit-sharing 
agreements increases as a function of growing water scarcity, because 
shortage of water resources continuously raises the economic costs of 
noncooperation. However, this general assessment of the concept stands in 
contrast to its low level of dissemination in practice, above all on the Afri-
can continent. 
Table 2 continued 
 Public participation should be promoted pragmati-
cally and with a view to the situations given on the 
ground. Among other things, participation is a ques-
tion of capacities: The river- and lake-basin organi-
zations concerned should envision creating a unit or 
office in charge of organizing the participation 
process on a continuous basis. 
DC should organize a workshop designed to discuss 
and make accessible participation-related experi-
ences and best practices from developing countries 
and countries in transition as well as the experiences 
that have been made with participation along Euro-
pean and North American waterbodies. 
Recommendation six: 
Strengthen donor coordi-
nation  
Individual river and lake basins are receiving support 
from – in some cases – ten and more donors. Ger-
man DC should focus more on creating donor coor-
dination bodies designed to coordinate activities in 
individual basins. In order to create more transpar-
ency, German DC should work for publication of the 
both projects it supports and the relevant project 
data. Consideration of and decisions on provision of 
support to further basins and organizations should 
involve coordination with other donors. 
Recommendation seven:
Extend cooperation to in-
clude groundwater man-
agement  
In many African countries groundwater resources are 
increasingly used for agriculture or water supply, 
usually without any consideration of the possible use 
rights of other riparian countries. Cooperative 
management approaches for groundwater resources 
should therefore be given more consideration, e. g. 
through regional standardization of monitoring 
networks and by the development and use of models.
Source: Compiled from the individual reports as well as from commentaries 
provided by all parties involved in the project. 
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The difficulties involved in reaching agreements on allocating the benefits 
of win-win projects must be sought in part in the contrasting interests of 
the countries concerned. Other obstructive factors include claims to sover-
eignty focused on water rights, uncertainties over project impacts, insuffi-
cient administrative and economic capacities, or conflicting sectoral inter-
ests, e. g. cases in which all riparians concerned are interested in expand-
ing irrigated agriculture. One reason why benefit-sharing agreements often 
fail in practice is that the economic benefits are not transparent (in ad-
vance) for individual countries – and it often proves difficult to render 
them visible. 
Most of the benefit-sharing agreements concluded thus far have been con-
cerned with the development of water infrastructure (project type: "joint 
dam construction"), as a rule for hydropower generation, but also for flood 
protection. Generally speaking hydropower has the greatest plausibility for 
benefit-sharing agreements, the reason being that the benefits of such 
projects are relatively simple to estimate and can usually be assessed on a 
consensual basis. For this reason there is good reason to assume that in the 
future benefit-sharing agreements will continue to be concentrated mainly 
on river development and exploitation of additional water resources. In 
South Africa in particular, transboundary water pipelines1 are an important 
option on the water-supply side. Politically, it is far easier to allocate addi-
tional water resources than it is to reallocate existing water uses under 
conditions of absolute water scarcity. 
In DC practice, the programmatic call for win-win solutions in water co-
operation may therefore imply one-sided support for dam construction and 
transboundary water pipelines. In view of the fact that ecological, social, 
and economic impacts have in the past often been given too little consid-
eration, DC should continue to work for adherence to the guidelines of the 
World Dam Commission; and as far as engagement in dam and pipeline 
projects is concerned, DC should continue to insist on a comprehensive 
preliminary assessment of the economic, social, and ecological impacts 
that may result from such projects. 
                                                          
1  The best-known project of this kind is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, mainly 
because of its transboundary water-transfer function and the financial transfers that ac-
company it.  
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Most of the existing benefit-sharing agreements concluded thus far cover 
projects whose economic benefits for the countries involved are fairly easy 
to calculate (hydropower plants or dams). By comparison, the benefits 
stemming from projects designed to improve water quality, protect biodi-
versity, or to jointly manage groundwater resources are more difficult to 
assess, and accordingly they are very seldom calculated on a transbound-
ary basis. This is the reason why there are very few examples of benefit-
sharing agreements for this kind of project. 
In advance of projects with possible transboundary impacts, DC should 
always insist that a comprehensive assessment of the economic benefits of 
cooperation be conducted, since estimates of this kind constitute an im-
portant precondition for such intergovernmental agreements. At present 
the low "visibility" of the positive effects of cooperation must be seen as 
an important obstacle to the further development of transboundary coop-
eration. While the relevant costs of cooperation for individual countries 
can often be directly estimated, this is frequently not the case when it 
comes to the benefits. Finally, DC should work to ensure that the potential 
economic benefits are highlighted for projects involving the joint pursuit 
of environmental-protection objectives (improvement of water quality, 
conservation of freshwater ecosystems, minimum runoffs). 
Due to the social risks and the potential environmental impacts of trans-
boundary benefit-sharing agreements, its is essential to ensure should that 
such agreements are embedded in a comprehensive development strategy. 
The lines of conflict over water use in Africa are drawn not only between 
states but also, within countries, between different sectors, forms of water 
use, and population groups. Since in the African context benefit-sharing is 
also concerned with allocation of the benefits within countries, participa-
tion of local groups, interest organizations, and the general public in trans-
boundary water cooperation is a matter of considerable significance. 
At present it is not possible to derive any general propositions on whether 
functional and bilateral approaches increase the probability of benefit-
sharing mechanisms or whether multilateral and integrative management 
approaches are more likely to prove conducive to the adoption of such 
mechanisms. In the end, this depends in large measure on the concrete 
problem context and the object of cooperation. In developing water infra-
structure, above all in dam construction, more bilateral and sectoral ap-
proaches have become established and proven to be functional. The com-
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paratively low transaction costs involved are also a good reason to decide 
in favor of a narrow definition of the object of cooperation as well as for 
limitation to those riparians that are immediately affected by a given coop-
eration project. On the other hand, in certain problem constellations mul-
tilateral and comprehensive approaches to transboundary water manage-
ment offer the possibility to negotiate larger packages. 
Against this background, DC might be well advised to opt for a multilevel 
approach: In some river or lake basins the focus may be more on building 
the institutional framework (e. g. in the SADC region), in others, though, it 
will be necessary to start out by outlining the economic benefits of coop-
eration as a means of fostering the propensity of the governments con-
cerned to cooperate (e. g. cooperation among the Nile riparians). Further 
development of regional water agreements may facilitate the establishment 
of benefit-sharing agreements by creating and clarifying the conditions 
needed for negotiations and reducing potentially obstructive asymmetries 
between the riparians concerned. Establishment and further development 
of river- and lake-basin organizations can also increase the likelihood of 
win-win projects by creating a stable and confidence-building institutional 
environment. 
3.2.2 Recommendation two: Strengthen information 
exchange and management 
The statements made in the following are based essentially on the report 
by Grossmann (2005). Organization and provision of information for joint 
use is one of the most important principles of transboundary water man-
agement and at the same time one of the core tasks of river- and lake-basin 
organizations. If water-related problems are to be solved cooperatively, it 
is necessary for all riparians to be familiar with all of the facts they need to 
(a) negotiate an equitable and reasonable share of the water resources 
concerned and (b) prevent any significant damage beyond their borders. 
Suitable information is also needed to identify win-win solutions. As a 
matter of principle, it is important to distinguish here between information 
needed for strategic planning, i. e. as a basis for intergovernmental nego-
tiations, and information needed to manage water infrastructure. 
In promoting transboundary water management, DC should not lose sight 
of the tensions between levels of publicness of different kinds of informa-
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tion. When the issue at hand is the allocation, protection, and basic supply 
of scarce water resources, it is important to adopt transparent mechanisms 
to facilitate the participation of all stakeholders; this means that informa-
tion must be largely public in nature (see Recommendation 5). On the 
other hand, transboundary water management is for the most part a task 
for which the state is politically responsible. If riparians hold back infor-
mation for strategic reasons, a joint database – one available not to the 
public but only to the government authorities of the parties to an agree-
ment – may serve as an important confidence-building measure for trans-
boundary consultations. 
Instead of issuing sweeping calls for more data, it would be important to 
start out by asking what types of information with what level of differen-
tiation are required for specific management tasks. This, however, presup-
poses that the relevant actors are roughly familiar with the problems in-
volved along the waterbody in question; these problems can be determined 
on the basis of what is known as a transboundary diagnostic analysis. 
Should additional basic information be needed on the status of water re-
sources, it will be necessary to look into whether and to what extent there 
is a need to improve the information base as a means of more closely de-
fining the options actually available – and whether the effort is 
worthwhile. In early phases of project initiatives, scoping, i. e. definition 
of the framework involved, can be used as a means to lower the costs of 
information acquisition. 
Depending on the form of intergovernmental organization involved, there 
are different ways to divide up the central tasks of information provision 
between national authorities and international river- and lake-basin organi-
zations. Whether or not the development of joint but independent analyti-
cal and planning capacities at the basin-organization level leads to dupli-
cations will depend on the capacities available in the riparian countries 
concerned. DC should for this reason bear in mind the interactions be-
tween the building of national institutions and the development of relevant 
forms of cooperation. A far as the complexity and the dimensions of this 
task is concerned, experience indicates that one promising approach is a 
division of labor between the member countries responsible for data col-
lection in their sphere of responsibility and an international river-basin 
commission in charge of assembling and strategically analyzing the data at 
the river-basin level. 
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The important instruments of data provision include information systems 
and models that can be used to simulate water yields and the effects of 
different management strategies on water balances. If DC supports a deci-
sion-support component, it should ensure that the instrument is geared to 
actor information needs and will serve a useful purpose at both the re-
gional and the national level. Furthermore, these systems should be an-
chored in appropriate administrative units of both the international river 
organization and the national authorities (ownership). There must also be 
consensus on the assumptions, methods, and technical descriptions to be 
used, and the systems must be accessible to all users and decision-makers. 
In supporting transboundary water management, DC should seek to 
achieve synergies, e. g. by means of close coordination with other national 
and international initiatives. This applies for (a) generation of data and 
basic information and (b) analysis and research. Close integration of run-
ning programs2 into information-acquisition strategies is one direct way to 
facilitate the work of river- and lake-basin organizations. Preparation and 
dissemination of documentation standards and requirements and informa-
tion systems is one way to ensure that the information collected on and by 
individual projects remains accessible for other uses. International re-
search programs – like e. g. the GLOWA program on Global Change, 
which is supported by the BMBF – may also provide contributions to 
optimizing databases and analyzing possible options for action. 
3.2.3 Recommendation three: Support the establishment of 
coordination and cooperation forums 
Following the arguments presented in the report by Mostert (2005), trans-
boundary water management may be understood as a cyclic process that, 
in the ideal case, involves three phases. In a first phase the countries con-
cerned decide whether they are interested into entering into negotiations in 
the first place; the interests involved may differ to such an extent that 
                                                          
2  To cite some examples, the WMO's HYCOS program on optimizing hydrological 
measuring networks, ESA's TIGER program on provision of earth-observation data, 
UNESCO's FRIEND analysis and model-development program, groundwater-related 
data provided by the International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre 
(IGRAC), the UNESCO-IHP/IAH International Shared Aquifer Resources Management 
initiative (ISARM).  
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some countries may not anticipate any improvements from negotiations. In 
the second phase the countries concerned conduct negotiations on the 
establishment of river- or lake-basin organizations as well as on certain 
proposals (projects, programs of action, strategies). As a rule procedural 
rules will also be the subject of negotiations in this phase (conflict-settle-
ment procedures, data-sharing, etc.). It is in the third phase that agree-
ments are implemented (Mostert 2005; see also the report by Grossmann 
(2005). 
River- and / or lake -basin organizations should be supported as platforms 
for negotiations; such organizations can serve to reduce the likelihood that 
conflicts over water use may escalate in that their work is based on bind-
ing procedural rules that govern the ways in which conflicts are dealt with. 
Such organizations play an important role in information provision and 
ensuring the acceptance of relevant information that may be of central 
importance for the development of and decisions on alternative resource 
uses. They can also monitor the implementation of agreements and func-
tion as a central liaison partners for an overall river basin. This all serves 
to bring about a type of support that is both regionally oriented and inte-
grated and facilitates coordination between the donor organizations in-
volved (KfW 2002). 
The establishment of river- and lake-basin organizations is itself the result 
of negotiations in which sovereign states signal their willingness to coop-
erate. The different mandates and task areas involved may be seen as indi-
cating different degrees of cooperation, but also different levels of will-
ingness on the part of riparians to delegate rights to such organizations. In 
any case, river- and lake-basin organizations are an important – though not 
the only – condition required for successful transboundary water manage-
ment. We can identify three organization types that reflect different stages 
of cooperation: 
— negotiating bodies and coordinating committees, 
— technical advisory committees or advisory commissions, 
— river-basin organizations with highly differentiated organizational 
structures. 
The experiences made by the GTZ in the river and lake basins in question 
indicate that it is essential to accord sufficient consideration to the factor 
of time in efforts to develop transboundary organizations. Depending on 
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the political constellations involved, it may take many years transboundary 
cooperation projects to materialize or for decisions to be reached on im-
portant and in some cases conflictual issues. In principle, donor organiza-
tions can and should seek to use their influence to accelerate such pro-
cesses of negotiation and cooperation, but they can and should not seek to 
fundamentally alter these processes in terms of substantive considerations 
or the timeframes involved. What is called for here is long-term donor 
engagement. 
Transboundary water management is above all a political undertaking, and 
not merely a technical matter. It is this that often makes the process of 
working out agreements a protracted and difficult matter. On the other 
hand, though, this state of affairs can be turned to account to come up with 
positive effects that go beyond the narrow field of "water management," 
e. g. in the fields of crisis prevention and regional security, in efforts to 
strengthen rule-of-law and participatory structures, and in promotion of 
economic and political integration.  
Regional and continental organizations like the SADC Water Division and 
AMCOW should continue to receive support, because they may generate 
important impulses toward creating new river- and lake-basin organiza-
tions or optimizing the work of existing organizations. And the establish-
ment of centers of competence can serve to further promote the ongoing 
South-South exchange of information and experience. 
In quite general terms, DC can make use of various instruments to pro-
mote the willingness of riparians to engage in negotiations and continuous 
cooperation in river- and lake-basin organizations, taking care to ensure 
that these instruments are geared specifically to individual fields of action 
(Table 3). 
However, Mostert (this volume) points out that no systematic evaluations 
have yet been performed on the impacts of these instruments: As a rule, 
individual projects are evaluated; hardly any systematic studies have been 
published. There is an urgent need to redress this situation. 
Of all of these instruments, it is the financing of infrastructure projects that 
poses the greatest challenge. It is true that it is possible to reach agreement 
on some projects directly with river- and lake-basin organizations; the 
KfW e. g. is carrying out projects in the energy sector together with the 
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Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) (con- 
tracting party and institution in charge of the project). But this is more the 
exception than the rule. Normally credit for infrastructure investments 
(dam construction, irrigation and drainage, urban water supply and waste-
water disposal) are granted on a bilateral basis. Projects designed e. g. to 
expand irrigated agriculture in a country on the upper course of a river 
may hold considerable conflict potential. This may, though, also apply for 
projects that are designed to promote certain industries and may have 
impacts on downstream water quality. It is for this reason important to 
examine FC and TC projects to determine whether and – if the answer is 
yes – what transboundary impacts must be anticipated. If there is any rea-
son to fear substantial negative impacts, it would be imperative to perform 
a risk analysis (KfW 2002). 
In supporting water-related measures that are likely to have impacts on 
other riparians, DC should continue to insist that countries planning such 
measures abide by the principle of prior notification, and no engagement 
should be embarked upon unless the countries that could face negative 
impacts raise no objections. If objections are raised, the relevant imple-
menting agency should start out by looking into whether a planned project 
may entail negative impacts; this should be done by independent experts. 
In such cases DC can provide legal advice to the organizations concerned 
and condition provision of DC funding on compliance with the rules 
named above. The principle of prior notification and the no-objection rule 
Table 3: Instruments used to promote cooperation 
Exchange of expertise and 
capacity-building 
• (Feasibility) studies and 
research 
• Data exchange 
• Long-term / short-term experts 
• Education and training 
• Twinning 
• Organizational development 
• Technical and advisory 
services 
Capital 
• Grants or loans for infrastructure projects 
• Debt relief (debt rescheduling, debt 
refinancing debt reduction and / or debt-
service reduction) 
Financial support for 
• development of institutions of cooperation 
• operations of basin organizations 
• data-sharing and information management 
Source: Mostert 2005, 22 (modified by the authors) 
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should also be applied for projects eligible for German Hermes export-
credit guarantees. 
3.2.4 Recommendation four: Promote the sustainable 
funding of river- and lake-basin organizations 
An early study (Berthelot 1989) of five African river- and lake-basin 
organizations pointed to the problem that despite their legal obligations to 
do so, member countries as a rule do not provide the funds needed to cover 
the operational costs of these organizations. This has meant that even 
without sufficient means, large, personnel-intensive organizations have 
been created, and this in turn has entailed high administrative and 
organizational costs. Funds earmarked for other projects have in some 
cases been misappropriated. The 1998 Berlin Recommendations also 
addressed the need for sustainable funding of river- and lake-basin 
organizations: 
“In terms of their volume, commission projects and their structure and 
manpower levels should be in line with the funds available. External 
support should not be seen as a medium- or long-term means to meet 
the financial needs of commissions”. (BMZ 1999, 163) 
Most of the organizations investigated are still far from reaching this goal. 
Even though the contract stipulations generally contain provisions on 
budget appropriations (see Box 1), the member countries generally tend to 
be remiss in their payments. 
In principle, administrative and personnel costs could be funded through 
fees in cases in which the organizations concerned (e. g. the OMVS or the 
Zambezi River Authority/ ZRA) own and operate hydropower plants. The 
ZRA, for instance, has, since 1999, levied fees on the two national elec-
tricity companies for the water made available to them to generate power, 
and the authority is therefore largely independent of payments from na-
tional water authorities. DC should use its influence to ensure that this 
principle is applied on other, comparable cases. But experience also shows 
that this is far more difficult to achieve in the case of dams built to supply 
irrigation water, since this would necessarily presuppose that the principle 
of cost coverage had been implemented at the national level. Here we find 
a clear-cut linkage to national reforms in the agricultural and water sectors. 
Recommendations on development cooperation in transboundary water management 
German Development Institute 313 
In principle, it may be justifiable to provide financial support for river- and 
lake-basin organizations in the form of start-up funding for a given period 
of time and for the express purpose of tackling specific tasks. This would 
make it possible to provide financial support for weaker countries in ne-
gotiation processes; as an approach to initiating cooperation, financial 
support may also be justified as a means of paving the way for round-table 
talks; and the organizations concerned could also be provided financial 
support in working out agreements on organizational development and the 
building of management capacities. 
However, DC should also take steps to ensure that as soon as the organi-
zations concerned have reached a certain level of development and institu-
tionalization, the member countries gradually start taking over the costs of 
Box 1: Funding of organization work  
As far as negotiating bodies and coordinating committees are concerned, the 
member countries are obliged to pay for their own delegations and in given cases 
for external advisers as well. The costs for meetings are borne by the host coun-
try. In some cases international donors provide financial support for national 
delegations to make up for the unequal negotiating capacities of the member 
countries. 
No special funding agreements have been made for the technical advisory com-
mittees and advisory commissions investigated (e. g. the Okavango Commission 
and the Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee for the Maputo and the Inco-
mati). To fulfill their sizable tasks, (recommendations on technical, legal, organ-
izational, and other measures needed to promote the conclusion of comprehen-
sive water-cooperation projects), these organizations are reliant on external 
funding and ad hoc national appropriations if these tasks are not part of the re-
sponsibilities of national water administrations. 
As far as organizations with differentiated organizational structures are con-
cerned (e. g. the OMVS), the member countries are responsible for covering 
payroll costs and the costs incurred in carrying out operational tasks. Compre-
hensive tasks such as strategic planning, regulation, project implementation, data 
collection, and monitoring require substantial amounts of funding, which the 
member countries are also expected to raise. Different keys are used to determine 
the shares to be paid by individual member countries: (a) all member countries 
pay the same share; (b) the shares to be paid by individual member countries is 
keyed to the benefits accruing to them; (c) in some cases payments are adapted to 
the economic capacities of the member countries (with weaker countries paying 
less). 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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organization work. In view of the fact that the state of organizational de-
velopment and the spectrum of tasks of such organizations have a crucial 
influence on the operational costs of these organizations, DC has, in es-
sence, two possible points of departure in seeking to ensure that their fi-
nancial basis is sustainable: It can seek to influence both organization 
designs and development and the ways in which given tasks are ap-
proached. DC can also use the instrument of organizational development 
to seek to ensure that the staff levels of commissions are in line with their 
tasks, and it can introduce financial control mechanisms that render the 
uses to which the funds are put transparent both for both paying countries 
and donors. The example of the Niger Basin Authority is of some interest 
in this respect; the NBA has create an administrative and finance depart-
ment to which a finance and auditing unit reports.  
3.2.5 Recommendation five: Strengthen public participation 
in transboundary water management 
Compared with other issues, the question of "public participation" did not 
figure prominently in the terms of reference. It would, however, be worth 
looking into the issue in a separate study that distinguished between two 
different aspects: 
1. international public participation in transboundary river- or lake-basin 
organizations, and 
2. national public participation in cases in which a national catchment 
area is part of a transboundary river or lake basin. 
We find that as a rule there is no provision for a formal participation of the 
public, of interest groups, or of stakeholders in international river- or lake-
basin organizations; one exception here is the Zambezi River Commission. 
Some river- and lake-basin organizations do, however, involve certain 
segments of the public in certain programs or projects (see Box 2). These 
few examples show that approaches involving broader participation and 
transparency are indeed to be found on the African continent.  
Promotion of transboundary water management must do justice to the fact 
that governments and state machinery can raise no claim to have all of the 
skills and competence that go into the making of water management. Pre-
cisely in regions with weak statehood and weak administrative capacities, 
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it will prove necessary to pay far more attention to involving nonstate 
actors in transboundary water management, and this is unlikely to have 
any negative impacts on the (re)emergence of effective state structures. 
Promotion of public participation in transboundary organizations should 
be approached pragmatically and in ways adequate to the situation given. 
The reasons are obvious: The areas concerned are all very large river and 
lake basins with a good number of riparian countries. Government repre-
sentative in the organizations concerned may not be well disposed toward 
any engagement of civil society – or willing to accept such engagement 
only in certain phases of negotiations and on certain issues. The represen-
tatives to be appointed to transboundary organizations are generally re-
quired to have some sort of legitimacy. Participation, though, calls above 
all for supraregional coordination of and cooperation among local groups, 
interest organizations, etc. Such efforts are as a rule in need of organiza-
tional and financial support. 
The core aspect of any participation strategy is public access to informa-
tion and data, and this means that the organizations concerned must make 
relevant information available. Some of the older organizations, like the 
OMVS and the NBA, have up-to-date information sheets or websites. A 
second aspect, and one that assumes relevance only beginning at a certain 
level of organizational development and for measures for which decisions 
are pending, is concerned with the intensity of participation: Are groups 
representing the public given a hearing on certain decisions, and do they 
have a right to become involved in the decision-making process? In any 
case there is a need for formal arrangements governing who is to partici-
pate and for what purposes and who is bear the costs of such participation. 
Public participation, however, is also a question of capacities: In the river- 
and lake-basin organizations concerned, it would be essential to envision 
setting up an office or unit in charge of organizing the process of coopera-
tion on a continuous basis. Another important factor is the need to de-
velop, on a case-by-case basis, a number of different participation strate 
gies: e. g. involvement of international NGOs when it comes to interna-
tionally significant, sensitive ecosystems; participation of the local popu-
lation, whose interests are unlikely to be identical with those of NGOs; 
and creation of regional forums. DC can assume an active role in the de-
velopment of participation strategies. 
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DC could e. g. organize a workshop designed to discuss and make accessi-
ble experiences and best practices from developing countries and countries 
in transition and the experiences that European and North American coun-
tries have made on their own rivers and lakes (see Box 3). Such workshops 
Box 2: Participation in transboundary river management  
The OMVS' Environmental Observatory was set up as part of the Programme 
d’Atténuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l’Environnement. The Environmental 
Observatory is a network of governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
designed to bring together organizations and individuals that provide environ-
mental information. The Observatory has a central database designed to make 
data available and to publish them on a periodic basis. 
Another example is the Okavango Liaison Group, which was founded in 1996 as 
an NGO coalition and has since gained the right to active participation in trans-
boundary water management. 
A similar process can also be observed in the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority (LHDA), where national and international NGOs are speaking up for 
the concerns of the affected population. This has been formalized in a 
memorandum of understanding between the LHDA and the interest groups 
involved that provides for cooperation in certain areas. As regards environmental 
issues, recently more and more nonstate stakeholders have been included in the 
ZRA's work on the basis of a so-called Stakeholder Working Group. 
Stakeholder workshops have also been organized in the context of the Lake 
Victoria Environmental Management Project. 
Source: Complied by the authors 
Box 3: European experiences with participation 
The established international river commissions in Europe, including the interna-
tional commissions for the protection of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Danube, etc. 
grant universal access to information via their websites, while the commissions 
decide from case to case on who should have access to more special information 
and who should be consulted on what particular issues. As a rule the 
commissions grant observer status to NGOs and associations in certain 
commission bodies. These groups or organizations are required to meet certain 
conditions to attain observer status: They need to demonstrate that they have a 
general interest in water-related issues; the delegates who participate in 
commission meetings need to be elected by their memberships; and the groups or 
organizations concerned must themselves have the means they need to 
participate. 
Source: Compiled by the authors  
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should also make use of the experiences made with the ESPOO Conven-
tion on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
and possibly as well with the UN/ECE Helsinki Convention, which also 
includes countries in transition. 
3.2.6 Recommendation six: Strengthen donor coordination 
In view of the fact that as a general rule a good number of donor organiza-
tions tend to be engaged in various fields of action in a given river or lake 
basin,3 coordination among donor organizations and between donor 
organizations and riparian countries is a matter of great importance. 
Uncoordinated approaches can lead to activity overlaps, while other im-
portant fields are sidelined. On the other hand, coordination between do-
nors and riparian countries is called for in order to adapt possible support 
to the needs of these countries. Another element associated with uncoordi-
nated approaches has to do with donors who are engaged bilaterally in a 
river or lake basin, where in particular promotion of individual projects 
may entail transboundary impacts, and where a coordinated approach to 
capacity-building may generally be seen as reasonable. Coordination of 
capacity-building measures that include all riparians of a river or lake 
basin can serve to boost the effectiveness of river- and lake-basin organi-
zations. German DC should for this reason step up its efforts to create 
bodies in charge of coordinating activities in one catchment area.4  
To bring about more transparency, DC should undertake efforts to ensure 
that the both projects it supports and the relevant project documents are 
made publicly accessible. In a first step it could (like the World Bank) 
document its projects in detail on the Internet. This would be an important 
step, and one that would not be too costly. 
German DC could consider together with other donors whether and which 
other river basins and/or riparians could (should) be provided support. One 
                                                          
3  To cite two examples: over ten donors are presently engaged on Lake Victoria; the 
number for Lake Chad is over 15. 
4  With a view to coordinating its own policies, the BMZ formulates what is known as 
cooperation projects in which the GTZ and the KfW work together on the basis of a 
clearly defined division of tasks. 
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interesting river system is e. g. the Maputo-Incomati, where there are at 
present use conflicts between water-supply needs and the aim of protecting 
aquatic ecosystems. Efforts to find solutions to these conflicts are being 
supported by the EU and the Netherlands. The BMZ has commissioned the 
GTZ to examine the feasibility of an engagement in the Congo-Oubangui-
Sangha Basin. 
3.2.7 Recommendation seven: Extend cooperation to cover 
groundwater management 
Transboundary lake-basin management on Lake Victoria and Lake Chad has 
already come in for consideration by German DC. On Lake Chad we find 
clear-cut linkages with groundwater utilization. Often, regions with marked 
seasonal rainfall fluctuations that tend to be low when averaged over a 
number of years, i. e. whose surface waters do not offer sufficient supply 
security, do have, regardless of season, extensive groundwater resources that 
could be tapped. According to a UNESCO compilation, there are 38 
transboundary groundwater systems to be found in Africa. Many of these 
systems have not yet been properly explored and characterized, and there is 
thus is very little information available on their present state, i. e. on 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the groundwater availability there. 
The only cooperation projects that can be cited as examples here are found 
in northern Africa (the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, NSAS, shared by 
Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Chad, and the North-West Sahara Aquifer System, 
NWSAS, shared by Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia). Nevertheless, in many 
African countries such groundwater resources are being used increasingly 
for agriculture or water supply, for the most part without any consideration 
being given to the claims to use rights raised by other riparians. 
Groundwater resource management should therefore be accorded more 
attention; this could e. g. take on the form of efforts to standardize regional 
monitoring networks develop appropriate models. 
Because of the semi-arid and arid climate and the complex geological 
conditions often found on the continent, the regional boundaries of 
groundwater management areas (catchment areas) seldom coincide with the 
boundaries of river and lake basins. The BMZ should for this reason initiate 
steps to examine the feasibility of an African transboundary groundwater 
systems project. 
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